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Abstract
This dissertation studies antitrust issues in mergers, tacit collusion, and exclusive
discount. The second chapter evaluates the welfare effects of the 1997 merger between
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry with a
special emphasis on dynamic merger efficiencies. I develop an empirical model of multi-
product firms, allowing for both learning-by-doing and product innovation in the dynamic
game to quantify merger efficiency. The results show that the primary benefits from the
1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger come from accelerated learning-by-doing. Taking
account of all static and dynamic effects, net consumer surplus is found to have increased
by as much as $1.57 billion. In contrast, a static model ignoring dynamic learning-by-doing
and innovation predicts a consumer loss of $22.53 billion due to reduced competition. These
results provide important policy implications for antitrust practice by showing that ignoring
dynamic effects could possibly lead to biased results and erroneous conclusions with regard
to the welfare impact of a merger.
The third chapter models emergence of tacit collusion. In the context of an in-
finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, coauthor Joseph Harrington and I provide insights
demonstrating how cooperation is initiated when players cannot form explicit agreement,
ii
but signal and coordinate through their actions. We find the longer players have gone
without cooperating, the probability that they’ll cooperate in future diminishes. While the
probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that
cooperation never occurs.
In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I connect economic theory and antitrust
practice for exclusive discount by providing a structural empirical framework that is directly
applicable in antitrust practice. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate how to
apply the framework to empirically evaluate the impact of bundled or exclusive discount
under different market structures. The numerical analysis also suggests that the welfare
effects of bundled and exclusive discount are case specific. In addition, differences between
bundle and exclusive discount are important, as it is possible for either one to hurt consumers
while the other makes them better off.
Keywords: Dynamic Merger Efficiency, Aircraft, Learning-by-doing, Innovation,
Tacit Collusion, Cooperation, Bundled Discount, Exclusive Discount
JEL Classification: C72, C73, L13, L40, L44
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This dissertation contributes to the literature of antitrust economics. Chapters 2-4 are three
separate essays on mergers, tacit collusion, and exclusive discount, respectively. The second
chapter evaluates the welfare effects of the 1997 merger between Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas in the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry with a special emphasis on
dynamic merger efficiencies. I develop an empirical model of multi-product firms, allowing
for both learning-by-doing and product innovation in the dynamic game to quantify merger
efficiency. Merger efficiency from learning-by-doing is then disentangled from impact of
innovation and damages from reduced competition. The results show that the primary
benefits from the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger come from accelerated learning-
by-doing. Taking account of all static and dynamic effects, net consumer surplus is found
to have increased by as much as $1.57 billion. In contrast, a static model ignoring dynamic
learning-by-doing and innovation predicts a consumer loss of $22.53 billion due to reduced
competition. These results provide important policy implications for antitrust practice by
showing that ignoring dynamic effects could possibly lead to biased results and erroneous
conclusions with regard to the welfare impact of a merger.
The third chapter models emergence of tacit collusion. In the context of an infinitely
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, coauthor Joseph Harrington and I provide insights demon-
strating how cooperation is initiated when players cannot form explicit agreement, but signal
and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impa-
tient. Players are not informed of any other player’s type. An impatient type is incapable
of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types - and this is common knowledge
- then they can cooperate. The game is thus a process of learning and revealing information
on player types. Through repeated interactions, players update their beliefs about the type
of the other player, which determines their own probabilities of initiating cooperative plays
and revealing their types. We find the longer players have gone without cooperating, the
probability that they’ll cooperate in future diminishes. While the probability of cooperation
emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.
In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I connect economic theory and antitrust prac-
1
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tice for exclusive discount by providing a structural empirical framework that is directly
applicable in antitrust practice. In the model, I highlight the difference between product al-
ternatives and bundle alternatives and the difference between bundle discount and exclusive
discount. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate how to apply the framework
to empirically evaluate the impact of bundled or exclusive discount under different market
structures. The numerical analysis also suggests that the welfare effects of bundled and
exclusive discount are case specific. In addition, differences between bundle and exclusive
discount are important as it is possible for either one to hurt consumers while the other
makes them better off.
2
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2 Estimating Dynamic Merger Efficiencies with an Applica-
tion to the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger
2.1 Introduction
“A primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate
significant efficiencies... which may result in lower prices, improved quality,
enhanced service, or new products.” (2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines)
One of the central duties of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust
Division of the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is to evaluate the potential impact of
a merger between competing firms on the welfare of consumers. Mergers that would make
consumers worse off are either to be restructured in order to avoid such detrimental effects
or challenged and prevented. In light of the size and number of companies involved in
merger activity, the potential welfare impact is significant. As reported in the most recent
Hart Scott Rodino Annual Report, there were 1,450 proposed transactions involving large
companies in 2011, with a total capitalization of almost one trillion dollars.
In evaluating a prospective merger, the approach is to compare the pre-merger outcome
with a forecast of the post-merger outcome. This comparison typically takes the form of
comparing current prices with some projected prices if the merger were to occur. To gen-
erate that projection, it is common to hold firms’ costs and the quality of their products
fixed and to estimate what the impact on price would be if a firm’s assets were acquired by
a competitor. While there are some variants to this approach, for example, it may be rec-
ognized that some products would be removed or some immediate cost reductions realized,
the evaluation still takes the form of a short-run analysis. The fundamental question asked
is: what will happen to consumer welfare in the short-run in response to this merger?
It is well recognized, however, that the primary efficiencies from some mergers are likely
to be dynamic, as they are realized over time and are endogenous to firms’ decisions in
the post-merger environment. Such dynamic efficiencies can come from a reduction in
cost because of learning-by-doing or altered incentives to invest in reducing marginal cost,
from better products due to investment or adoption of new technologies, and from future
3
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entry and exit (perhaps involving additional mergers and acquisitions). For example, the
international hard drive disc (HDD) market has experienced a series of major mergers in
recent years. Maxtor and Samsung were acquired by Seagate in 2006 and 2011, respectively,
and Hitachi was sold to Western Digital in 2012. The most significant impact on consumer
welfare from this altered market structure may lie not with how it affects price in the short-
run but rather its impact on product cost and quality in the long-run. Will firms have
stronger or weaker incentives to invest and innovate? Effectively addressing such questions
is central to a proper evaluation of the welfare effects of these mergers.
Though dynamic efficiencies are well-recognized as potentially substantial, they have
not played a significant role in merger evaluation by antitrust authorities because of the
lack of methods for estimating these efficiencies.1 Furthermore, while we can speculate as
to what the dynamic welfare effects of a past merger might be, there has been little research
that actually estimates these effects. The primary objective of this paper is to contribute
to studies on these policy issues by quantifying dynamic efficiencies from the 1997 Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger. In achieving this, I develop an empirical model targeting the
aircraft industry and then compare efficiencies estimated using a dynamic model to those
estimated from a static model.
The empirical model encompasses two common dynamic forces relevant to industry
performance and thus to the evaluation of a merger: learning-by-doing2 and improvements
in product quality3. These forces are encompassed in a model with multi-product firms that
compete in an infinite-horizon dynamic game. In each period, a firm decides how much to
produce (which may be a vector of quantities if it has multiple products), while taking into
account its impact on current profit and its future profit stream through the effect of output
1The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines indicate that dynamic efficiencies, “such as those relating
to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification.”
2 Traditional industries benefiting from learning-by-doing include: aircraft, shipbuilding, semiconductors,
fuel cell vehicles, oil drilling, photovoltaics, machine tools, metal products, nuclear power plants, and chemi-
cal processing. Recent works in estimating learning-by-doing include Benkard (2000) for aircraft, Thompson
(2001) and Thompson (2007) for shipbuilding, and Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006) for surgical proce-
dures. See Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2010) for a complete list of learning-by-doing
estimation works.
3Competition in quality improvements is important in high technology industries, such as biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals, medical instruments, aircraft, automobiles, computer hardware and software, cell
phones, and game consoles. However, there are limited intra-industry empirical studies on relationships
between quality improvements and market competition. Examples include Goettler and Gordon (2011) and
Nosko (2010) for the CPU market, and Hashmi and Biesebroeck (2010) for automobiles.
4
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on the firm’s experience. Experience is a state variable that rises as a firm’s past output
accumulates (learning), but also depreciates over time (forgetting). Learning-by-doing is
modeled by having unit production cost be a decreasing function of experience. Also, a
firm’s production is allowed to have spillover effects with regards to experience accumulation
from that firm’s other products and also its competitors’ products; the magnitude of these
spillover effects are allowed to depend on ownership and product characteristics. In addition
to deciding how much to produce each period, a firm decides whether to invest in improving
the quality of its products. These potential product upgrades are exogenously generated
from outside of the industry. Adoption of an upgrade incurs a direct cost but also an indirect
cost through a setback in experience; for example, Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) found
for the automobile industry that “introducing a new model variant into production does
cause productivity setbacks.” For this setting, firms are assumed to behave according to
a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which they decide on production and upgrades in each
period given the state variables of firms’ experiences and product qualities, as well as given
the stochastic realization of market size, product characteristics, and upgrading costs.
Before moving on to specifics relating to the aircraft industry, let us consider the possible
welfare implications of a merger within this framework. A merger might hurt consumers
because reduced competition creates the incentive to restrict production and raise price; this
is the traditional market power effect. A merger might also generate dynamic efficiencies
in several ways through its impact on the evolution of production experience. First, there
is an immediate benefit in lowering marginal cost for products of the merged firm because
accumulated experience is shared; This is due to possible spillover of experience across
products, serving to lower cost, raise output, and elevate consumer welfare. Second, the
merged firm may choose to alter its product line, for example, by shutting down some of the
products of the acquired firm. Fewer products means less variety (which makes consumers
worse off) but also more output per product, implying faster experience accumulation,
lower unit cost, and lower future prices (which makes consumers better off). Third, future
experience might be more effectively shared between different products within the same
firm (within-firm spillover) than between different firms (across-firm spillover), which again
will produce lower costs after the merger.
5
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A second source of dynamic efficiency comes from altered incentives for quality im-
provements. The direction of this effect is ambiguous. After a merger, softened competition
could discourage innovation but enlarged market share may mean a bigger benefit from
a better quality product. which would stimulate incurring the fixed cost to innovate. If
quality improvements negatively impact experience and raise unit cost then this will further
complicate the evaluation. Assessing how these forces net out in terms of firm behavior and
consumer welfare will then require estimating parameters, solving the dynamic model for
equilibrium behavior, and simulating the industry path with and without a merger.
Having developed this empirical model, I then apply it to the medium-sized wide-bodied
aircraft industry to evaluate the 1997 merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Prior
to the merger, the market was occupied by three firms, Boeing, Airbus, and McDonnell
Douglas, who were producing four products (A330, A340, B777, and MD-11) in the medium-
sized wide-bodied aircraft market.4 Immediately after the merger, the new Boeing company
shut down production of MD-11. Manufacturing aircraft is labor-intensive and learning-by-
doing is commonly recognized as an important feature in the industry.5 Boeing 777 was
introduced only two years before the merger, with submodels of B777 arriving soon after
the merger. Thus, by ceasing production of MD-11, Boeing hoped to achieve lower marginal
cost more rapidly for its B777. Besides learning-by-doing, innovation through upgrades is
another distinct feature of the aircraft industry. New generations of aircraft were introduced
of higher quality. This was especially so after the September 11th attacks when petroleum
prices skyrocketed and airline demand for more fuel-efficient aircraft accelerated.
To evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, the dy-
namic model is solved for three different scenarios: (i) merger and the MD-11 is immediately
shut down (which is what actually occurred), (ii) merger with continued operation of the
MD-11, and (iii) no merger. The time series for price, consumer surplus, profit, and total
surplus was computed for all scenarios. To disentangle efficiency resulting from learning-by-
doing from efficiency due to quality improvements and the market power effect, I solved an
4The merger of the two companies affects the entire aircraft industry. However, I will focus on its impact
on the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry only, which can be viewed as an isolated market from
other aircraft industries as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
5The aircraft industry is the market where learning-by-doing was first recognized. See Wright (1936).
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additional model that does not allow for quality improvements and still another that does
not allow for either learning-by-doing or quality improvements. The results show that the
primary benefits from the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger come from accelerated
learning-by-doing rather than from a higher rate of innovation. Furthermore, the dynamic
efficiencies generated by the merger are large enough to exceed the static market power
effect, which is about $20 billion. Taking account of all static and dynamic effects, net
consumer surplus is found to have increased by as much as $1.57 billion. These results
show that ignoring dynamic effects can lead to biased results and erroneous conclusions
with regard to the welfare impact of a merger.
This paper is directly related to three lines of research: dynamic effects of a merger,
learning-by-doing in the aircraft industry and other industries, and dynamic innovations
within an industry. Gowrisankaran (1999) is one of the first papers that theoretically ex-
amined the dynamic effects of a merger. Performing numerical analysis within the Ericson-
Pakes framework (Ericson and Pakes (1995)), firms were modeled as choosing investment
to expand capacities dynamically, with endogenously generated mergers. Gowrisankaran
(1999) assumed marginal cost is fixed and common across firms. The impact of a merger on
consumer welfare was not a central issue in that paper. Chen (2009) also examined these
issues theoretically and had firms make dynamic investment decisions affecting capacity
accumulation, which impacted marginal cost over time. That analysis explored the bias
in static merger analysis when dynamic investment is ignored. Stahl (2009) estimated cost
and revenue parameters for the broadcast television industry, where costs were estimated as
residuals of firm behavior unexplained by revenues. That paper focuses on the consolidation
process itself rather than evaluating merger-generated efficiencies and thus does not solve
the dynamic oligopoly model. Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2010) evaluated the
medium- and long-run dynamic effects of airline mergers and explored the effect of mergers
on market structure rather than consumer welfare. Jeziorski (2011b) and Jeziorski (2011a)
studied merger impacts in the U.S. radio industry and took account of the markets being
two-sided. Jeziorski (2011b) compared listeners’ welfare increase from product variety with
the market power effect. Jeziorski (2011a) endogenized merger decisions and found that to-
tal cost savings from mergers outweighed the loss caused by increased market power. Nocke
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and Whinston (2010) provided a new theoretical framework to model dynamic merger de-
cisions where firms’ choice variables other than merger decisions are assumed to be static.
They derived conditions whereby an antitrust authority can maximize the present value of
consumer surplus by using a myopic merger review policy. I contribute to this line of re-
search by introducing a model that focuses on the endogenous dynamics of cost and product
quality.
The empirical learning-by-doing literature encompasses a wide array of industries. This
paper is most closely related to the pioneering research of Benkard (2000) and Benkard
(2004). Benkard (2000) introduced the concept of forgetting to explain the rise in cost for the
Lockheed L-1011, and Benkard (2004) allowed for a learning curve in a dynamic oligopoly
model with four single-product firms, estimating welfare under several counterfactual sce-
narios with a social planner and a monopoly. This paper follows this methodological path
but focuses on merger evaluation. I extend the empirical model to allow for multi-product
firms, dynamic quality improvements, and the spillover effect of learning curves. In my
model, merger efficiencies are likely to arise either through accumulation of experience due
to combining output and the spillover effect or through a higher probability of upgrading
products. Although the spillover effect of the learning curve has not been widely investigated
for the aircraft industry,6 it has been modeled and estimated for other industries, including
semiconductors (Irwin and Klenow (1994)), shipbuilding (Thornton and Thompson (2001)),
fuel cell vehicles (Schwoon (2008)), steel (Ohashi (2005)), and health care (Chandra and
Staiger (2007)). However, those papers are not targeted at evaluating mergers in the context
of a dynamic game, and none of them simultaneously estimated within-firm spillover and
across-firm spillover, which could be significant factors in calculating merger efficiencies.
With respect to the empirical literature on innovation, this paper is most closely related
to Goettler and Gordon (2011), which examines the microprocessor industry. Both Goettler
and Gordon (2011) and my work use the concept of a product’s quality relative to an outside
good whose quality is changing over time; this is a modeling device first proposed in Pakes
6Benkard (2000) modeled a submodel spillover effect among submodels of an aircraft type but no cross-
product or cross-firm spillover effect and a complete within-model spillover is assumed in Benkard (2004).
The international trade literature studies knowledge-spillover in the sense of technology transfer across
countries and across industries. See Grossman and Helpman (1995) for a review of that literature and Niosi
and Zhegu (2010) for a review of the aircraft industry specifically.
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and McGuire (1994). One major difference of my paper from that by Goettler and Gordon
(2011) is in the modeling of quality evolution of the outside good. Goettler and Gordon
(2011) fixed the difference in quality between the industry frontier product and the outside
good. Thus, in their model, the outside good upgrades automatically when the product
with the highest quality upgrades. In contrast, I let the quality upgrade of the outside good
be exogenous and evolve stochastically. Although it is appealing to endogenize outside good
evolution in a single-product firm model as in Goettler and Gordon (2011), their method
might not be suitable for multi-product aircraft manufacturers. Aircraft upgrades involve
inventions of new patented technology that are more likely to be shared within a firm. Thus,
it is less realistic to assume that when the frontier product upgrades, the good outside the
market receives the same technology and upgrades automatically while a same-firm product
does not. In addition, Goettler and Gordon (2011) focused on dynamic demand while fixing
marginal cost for any given relative quality, while I assume static demand and concentrate
on cost structure evolution.
In conclusion, I evaluate the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger in terms of its
impact on consumer welfare by constructing a dynamic oligopoly model for multi-product
firms with learning-by-doing and endogenous quality improvements. Allowing for both
the evolution of cost and product quality is new to the literature on dynamic oligopoly
equilibrium models. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a global view of the structural model. The data used for estimation and calibration is
reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 applies the structural model to the aircraft industry. Using
equilibrium strategies solved from the dynamic model, merger evaluation is conducted in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Model
This section describes the general dynamic framework that is the basis for the model to be
estimated for the aircraft industry. In describing the framework prior to putting forth the
empirical model, the intent is to give readers a global view of the decisions made by firms
and consumers and how the environment evolves. Then, in Section 4, this framework is
populated with the specific structure that will then be estimated.
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The model has multi-product firms with differentiated products that compete in both
quantities and qualities. Quantity choices affect dynamic market cost structure through the
mechanism of learning-by-doing while qualities are improved through innovation decisions
to replace old generations of products with the next generation of higher quality products
(which are exogenously produced). Thus, improvements in product quality are realized by a
generation upgrade. The model is applicable to many industries for which learning-by-doing
and innovation are important, including high technology manufacturing industries such as
aircraft, computer hardware, tablet, and smart phone.
The industry is composed of I multi-product firms competing in discrete time over an
infinite horizon. Firm i ∈ I = {1, ..., I} has a product set Ji and J is the union of Ji for all
i. Size of Ji and J, denoted by Ji and J , are thus number of products in firm i and in the
industry, respectively. Exit and entry on both firm and product level are assumed away.7
However, they can be easily incorporated in the model.8 Quantity of product j from firm i
at period t is denoted as qi,j,t, or simply as qj,t when there is no need to specify to which
firm the product belongs.
In the remainder of this section I discuss modeling of the demand function and produc-
tion cost function to be used when firms are making dynamic decisions. Then, I introduce
structures on generation upgrade decisions. The section is concluded with a description of
the dynamic game.
2.2.1 Demand Function
Demand is determined by both the market size M that follows an exogenous stochastic
process and characteristics of all products in the market. Characteristics of product j are
classified into 3 categories. Xj represents all fixed characteristics of product j. Gj is the
relative generation of product j, which measures product quality and evolves following
endogenous innovation decisions. (I will explain it more fully later.) Finally, ξj captures
characteristics unobserved to econometricians that evolve exogenously, such as product
suitability. Let X, G and ξ denotes the vector of Xj , Gj and ξj , respectively, of all products.
7See section 2.4.5.3 for a more detailed discussion on exit and entry.
8See Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) for an example of modeling exit and entry.
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It is assumed that consumers do not engage in intertemporal substitutions. Their choices
of demand are solely based on current period product characteristics. Therefore, I assume
that when (X, G, ξ) and an industry quantity vector Q is given in a period, the inverse
demand function P = P (Q;X,G, ξ,M) is single valued and taken as given for firms.
2.2.2 Production Cost Function
Production cost of product j in period t, Cj,t, is a function of quantity qj,t and experience
level Ej,t. Cj,t is assumed to be increasing in qj,t and decreasing in Ej,t. Thus, experience
helps to lower production cost. Ej,t itself is a function of the experience level from last
period Ej,t−1 and the quantity vector of last period Qt−1. I introduce Ej,t so that instead
of tracking the entire product history, I can just use Ej,t as a state variable in the dynamic
game. I restrict Ej,t to be increasing in both Ej,t−1 and any qk,t−1, ∀k ∈ J. This implies
that experience accumulates over time both through direct learning from production (qj,t)
and spillover from production of other goods (qk,t, k 6= j). Forgetting is incorporated in the





I assume that product innovation can be characterized into discrete generations, with higher
generations providing higher utility for consumers.9 For an industry with everlasting inno-
vations and infinite horizon, it is natural to believe that each product has infinitely many
generations gj ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. However, since the generation of each product is going to
be a state variable in the dynamic game, direct modeling of gj ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} will explode
the state space and make it empirically intractable. Also, it is too restrictive to assume
that there is some maximal level of generation. Therefore, to deal with this dimensionality
issue, quality is measured as quality relative to an outside good, where the outside good
stochastically improves over time, and the difference in quality between a firms’ product
and the outside good is bounded. Formally, relative quality is defined as
Gj,t = gj,t − g0,t
9See Section 2.4.4.1 for definition and reasoning for generation upgrades in the aircraft industry.
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where g0,t is the generation level of the outside good. Relative generation of all products
Gt is assumed to contain all of the information of gt that is relevant in determining the
demand function.
The model then tracks relative generations instead of absolute ones.10 This modeling
method helps to solve the dimensionality problem for industries where, given an appropriate
definition of generation, maximum relative generation is observed to be small. One example
of such an industry is the video game console market. A generation of the game console
is commonly defined by processor word-length (number of bits), and there has been hardly
more than one generation gap between actively produced game consoles at any time in
the history of the industry.11 Note that by treating Gj as a product characteristic, the
assumption that relative generation is sufficient in determining demand is consistent with
the discrete choice model of the demand system that is widely employed in the literature.
Thus, employing relative generation creates no loss of useful information in determining
demand.
I assume that g0,t advances each period with probability p
G.12 In the equilibrium, pG
determines the long-run industry innovation rate.
g0,t =
 g0,t−1 + 1 with probability p
G
g0,t−1 with probability 1− pG
(1)
Evolution of gj,t is controlled by joint upgrading decisions over all products of firm i owning
product j, denoted as Ui ∈ {0, 1}Ji . In each period, Ui is chosen to maximize total expected
value of the firm upon observing realization of a vector of random upgrading cost CGi for
all the products firm i owns. Let uj,t ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator of product j generation
upgrading in period t as a result of joint upgrading decisions, and let cGj,t be the realized
upgrading cost for product j in period t. The impact of uj,t can be summarized by the
10Given the assumption that only relative generation matters, Gj can always be normalized by subtracting
it from its observed mean.
11See a table of generations of game consoles in Liu (2010).
12If enough generation upgrading decisions at each state are observed, it would be better to let pG depend





 1→ pays c
G
j,t; gj,t = gj,t−1 + 1; Ej,t = ψ(Ej,t−1)
0→ pays 0; gj,t = gj,t−1; Ej,t = Ej,t−1
(2)
where ψ(x) is a given function, with the property ψ(x) < x, ∀ x, that models setback in
experience level when upgrading a product. Thus, when product j is upgraded in period
t, its generation will increase by 1 while incurring an upgrade cost of cGj,t and a setback in
experience to ψ(Ej,t−1).
2.2.4 Dynamic Game
For the dynamic game, each product has three states variables: experience level Ej , rel-
ative generation Gj , and unobserved characteristics ξj . The state of the industry is then
characterized by a state profile ω = (E,G, ξ,M), where M is the overall market size. Firm
i makes joint decisions in upgrading all its products, Ui, and in quantity choices of those
products, Qi. Each period in the game can be divided into three stages as follows:
• (i) Nature Stage
– Nature draws shocks on demand (M and ξ) and innovation of the outside good
(g0,t). All draws are immediately observed by all firms.
• (ii) Innovation/Upgrading Stage
– (ii.a) Firms learn their upgrading cost, which is private information.
– (ii.b) Firms simultaneously make adoption decisions (Ui). Resulting new gener-
ation levels of all products are immediately observed by all firms.
• (iii) Production and Learning Stage
– Firms compete in a simultaneous quantity competition game. Experience level
for each product is realized based on quantity choices and is revealed to all firms.
Note that experience state evolves in both stage (ii) and (iii), while generation state
changes in stage (i) and (ii). Quantity and upgrading decisions are made in different stages.
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Thus, expected future values need to be constructed differently when solving for optimal
quantity and upgrading policies. To deal with these complexity, I found it very helpful to
be specific about stages for ω. Hereafter, I will denote state profile at the beginning of
Stage (ii) as ω and the state profile at the beginning of Stage (iii) as ω̃.
For Stage (ii), since firms do not observe other firms’ realized upgrading costs and
upgrading choices when making their own decisions, they have to put probabilities
Prωk = Probability of choosing U
ω
k
on competitor k’s possible moves. In the following discussion on solving for Prωk , I drop
superscript ω on Ui for simplicity and all the discussions are with respect to a given state
profile ω. Denote firm i’s expected value, excluding upgrading cost, of choosing Ui as
EV Uii . EV
Ui
i is the summation of expected values across all products firm i owns and the
expectation is over other firms upgrading probabilities Prωk . Let Ui and U
′
i be two different
vectors of choices from the set {0, 1}Ji . The vector Ui will be chosen if it gives firm i
the largest net continuation value (expected future value less upgrade cost). Thus, the
probability of choosing the vector Ui is simply given by the probability of net continuation











i · U ′i),∀ U ′i 6= Ui] (3)
Note that by allowing firms to have multiple products, complications arise in that I need to
solve for joint probabilities for each firm, which may have multiple solutions. Fortunately,
introducing randomness in a separable form through upgrade cost guarantees a unique
solution that can be easily solved for Equation (3). The crucial point is that given Ui,
EV Uii is not a function of any cj . The proof can be found in the Appendix.
With equilibrium Prωi solved from Equation (3), I now turn to equilibrium quantity
choices. Since production affects future variable cost through its direct impact on experience
accumulation, production decisions for each period could no longer be modeled as static.
Quantities enter both the current profit function and the next period value function in the
14
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Bellman equation. Aside from this quantity effect on future costs, the per period game is
a quantity competition with heterogeneous goods and multi-product firms. The per period
payoff (profit) function for product j is
πω̃j = pj(Q;X,G, ξ,M)qj − Cj(qj ;Ej). (4)









where next period values are in prime terms. Value function for product j, denoted as V ω̃j ,
is then defined by the Bellman equation:




where ”∗” denotes value based on optimal quantity choices. The transition matrix for
calculating E[Vj(ω̃
′|ω̃, Q)] is left in the Appendix.





for each state profile ω̃. Note that I utilize the differentiation of ω and ω̃ here. I find that
tracking V ω̃j instead of V
ω
j makes computation much easier.
2.3 Data
Data utilized in this paper is taken from several sources. To obtain evidence on defining
medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft as a single market, I utilized route-level aircraft type
and traffic data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. This data reveals whether
medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft are mainly competing with each other on the routes they
fly.
In the application to the aircraft industry, I use a nested-logit discrete choice model
for the demand function. Annual fleet and deliveries data from the Airline Monitor are
taken to construct quantities for each aircraft type each year. Annual average aircraft
value data for each type is provided by Avmark and is used as plane prices. Market size is
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approximated by the total number of used and new wide-bodied aircraft using data from
the Airline Monitor. This choice of approximation is based on the resale and rental market
assumption discussed in Section 2.4.2 below. In the discrete choice model, the aircraft
are heterogeneous in characteristics, and the characteristics are collected from the official
websites of Boeing and Airbus, as well as various online sources. Characteristics include
number of seats, maximum range, number of engines, fuselage, empty operating weight,
and first flight year.
Prices need to be instrumented in the demand estimation since they are likely to be cor-
related with unobserved aircraft characteristics, which is the error term in the regression.
Assuming that observed characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved components,
characteristics are taken as one set of instruments. Cost shifters that are assumed to be
correlated with price but not with unobserved characteristics are taken as another set of in-
struments. Cost shifters used include present and lagged terms of U.S. manufacturing wage
rates from theBureau of Labor Statistics, and aluminium prices from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics Online Database.
Production cost estimation is decomposed into three steps. First, I estimate labor input
as a function of the production rate and experience. I utilize the data on direct man
hours incurred by Lockheed in the production of each L-1011 aircraft for labor input;13
The Jet Airliner Production List provides the first flight date of every wide-bodied aircraft
produced, which is taken as the date of production.14 Production rates and experience are
constructed using quantity data and date of production. Second, the relationship between
total variable costs and labor input is estimated also using data for the L-1011 program
taken from Benkard (2004). Third, maintenance costs of the L-1011 plants reported in
Lockheed’s annual reports are used to estimate fixed costs.
In labor input estimation, quantities are likely to be correlated with unobserved produc-
tivity. Thus, I instrument quantities using a set of cost and demand shifters that are assumed
to be correlated with quantities but not with unobserved productivity. Cost shifters are
identical to those used in demand estimation. Demand shifters include present and lagged
13I am grateful to C. Lanier Benkard for making this data available.
14The Jet Airliner Production List also has ownership history of all wide-bodied aircraft, which can be
used to calculate the rate of aircraft resale and rental.
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terms of world and regional GDP from IMF’s International Financial Statistics Online
Database and oil price data from the Energy Information Administration.
Generation upgrade-related parameters are calibrated based on data from several dif-
ference sources. Fuel efficiency data from the Airline Monitor and operating cost difference
claims reported in Boeing and Airbus newsletters are used to determine generations of air-
craft. Given the definition of generation, average time before generation upgrade can be
calculated using differences in first flight year across generations, which was obtained from
the Jet Airliner Production List. Upgrading probability is then the inverse of this average
time. Since generation is included as a characteristic in demand estimation, generation gap
is directly obtained from demand estimation. Finally, generation upgrade costs for various
aircraft models were collected from news clippings.
2.4 Empirical Application
In this section, I apply the model in Section 2.2 to the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft
industry. Depending on industry specifics and data availability, demand and cost functions
described in Section 2.2 are parameterized, and parameters in the model can be estimated
following at least two different approaches. First, parameters can be estimated directly in
the dynamic game. The common solution method is to first build a likelihood function or
moment conditions as functions of the parameters based on the data. Typical examples
of moments include average firm choices (price, investment, exit and entry, etc.) and co-
variances between a firm’s choices and a firm’s own states or rival firms’ states. Then one
solves a constrained maximization or minimization problem with respect to the likelihood
function or moment conditions by treating equilibrium conditions (Equations (3) and (5)) as
constraints. Thus, when the optimization problem is solved, optimal parameter values are
found together with the corresponding equilibrium of the dynamic game. Second, demand
and cost parameters can also be estimated separately in a first stage, and one assumes the
structures generating the estimates are unchanged in the dynamic model. The estimates are
then taken as primitives in solving for the equilibrium of the dynamic game. This latter ap-
proach is computationally less burdensome than the first approach since the dynamic game
only needs to be solved once, and there is no parameter searching in solving the dynamic
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game. However, it also requires more structure assumptions as discussed above.
Data availability can be a factor determining which approach is used. When observations
are serially correlated, the entire time series of a variable, for example the price of a product,
is just one observation of its evolution, which is affected by various shocks. Thus, if there
is only one market in the industry, as in the case of the aircraft industry being studied
here, there is just one observation for each variable to construct moment conditions or the
likelihood function. This limits both credibility and the number of moment conditions that
can be constructed. Hence, for this paper, I chose the second approach to evaluate the 1997
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger in the aircraft industry.15
For the rest of this section, some background information is provided regarding market
definition. Then, I present the specific empirical model of the demand and cost function for
the aircraft industry and discuss the estimated parameters. With demand and cost structure
introduced, I turn to discussions of definition and calibration of generation upgrade. I finish
this section with further analysis on applying the dynamic game to the medium-sized wide-
bodied aircraft industry.
2.4.1 Medium-Sized Wide-Bodied Aircraft as an Industry
A wide-bodied aircraft is a large jet airliner with two passenger aisles. (See Figure 1 for
interior arrangements of a typical 3-class-configuration wide-bodied aircraft.) Following the
introduction of the first wide-bodied aircraft, Boeing 747, in 1969, only four firms were
active in the industry. Of these four firms, Lockheed left the market in 1984. Nine wide-
bodied types were in production during the 1990-2010 period, yet they were not all directly
competing with each other due to differences in plane size and maximum flying range.
Figure 2 suggests that in terms of size and range, these nine aircraft types are clustered
into three groups: small (around 250 seats), medium (around 300 seats), and large (around
450 seats). The horizontal line in the figure marks the nautical distance between Beijing
and New York, and is used as a benchmark separating transatlantic and transpacific routes.
Differences in length of routes are continuous so this benchmark should only be viewed as a




guideline rather than a strict rule. However, we can see that, compared with small aircraft,
medium and large aircraft have longer range and are more suitable for transpacific routes.
The primary impact of the merger on market structure was the elimination of McDonnell
Douglas, whose only wide-bodied aircraft then in production was MD-11. Thus, I focus on
a sub-market of aircraft that directly competed with MD-11. That is, the medium-sized
group, which includes A330, A340, B777, and MD-11.
Other than those nine current types shown in Figure 2, Boeing introduced B787 in 2011
as a replacement of B777 and Airbus answered with A350, an upgrade of A330, that is
projected to enter the market in 2014. I treat B777 and A350 as new generation upgrades
of B777 and A330 respectively in the model. In this sense, there are more than one aircraft
model numbers (e.g. A330, A350) matching the same product in the model due to generation
upgrade. I will still call these products B777 and A330 for simplicity when there is no
ambiguity. Table 1 provides a summary of the important characteristics of the medium-
sized aircraft. MD-11 is the first product in the medium-sized sector while B777 is the
last to enter the market. Number of engines is an important characteristic because it is an
indicator of fuel efficiency. Twin-engine aircraft are generally more efficient than aircraft
with more engines.
To examine whether medium-sized aircraft can be treated as a single market, I collect
route level information and calculate the following ratio for each route:
medium-wide-ratio =
total number of flights of medium wide-bodied aircraft
total number of flights of any wide-bodied aircraft
(6)
If this ratio is close to 0, then it is a route where the medium-sized aircraft hardly
compete with other wide-bodied aircraft (small or large); if this ratio is close to 1, then it
is a route where other wide-bodied aircraft (small or large) hardly compete with medium-
sized ones. However, if this ratio is close to 0.5, then medium-sized aircraft are actively
competing with other wide-bodied aircraft on a given route. As such, a large proportion
of routes with the ratio close to either 0 or 1 would be supporting evidence for defining
medium-sized as a single market.
I observe monthly the total number of flights for each aircraft sub-model (e.g., Boeing
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777-200) on any U.S. domestic and international route during the 1990-2011 period. For each
month-aircraft-route observation, I also observe number of passengers, pound of freights,
distance of routes, and total flying time. I focus on those routes with at least one flight of
medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft and having distances longer than 1000 miles. I merge all
of the post-merger years data (1997-2011) and then only keep routes that have, on average,
at least 50 flights of any wide-bodied aircraft per year. All these steps are intended to
help me focus on medium-sized-related routes where wide-bodied aircraft are flying in a
nontrivial frequency. I also drop all non-jet observations, although they are not expected
to fly on a route where wide-bodied aircraft are also flying anyway.
I end up with 908 routes. Checking the medium-wide-ratio, I find:
1. 61.5% of the routes with medium−wide−ratio > 0.8 or medium−wide−ratio < 0.2;
2. 74.0% of the routes with medium−wide−ratio > 0.7 or medium−wide−ratio < 0.3;
Figure 3 demonstrates the distribution of the medium-wide-ratio.16 I also repeated the
above steps with several single year data sets and found similar results.
I present some typical examples of routes and their major aircraft:
1. New York, NY – Shanghai, China: A340, 55.0%; B777, 45.0%
2. Miami, FL – Cologne/Dusseldorf, Germany: A330, 73.9%; A340, 11.5%; MD-11, 5.8%
3. Dallas, TX – Osaka, Japan: B777, 82.1%; MD-11, 17.9%
These markets are exclusively served by medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft. In contrast,
typical routes with a medium-wide-ratio close to 0.5 are hub-to-hub domestic routes, e.g.,
Los Angeles to Chicago. Based on their product traits as reported in Figure 2 and demand
information as reported in Figure 3, the data supports treating medium-sized wide-bodied
aircraft as a well-defined market.
16The part of the density outside range [0, 1] in the figure corresponds to observations close to 0 and 1.
They are plotting bugs to be fixed. There are in fact many routes with medium − wide − ratio = 0 or 1.
The shape of the density would remain the same after fixing the bug, except that it would be a little bit
higher at 0 and 1.
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2.4.2 Demand Function Estimation
Following Benkard (2004), I model yearly aircraft demand using a nested logit discrete
choice model. The demand system is estimated with demand data for the period 1991-
2009. A total of 12 aircraft submodels (e.g. Boeing 777-200) were observed over the period,
leading to 113 submodel-year observations. Consumer a’s utility function of aircraft j at
time t is
vajt = ϕGjt +Xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt + ζagt + (1− σ)εajt, (7)
where Gjt is the plane generation level measuring quality. Impact of future generations
on demand is then modeled as differences in generations times ϕ. ϕ thus represents gaps
in quality between generations. Xjt are observed characteristics including seats, maximum
range, and number of engines. pjt is the average price for aircraft j in year t. All prices
are converted into 1994 U.S. dollars. ξjt is the unobserved component affecting demand.
Its variation captures variations in consumer preference over brand and plane characteris-
tics. Note that although characteristics are fixed for an aircraft, preference over brand or
certain characteristics might change across time due to shocks such as aircraft accidents or
expansion of an airline, which prefers a certain aircraft type. Since evolution of ξ is affected
by these exogenous shocks, I assume generation upgrade decisions do not affect evolution
of ξ. ζagt and εajt are respectively the random group- and plane- specific tastes. εajt is
an identically and independently extreme value. I allow for two groups in the model, one
includes all new medium-sized aircraft and the other includes only the outside good, which
stands for small or large wide-bodied aircraft and all of the old wide-bodied aircraft on
lease. σ ∈ [0, 1] represents the within-group correlation of utilities.
Each year is viewed as a market, and, as in Benkard (2004), the market size M is ap-
proximated by the total number of used and new wide-bodied aircraft. This approximation
is consistent with the assumption that all old and new aircraft are re-sold or rented out
each year.17 If a used aircraft did not change ownership in a year, it is viewed as bought
by the firm who owned it. In this sense, market size or total transaction each year equals
17Used aircraft trade and rental are very common. For example, almost every MD-11 airliner has changed
ownership or is owned by a leasing company.
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total number of used and new aircraft.
Consumer a chooses product j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J} in period t if vajt > vakt for all k 6= j,
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}. 0 denotes the outside good. Then integrating over the probability of
choosing product j for all consumers gives the well-known formula for the market share of




















Taking the logarithm and rearranging terms results in the following equation to be estimated
using two-stage least squares (2SLS):








Rearranging terms of Equation 8 gives the inverse demand function P = P (Q;X,G, ξ,M)
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Both price and within group share ln(sj/g,t) need to be instrumented in the demand es-
timation since they are likely to be correlated with unobserved aircraft characteristics ξjt
(the error term in the regression). Used instruments include: observed plane characteris-
tics, characteristics of other planes, hourly wage in manufacturing and its lagged terms,
price of aluminum and its lagged terms, and number of other products within the same
firm. Firm dummy variables were also tried but adding them did not improve estimation.
Observed plane characteristics and characteristics of other planes are taken as instruments
with the assumption that observed characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved
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components. Manufacturing wage and aluminum price are cost shifters for price and are
assumed to be orthogonal to ξjt. All these instruments are widely used in the literature
except for the number of other products within the same firm. Here I assume that number
of other products within the same firm is not correlated with unobserved characteristics of
a product. It is correlated with the price of a product because operating cost for an airline
(consumer) is generally lower if its fleet consists of a set of planes from the same firm. Thus,
a positive externality of products of a firm on other products in the same firm is expected.
σ is identified by covariation between the within-group market share of the plane sj/g,t and
its total market share sjt. It is also instrumented by the number of other products within
the same firm.
I also tried adding in other independent variables, including fuselage, first delivery year,
and firm dummies, but all those variables have very small and insignificant coefficients.
Besides, removing and adding them have almost no impact on estimation results.
The estimates for Equation (8) without and with the generation term G are reported




the percentage change of the market share ratio of product j relative to the outside good.
All parameters are significant when generation G is not included in the regression. Signs
of all estimates are as expected. Price has a significant negative influence on market share.
Within group utility correlation σ is close to 1. Together with the comparatively larger
price coefficient, it indicates high cross-product elasticities and that inside goods are closer
substitutes to each other than to the outside good. The number of engines has negative
effect since aircraft with fewer engines generally have higher fuel efficiency. All other factors
equal (including price), airlines prefer larger planes and planes with longer range.
The last column in both tables presents standard errors of data observation as indica-
tors of variations in the explanatory variables. Having data variation helps to determine
relative importance of characteristics. For instance, in Table 2, the coefficient on maximum
range (“range/10000”) is estimated to be 2.04, which in absolute value is about three times
as large as that of the number of engines. But the ratio of potential variation of the two
characteristics is about 2/9th. Putting the coefficient and data variation together, the num-
ber of engines generally has a larger contribution to the differences in market share across
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products than the maximum range does. For example, take the characteristics of A330 and
A340 presented in Table 1. The difference in maximum range is 0.2 ten thousand kilometers
while the difference in the number of engines is 2, or ten times larger. Hence, combining
the information from the first and last column, the number of engines contributes the most
to market share differences among characteristics when generation G is not included. Dom-
inance of the number of engines is understandable since it is correlated with fuel efficiency,
which is a major factor in operating cost. This is also supported by the observed trend of
twin-engine aircraft replacing those with three or four engines for medium-sized and small-
sized wide-bodied aircraft. (With respect to the two non-twin-engine medium-sized aircraft,
MD-11 was shut down after the merger and A340 experienced a low production rate in its
life and ceased production in 2011.)
When generation G is taken into account, it explains most variations contributed by the
characteristics, rendering them insignificant. The estimate on G suggests a 12% increase in
market share ratio when generation is upgraded. As to be discussed in Section 2.4.4.1, gen-
eration differences represents differences in operating costs for airlines. Therefore, the fact
that generation G has the strongest impact among characteristics (considering data varia-
tion) on market share emphasizes the important role of emphasizes the important role that
airline’s operating cost concern has in determining competition in aircraft manufacturing.
2.4.3 Cost Function Estimation
As with many other manufacturing industries, major variations in the unit cost of assem-
bling an aircraft are attributable to variations in labor inputs (L). Thus, I model total
variable cost (TV C) as a linear function of labor inputs L. Lockheed L-1011 is the only
aircraft type that I can observe unit labor cost. I first estimate the learning curve of L-1011
and employ estimates on its total variable cost function from Benkard (2004). Benkard
found the wage rate had been quite flat and fixed it at $20/hour. Labor cost is then this
wage rate times labor inputs L. Regressing total variable cost on total labor cost gives
TV CL−1011 = 36.2 + 0.12LL−1011.
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where TV CL−1011 is in 1994 dollar millions and LL−1011 is labor inputs based on L-1011
estimates and is in 1000 man-hours.
To get the cost function of other products based on that of Lockheed L-1011, I follow the
approach in the literature by assuming labor requirements per pound of aircraft is constant
across planes.18 Thus the cost function of product j can be derived from its weight ratio
to L-1011, denoted as rj . Total variable cost for product j is then calculated in the model
using
TV Cj = 36.2 + 0.12rjLj .
19
I will discuss the learning curve, Lj as a function of industry quantity vector Q and product
experience level Ej , in the next section.
Fixed cost is estimated to be $200 million per year based on Lockheed’s annual report on
L-1011. It is a strong assumption to speculate that fixed cost is the same across products,
but fixed cost has no impact on either prices or consumer surplus in a model without exit
and entry. I keep fixed cost in the model only for quantifying firms’ profits.
2.4.3.1 Labor Input Function
The learning curve describes the commonly observed negative relationship between accu-
mulated production and unit labor input requirements in aircraft and many other manu-
facturing industries. It is decomposed into two equations in my model: labor input as a
function of experience and experience as a function of current and past quantities. I will
discuss the labor input function in this section and the experience accumulation function
in the next one.
Following Benkard (2000), the log unit labor input requirement function for product j
18As Benkard (2004) pointed out, although there is no empirical evidence testing whether commercial
aircraft share learning curves, literature on military production does suggest that parameters do not vary
much across production lines. Further discussion on this issue can be found in Benkard (2004).
19I also estimated rj using the first approach described in the beginning of this section for the model
without generation upgrade. Specifically, I use difference between estimated and observed average prices
as the moment condition. The estimated prices are solved from the dynamic game for each trial of rj in
searching for optimal rj . Mimimization is carried out using KNITRO solver with its global multi-start
search. I found using the weight ratio as rj is optimal and cannot be improved.
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produced at time t is estimated based on the following regression:
lnLj,t = lnA+ γ1lnEj,t + γ2lnSj,t + εj,t. (10)
where A is the intercept and S = 127
∑τ=t+3
τ=t−3 qτ is the line speed or production rate commonly
included in the engineering literature.20 As a summation of recent quantities, line speed
S is endogenous and needs to be instrumented. γ2 > 1 implies decreasing returns to scale
while γ2 < 1 implies increasing returns to scale. There is no clear implications of γ2
without estimation since productivity of labor depends on the level of capital in the short-
run. Dependence of L on experience level E highlights the learning-by-doing feature. The
learning, forgetting, and spillover effect on marginal cost is then modeled as the impact of
industry quantity vector Q on the evolution of experience E.
2.4.3.2 Experience Transition Function
When there is no spillover of experience across production, experience accumulation is
commonly modeled as
Ej,t+1 = δEj,t + qj,t. (11)
in the literature, where learning is reflected by the positive relation between Ej,t+1 and qt,
and forgetting is modeled as 0 < δ < 1. Thus, experience accumulates as more aircraft are
produced but also depreciates due to organizational forgetting.
I further allow a spillover effect: experience may also accumulate through production
of other products. Thus, Ej,t+1 will be a function of the entire industry quantity vector
Qt. For product j, I let the contribution rate of different products on Ej,t+1 be different
in two dimensions: ownership and resemblance in aircraft characteristics. The experience
transition function becomes
Ej,t+1 = δEj,t +
J∑
j′
θj′f(Xj , Xj′ ; υ)qj′,t,
21 (12)
20Equation 10 can be derived from a production function with fixed capital taking the Leontief form in
labor and materials. See details in Benkard (2000).
21The spillover effects measured by the parameters here are net effects in the sense that increases in






1 if j = j′ (i.e. on own production)
θ1 if j
′ is a different submodel of j
θ2 if j
′ is a different product in the same firm
θ3 if j
′ is a product from another firm
(13)
measures the difference of across-firm spillover and within-firm spillover (θ3 − θ2) when
products are homogeneous in characteristics. Submodels (for θ1) are variations of a product.
For example, for product A330, there are two variations, A330-200 and A330-300, which
have slight differences in seats, range, and other characteristics.
f(Xj , Xj′ ; υ) is a product distance function. I use two characteristics: number of seats
and maximum ranges.22 Specific functional form of f(Xj , Xj′ ; υ) is then







where 1 stands for “number of seats” and 2 for “maximum range,” υ1, υ2 ∈ (0, 1); dx1 and
dx2 are the maximum difference set to normalize the differences into [0, 1]. Note that from
Equation (12) and (14), the larger the difference is for a given υ, the smaller the spillover
effect; υk close to 0 implies that characteristic k has a strong impact, while υk close to 1
suggests that characteristic k has little impact on the spillover rate.
By substituting Equation (12) into (10), I use a GMM method to estimate all the
learning curve parameters in these two equations based on monthly data of L-1011.23 Note
that εj,t represents the unobserved part of productivity and could be serially correlated.
Since productivity interacts with choice of line speed, S, and experience accumulation, E,
εj,t could also correlate with both E and S. Following Benkard (2000), the solution is
a GMM-HAC (Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent) estimator suggested by
Andrews (1991). The instrument variables are standard: demand shifters include various
world GDP measures, the price of oil, and a time trend; cost shifters consist of the world
the parameters represents net effects of experience spillover and labor market competition.
22I tried fuselage and some other characteristics and the results did not change significantly.
23Due to the special connections between L-1011 and McDonnell Douglas’s DC-10, I treat DC-10 as a
within firm product for L-1011 in estimation. A detailed discussion on this choice is given in the Appendix.
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aluminum price and the U.S. manufacturing wage rate.24 Other than time trend, all shifters
include both present and lagged variables.
Although an instrumental variable that specifically shifts quantity of each aircraft type
is not necessary for identification, it would be helpful to have instruments that affect quan-
tities of different types disproportionally. Thus, I include another two sets of instrumental
variables. First, I use GDP growth of various regions because different regions have dif-
ferent demands for various aircraft types and brands.25 Second, I use the weighted sum
of all jet accidents and incidents of a firm for the previous 18 months, with less weight on
narrow-bodied aircraft and freighters, divided by total aircraft in service in the same firm.
See Figure 4 for an example of the negative correlation of Boeing’s accidents index and
quantities produced.
Parameter estimates of the learning curve are given in the first two columns of Table 4.
Both characteristics have little impact on spillover (υ close to 1). Thus, I estimate another
learning curve without characteristics as in Equation (15), and the result is given in the
last two columns of Table 4.




Estimates are close in both cases since characteristics effects are estimated to be trivial.
I drop characteristics and use Equation (15) in the dynamic part. R2 of the estimation
is 0.92. Estimated and actual labor input of each L-1011 is plotted in Figure 5. The
estimates fit the data well, so I decided it is safe to ignore cost shock εj,t in the dynamic
game. All estimates are significant except for returns to scale. The exponential of the
labor cost intercept measures the unit labor requirement for the first aircraft built. As
discussed before, I will make this starting level different for different models based on their
weight ratios to L-1011. Thus, the shape of the learning curve is assumed to be the same
while levels are permitted to be different. There is a 55% labor savings when experience
24For a detailed discussion on choices of these instrumental variables, see Benkard (2000).
25Cited in a Wall Street Journal article ”Boeing Ups Forecast For Commercial Aircraft Demand Over 20
Years” published on June 16, 2011, Randy Tinseth, Vice President for marketing at Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, said, ”Economic growth, world trade and liberalization” are ”the fundamental drivers of air
travel” and correspondingly aircraft demand.
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doubles. This seemingly large learning rate is partly offset by a high yearly forgetting
rate at 43%(= 1 − 0.954912). Forty-three percent of experience is lost every year, making
it difficult to double experience especially when experience stock is already high. This
seemingly high forgetting rate is related to the relatively low aircraft production rate and
customized configurations for each aircraft built. In manufacturing aircraft, assembling
works repeat at a low rate and tasks are hardly ever identical. In addition, experience
measures a firm’s level of human capital rather than skills of each single worker. Thus,
frequent turnovers due to layoffs and promotions also imply a high forgetting rate.26 Both
the high learning rate and forgetting rate imply large benefits to produce more oneself and
to force one’s rivals to produce less. Dynamically, there will be fierce competition among
firms to reach and maintain high output and experience levels, while attempting to force
others to be stuck at low output and experience.
Submodel spillover is almost complete (θ1 = 0.9742). Given this result, along with the
fact that demand related characteristics are close among submodels, I decide not to differen-
tiate submodels in the dynamic game. There is almost no cross-firm spillover (θ3 = 0.0182).
This is understandable since experience is believed to be mainly accumulated through re-
peated practice of workers. Within-firm spillover is about a quarter (θ2 = 0.2408), indicating
that building four aircraft of a different type is as helpful in experience accumulation as
assembling one of the same type for a multi-product firm. Note that the large difference
between within-firm and cross-firm spillover suggests potential benefits when firms merge
and ownership structure changes if the within-firm spillover rate does not vary much on
properties beyond ownership.27
26This forgetting rate is close to the 39% forgetting rate estimated in Benkard (2000). See Benkard for
further discussion on the high forgetting rate.
27Several circumstances contribute to a large within-firm spillover effect. First, internal shifts of the
workforce are much easier than shifts across firms, and a firm may reallocate workers among different
departments to improve efficiency. Second, internal shifts help firms to avoid organizational forgetting by
keeping workforce busy assembling other models when demand for a certain model is temporarily low.
Furthermore, managerial ability and labor-cost-related production techniques usually can be shared only
within a firm, either due to firm differences or the need to keep business secrets.
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2.4.3.3 Discretization of Experience
With estimates given in Table 4, next period experience can be calculated using Equation
(15) for given experience and quantities of all products in a period. Experience defined in
Equation (15) is a continuous variable. To apply it as a state variable in the dynamic game,
I discretize the experience variable for each product into 7 grids:
E = {1, 10, 20, 40, 70, 110, 165} .
I use Ek to denote experience at the kth grid. (e.g., E2 = 10.) With enough grids, the
experience process can be approximated arbitrarily well. I will explore that more in Section
2.4.5.2.
I denote the experience level resulting from Equation (15) as E∗j,t+1, namely,














Euj is the smallest grid in E larger than E∗j,t+1, and Edj is the largest grid smaller than




j also depend on quantity Qt.
2.4.4 Generation Upgrade
In this subsection, I first present how generation is defined in the wide-bodied aircraft
industry. Then I discuss employment of relative vs. absolute generation for the medium-




2.4.4.1 Generation and Generation Upgrade
Ideally, I would treat each new aircraft type as a new product and allow a specific new
vector of characteristics for it. However, it is impossible to do so as we do not observe
characteristics of products not yet introduced. Instead, I categorize aircraft by generations
according to some criteria. Average generation gap ϕ is estimated in Section 2.4.2. Note
that for the purpose of quantifying the merger effect on expected future welfare and the
upgrade rate, knowing the average generation gap is sufficient.
There are many ways to define a generation of a jet airliner. Loosely speaking, a new
generation has substantial demand-side advantages attributed to more desirable character-
istics over the old generation. Empirically, one simple way is to treat each aircraft submodel
(e.g. the Airbus 330-200) as a new generation. However, differences between some types of
aircraft are quite distinctive from the differences between other types. New aircraft type and
submodels have been introduced to provide longer range, different options in size, higher
fuel efficiency, lower CO2 emission, etc. These variations create discrepancies in defining
a new generation as any new model introduced. In addition, the demand effect of some
new models are small and defining every small changes as a new generation will result in
too many possible relative generation levels that again causes the dimensionality problem.
Definition of generation needs to be applicable as well as capturing major demand effects.
The wide-bodied aircraft industry had evolved for 28 years before the merger and there
was no room left for firms to introduce new aircraft with range or plane size meeting the
market demand that is not yet covered by an existing type. Models introduced after the
1997 merger were generally driven by concern over operating cost.28 Hence, I define a new
generation of aircraft family as one that provides at least 5% lower operating cost for air-
lines. In the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft market, introduction of Boeing 777, 787,
and Airbus A350 are treated as new generations according to this definition.29
Upgrade in generation may also involve a huge amount of one-time development cost
and the lowering of experience level due to adjustments in production procedures. Thus,
28This is confirmed by discussions with Edmund S. Greenslet, an aircraft industry expert, and publisher
of The Airline Monitor.
29B787 and A350 are new generations of B777 and A330, respectively.
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generation upgrade provides a second source of experience setback other than organizational
forgetting. As discussed above, since a product will have different characteristics when its
generation is upgraded, its experience level will be lower as workers and technicians will
not be familiar with the new specification; it takes practices to figure out new mechanisms
that suit the new generation. One such evidence is the temporary rise in labor requirement
for the introduction of Lockheed’s L-1011-500.30 Figure 6 plots labor input (in 1000 man
hours) for each L-1011 built. There were only minor changes in characteristics involved
in the introduction of the L-1011-500, which does not even qualified as a new generation
according to our definition. However, we can still see a clear cost rise for the first two L-1011-
500 aircraft produced in the figure. Following the initial rise, the -500 type required a slightly
higher labor input and the difference vanished eventually. Vanished difference suggests that
the initial cost rise for the -500 type is not due to a systematically higher cost requirement
but resulting from a temporary lowering of experience due to the introduction of new types.
The detrimental effect of innovation on experience accumulation is also supported by the
work of Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) in the automobile industry as discussed in the
introduction. I will discuss the calibration of upgrading cost and determination of experience
setback later in this section.
2.4.4.2 Relative vs. Absolute Generation
A modeling obstacle of introducing generation upgrade into a dynamic game is that gener-
ation itself needs to be a state variable for each product, and it is implausible to assume
that the highest generation exists. In fact, even if I assume there is a highest generation
level, there are at least two problems. First, existence of the highest level implies that
the dynamic mechanism in generation is lost when all products reach the highest level.
Second, it is impossible to limit possible generations to a small number, which leads to a
dimensionality problem.
I choose to deal with the dimensionality problem by assuming that only relative quality
(or generation) matters in determining the individual demand function for each product.
Therefore, I can use the pace of evolution of the outside good as a benchmark, and track
30Benkard (2000) also published the same finding.
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only the generation difference of each product relative to the outside good.31 More precisely,
the benchmark is the average difference between the inside goods and the outside good in
generation. Thus, generation state G in the model is the difference from that benchmark
average difference. Because I observe no more than 2 generation lags among all inside goods
(new medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft), I model the generation difference state variable
Gj ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, where −1 denotes one generation behind the average difference between
inside and outside goods and 1 denotes one generation ahead of it. In this sense, fixing
product and product characteristics is equivalent to assuming that the inside goods and the
outside good have the same pace of technology improvement. In modeling, this is to fix
generation difference state variables for all products at 0.
Theoretically, the outside good is a composition of any products that can be viewed by
some consumers as substitutes of the products in the market. Therefore, with respect to
the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry, the outside good could consist of old wide-
bodied aircraft for sale and new non-medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft and even narrow-
bodied aircraft. Different components have different importance in terms of their degree of
substitutions to the inside goods.
Since production decisions on non-medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft are also made by
Airbus and Boeing, the evolution of the outside good is partially endogenous. However, the
event of relative generation downgrade of all inside goods has broader interpretations than
the generation upgrade of the outside good. Examining Equation (9) infers that downgrade
of Gj for all inside goods is equivalent to any permanent negative shock on overall demand
that lowers prices for all products by ϕα . For the evolution of demand and generations in
an industry, by simply observing the evolution itself, it cannot be determined whether it is
driven by innovations in the outside good or by a permanent negative demand shock. In
fact, there is no need to make such distinctions in determining generation evolution of the
inside goods. For the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry, generation upgrade is
mainly driven by macro economic shocks (e.g., the desire for better fuel efficiency due to ris-
ing petroleum prices after the September 11th attack), increasing demand for international
31The idea of relative generation is originated from relative quality modeled in Pakes and McGuire (1994)
and is similar to that in Goettler and Gordon (2011). See further discussion in the introduction.
33
ZHAO: Chapter 2
travel qualities, and increased supply in related markets. For example, Chinese manufac-
turers recently entered the narrow-bodied aircraft industry. This event is equivalent to the
outside good moving to a new generation in the sense that both will permanently shift de-
mand away from the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry and stimulate Boeing and
Airbus to innovate for more attractive planes. All these mechanisms are exogenous to the
medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry; hence, evolution of the market-wide generation
downgrade can be treated as exogenous.
2.4.4.3 Generation Related Parameters
I first specify distribution of upgrading cost cGj and experience setback function ψ(E) for
applying the model to the aircraft industry. cGj is assumed to be drawn from a uniform
distribution U [Cd, Cu].32 The largest and smallest development cost of recent new aircraft
models and submodels are chosen as Cd = 330 and Cu = 614 (in 1994 dollar millions).
The experience setback function ψ(E) is more difficult as estimating it in the first stage
requires observation of a products’s unit labor requirement and generation upgrade choices.
Experience setback in L-1011-500 provides a lower bound of setback magnitude, but I do
not have sufficient data to pin down a specific value. The strategy is to assume generation
upgrades setback experience by nG grids for the discrete experience state introduced in
Section 2.4.3.3. That is,
Ej,t = ψ(Ej,t−1) = min{Eg−nG , E1}, (17)
where Eg is the discretized grid that Ej lands on with g ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7}. Varying nG would
demonstrate impact of setback magnitude on firm behaviors. In the merger evaluation,
because there are not enough instances of generation upgrade observed to fully estimate the
upgrade cost, I set nG = 1.
33
Finally, pG, which also represents the industry long-run innovation rate, is obtained as
32I can also model CG as a choice variable rather than a random draw. Randomness is then introduced
through probability of success generation advance, which increases with upgrading cost. Although this
alterative is more common in the literature, it is less attractive for the aircraft industry since larger investment
in aircraft development is realized over time and is generally related to unexpected difficulties in development
rather than higher probability of success.
33I also tried setting nG to 0 or 2 and found no significant differences in quantifying merger efficiencies.
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the inverse of the average years across product before generation advances, which is 10.75.
Thus, pG = 1/10.75 = 0.09.
2.4.5 Dynamic Game Specifics
In this sub-section, I explore three issues related to the dynamic game. First, the preference
rank state variable is examined in its role to reduce the state space and lessening the
computational burden. It can be employed in a dynamic game of any industry with many
products that can be grouped into limited categories based on unobserved characteristics.
Second, I provide a test with respect to concerns on sensitivity of choices of discretization
of the state variables. I conclude this part with arguments on why exit and entry need not
to be directly modeled for the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry. Those readers
who are not interested in these issues may want to skip to Section 5.
2.4.5.1 State of Preference Rank
Demand estimation provides a panel data of unobserved characteristics ξ of all products.
Fluctuation in ξ represents changes in consumer taste driven by exogenous fluctuation in
various sources, such as important accidents or technological problems specific to a product
or a firm, personnel changes in important airlines, operating-cost-related macroeconomic
shocks that lead to preference of twin-engine aircraft, and the temporary spur in interna-
tional travel driven by the business cycle that makes relatively larger planes more attractive,
etc. Ideally, I would model this exogenous fluctuation in ξ by allowing ξj to be a state vari-
able for each product and then estimate its stochastic process using cell means. However,
adding in one more state variable for each product results in the well-known “curse of di-
mensionality” problem. Figure 7 provides a histogram of percentile prediction error for the
market share ratio sshare. Predictions errors are smaller than 3 percent for most observa-
tions and smaller than 10 percent for all. This suggests that the error term ξ is marginal
in explaining variations in market share in demand estimation.34 So to save computational
power for more important aspects, I compromise by putting restrictions on joint transitions
34The impact of ξ on quantity prediction is relatively large, but the majority of the prediction error is still
less than 15% as in Figure 8.
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of all ξj and introduce the preference rank state variable discussed below.
For the model of the medium-sized wide-bodied aircraft industry, macroeconomic shocks
influencing the entire market are captured by market size state variable M ; change in
product qualities are captured by the generation upgrade decision; observed differences in
characteristics are captured by X. Suitability is not an important issue when working with
the medium-sized market instead of the entire wide-bodied market. Then, variation in ξ is
most likely driven by two other factors: variation in preference over the more fuel efficient
twin-engine types and variation in preference over firm brands. Therefore, I assume that
variation in ξj , denoted as ∆ξj , can be decomposed into two additive parts that evolve
independently, with
ξj = ξj + w
T
j · κTj + wFj · κFj , (18)
where
• ξj is mean value of time series ξj ;
• wFj and wTj are given weights;
• κTj is variation of preference over twin-engine types; and
• κFj is variation of preference between Boeing and Airbus products.
κTj and κ
F
j are preference rank state variables used in the dynamic game. κ
T
j is common
among twin-engine types and κFj takes the same value for products of the same firm. I
denote the vectors of κTj and κ
F
j for all types and all firms as κ
T and κF , respectively. Thus,
the lengths of both vectors depend on the number of firms/types instead of the number of
products. For example, κT is of length 2 because I have two types: “twin-engines” and
“not-twin-engines.” The two vectors κT and κF are preference rank state variables in the
dynamic game and evolve stochastically over time.35 In the dynamic game, I allow each
vector to take on two possible values. Specifically, κT = κT1 is the vector for state where
35Note that transition of the preference rank state variable is over the entire vector κT instead of each
element of it. This further reduces the number of state variables. The idea behind this is that demand is
determined by relative ξj among products. Thus, relative preference over firms and types captures major
information of its absolute value counterpart. Finally, note that variation of preference of product j relative
to the outside good is captured by the variation of market size M .
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twin-engine aircraft are relatively preferred while κT = κT0 is the vector when they are less
attractive. Similarly, κF = κF1 when Airbus is preferred while κF = κF0 when Boeing is
preferred.









and transitions of κT and κF are calibrated as follows:
1. ξj is calibrated as the mean of time series ξjt and variation in ξ is calculated as
∆ξjt = ξjt − ξj .
2. Among the four products in the model, A330 and A340 are of the same firm but only
A330 is a twin-engine. Based on Equation (18), differences in series of ∆ξA330 and
∆ξA340 come from engine-difference only. κ
T and its transition are calibrated as
(a) For each time t, if ∆ξA330,t ≥ ∆ξA340,t, κTt = κT1. Otherwise, κTt = κT0.
(b) Using the time series of κTt from (a), its transition matrix is then estimated in
the usual way of a Markov chain.
(c) Value of κT1 is chosen as the conditional mean ((∆ξA330,∆ξA330)|∆ξA330,t ≥
∆ξA340,t).
36 The same applies to κT0.
3. κF and its transition are calibrated similarly using the time series of ∆ξA330 and
∆ξB777, both of which have two engines.
37
4. wTj and w
F
j are chosen to minimize the distance between observed and calibrated
panel of ∆ξ.
Figure 9 demonstrates the fit of data for ξ calibrated from Equation 18 (labeled as
“Rank”) and for having a binary state variable for each ξj (labeled as “Cell”). The prefer-
ence rank approach is able to provide better predictions for transitions and no worse fitting
in values, while reducing the size of the state space. Parameters and transition matrices
estimated are given in Table 5.
36If there is more than one product of the same type, quantity weighted means can be used instead.
37Value of κFMD11 is also conditional on whether Airbus or Boeing is preferred. I tried to allow preferences
rank states over three firms, but did not find much difference.
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Recall that ξ represents airline preference over brand and characteristics. Although it
is reasonable to assume that a merger does not affect airline preference over characteristics,
it certainly changes product ownership. This creates problems on how one should adjust ξj
if it were modeled as a state variable with its transition estimated based on its own time
series. However, with the introduction of the preference rank state variable, the merger’s
impact on ξj through ownership change is directly captured by κ
F
j in Equation (18).
2.4.5.2 Sensitivity of Discretization
Both experience state variable E and market size state variable M are discretized. Solving
quantity choices at all state profiles can be viewed as a non-parametric approximation of the
underlying equilibrium function from state space to policy space. Then a natural question
is whether I have chosen enough number of grids so that the approximation is close to
the underlying function. Although it is impossible to test sensibility of the choice of the
number of grids by having infinitely many grids, robustness can surely be tested by, for
example, doubling the number of grids and comparing resulting policy functions. I tried
this on several model specifications and with various denser griding methods and found close
equilibrium policy functions. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the result is robust to
the discretization method. While state space has high dimensions, demonstrating policy
function for more than three dimensions in one figure is hardly instructive. Thus, I chose
to plot one policy variable on two varying state variables while keeping other states fixed.
This led to hundreds of figures to cover the entire policy function even for very basic model
specifications.
Representative of that output, Figure 10 plots quantity of Airbus A330 as a function
of experience levels of Airbus A330 and A340, fixing experience level of Boeing 777 at the
lowest grid and market size at the highest grid.38 The blue plane is solved from the model
employed in the paper where E is discretized into 7 grids while the red plane is solved from
a model with a denser grid for E by adding a grid point between any of the seven original
38The equilibrium strategy for Figure 10 is solved from a scenario of post-merger with the MD-11 shut
down for the model without the generation upgrade feature. Figures for firm strategies with respect to all
states are available upon request.
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grids for E, i.e.,
E′ = {1, 4.5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 55, 70, 90, 110, 137.5, 165} .
The two planes are generally close to each other, suggesting the choice of seven grids provides
a close approximation to the underlying policy function.
2.4.5.3 Exit and Entry in the Medium-sized Wide-bodied Aircraft Industry
Entry and exit decisions of both firm and product levels are generally assumed away in the
model. The only exception is that I allow a firm to switch any of its product to a potential
entrant good by setting quantity of that product to 039 in any period and reverse the process
by setting a positive quantity in any future period. Here I elaborate on reasons why there
is no need to directly model entry and exit.
There are at least two reasons why entry on the firm level is rare in the wide-bodied
aircraft industry. First, it requires huge initial capital and a complete set of frontier tech-
nologies to start a new business. Historically, all four firms that participated in the wide-
bodied aircraft sector have been active in other sectors of the aircraft industry and are
somehow subsidized by powerful governments in their military sectors. Second, the state
of the art technologies employed in aircraft design and manufacturing also work as entry
barriers. Third, the learning curve feature acts as an entry barrier since it implies that an
entrant cannot make any profit until after a long period. Moreover, a firm may incur a
potential huge loss if there are not sufficient sales later at the bottom of the learning curve
to reimburse pricing below marginal cost in the early stage. Business failure of Lockheed
L-1011 stands as a perfect example and a live lesson. It is also the only incidence of exit
not resulting from a merger in the industry.
No new firms have entered the wide-bodied market since shortly after the industry
spawned about 40 years ago. Given that developmental time needed is at least five years
and no entering intention has been revealed by 2012, it is safe to say that there will be no
39In the empirical model with the demand function defined based on discrete choices, optimal quantity
choices are never 0, but can be arbitrarily close to 0. In this case, I call the quantity “effectively” zero since
it only has negligible difference from an absolute 0.
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new entrant until at least by 2017, that is, 20 years after the merger studied here. As for
exit, for the only two remaining firms, Airbus and Boeing, no evidence exists that they will
exit the market, particularly considering their important political strategic status.
Although entry and exit on the product level is not directly modeled as a firm choice
variable, I allow it in restricted format. First, a product can be switched between a potential
entrant and an active good through quantity choices as discussed above. Note that in the
model, when quantity of a product is effectively zero, it has no effect on choices of other
products or consumer surplus. This is demonstrated by the empirical results on MD-11
shortly after the merger in the scenario where MD-11 is not immediately shut down after
the merger. Second, the model is also consistent with the introduction of new aircraft as
future generations of the current types. This is because products in the model are captured
by characteristics, and their advances are captured by generation upgrade. So introduction
of a new generation model replacing the old one is viewed as a quality improvement of
a product. Hence, I feel comfortable to assume away exit and entry and instead focus on
experience and generation evolution that I believe are much more important in the dynamics
of the industry.
2.5 Results of Dynamic Analysis
Now that the dynamic model for the medium-size wide-bodied aircraft industry has been
setup, it can be used to address questions with regard to the impact of the 1997 Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger. First, I ask questions about the merger effect on consumer
welfare. What is the net effect of the merger on consumer surplus? How much efficiency
comes from dynamic mechanisms of learning-by-doing and generation upgrade? Was the
merger efficiency primarily attributable to learning-by-doing or generation upgrade? If
the dynamic mechanisms were ignored and instead a traditional static model were used,
how would the answers differ? Second, I examine how the merger affects firm behaviors
and market structure. How did the merger affect experience accumulation and generation
upgrade? If we had forbid Boeing to shut down the MD-11 immediately after the merger,
would Boeing have found it profitable to keep the MD-11 in the long-run? What would have
been the impact of keeping the MD-11? I address all of these questions in Section 2.5.1.
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Third, recent innovation events suggest that the aircraft upgrade rate and magnitude are
likely to be systematically higher in the future. I thus perform comparative static analysis
to examine the impact of this possibility. Specifically, what would the net consumer welfare
for the merger be if the generation upgrade rate and magnitude were larger? Section 2.5.2
deals with this question.
To address these questions, I solve three types of games:
• Game A: Dynamic game with learning-by-doing and generation upgrade
• Game B: Dynamic game only with learning-by-doing
• Game C: Static game without learning-by-doing or generation upgrade40
Game A corresponds to the full model described in Section 2.2 while Game B and C re-
move features from the full model to isolate learning-by-doing and market power effects.
All dynamic effects are assumed away in Game C, so the merger effect in it reflects only the
market power effect. The difference between Game B and C then reveals the impact of dy-
namic learning-by-doing. The influence of generation upgrade can be studied by comparing
results from Game A and B. Finally, Game C is a traditional static model, so comparing it
with Game A also reveals potential bias when ignoring dynamic mechanisms.
To evaluate merger efficiency, I solve dynamic models for three different industry sce-
narios for each of the three games:41
• Scenario (i): Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas and immediately shut down
MD-11 (which is what actually occurred)
• Scenario (ii): Boeing kept MD-11 after the merger.42
• Scenario (iii): No merger
The effect of the merger is quantified by comparing Scenario (i) and (iii). The comparison
of Scenario (i) and (ii) examines the difference between forcing MD-11 to be shut down
40For calculation of total discounted values, it is assumed that the same static game repeats in every
period.
41Discount factor ρ is set to 0.925.
42In this scenario, Boeing can set quantity of the MD-11 to 0 and pay the fixed cost. MD-11 then will
function as a potential entrant for Boeing that can come back in production at any time.
41
ZHAO: Chapter 2
immediately after the merger and letting it evolve endogenously after the merger. For each
scenario, with the solved equilibrium strategies, I compute the time series of expected values
of price, quantity, experience stock, upgrading probability, profit, consumer surplus, and
total surplus for 50 years starting from the state of 1997.43
Because Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions are identical in the nested logit
discrete choice model, consumer surplus can be obtained simply by integrating the demand
function.44 Following the literature (See Small and Rosen (1981) or Trajtenberg (1989).),
the formula for consumer surplus is:
CS =







Note that the CS formula above does not account for consumer benefits from absolute
generation upgrades. This is not a problem for the merger evaluation as those benefits will
cancel out when comparing the merger scenario with the no-merger scenario. In addition,
consumers’ preferences on product qualities also evolve over time. Thus, CS can be viewed
as consumer surplus adjusted for demand evolution, with a rate assumed to be the same as
the industrial innovation rate pG.
One-time cost synergy of the merger is modeled as an experience stock transfer from
MD-11 to Boeing 777 with a transfer rate τ . The merger is also likely to have fixed cost
synergies, although these cannot be estimated with only one observed merger in the aircraft
industry. However, fixed cost synergies do not affect price or consumer surplus. Formally,











With τ = 0, no experience stock is transferred; with τ = 1 all experience stocks are
transferred. Under the scenario where MD-11 is kept after the merger, the above equations
43All paths for different scenarios converge within 25 years. The years after reaching convergence have no
impact on comparisons across scenarios.
44Change in CS is a compensation variation, and CS tends to be overestimated in a logit-based model.
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assume that experience stocks are symmetrically transferred between MD-11 and Boeing
777. Asymmetric transfer rates can be easily incorporated in the model if necessary.
Since experience transfer is essentially a one-time experience spillover across products
when product ownership changes, a potential benchmark for τ is the estimated difference
between the within-firm spillover rate and the cross-firm spillover rate, i.e., θ2 − θ3. How-
ever, there is not enough evidence to conclude such a relationship since the underlying
mechanisms of one-time sharing might be different from experience sharing each period.
For example, building an aircraft involves thousands of tasks and different firms might ex-
cel in different tasks. A merger then helps sharing advantages in different tasks that might
give a larger boost in cost reduction than common experience spillover by having workers
perform similar tasks on different planes. I then choose to compute the welfare effect for
all τ ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 1} to evaluate the effect of the experience transfer rate.
In the rest of this section, I discuss the impact of the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
merger on consumer welfare and market structure (Section 2.5.1). In light of the recent spur
in innovation for low operating cost aircraft in the 2010s, I then perform a comparative static
analysis on the impact of innovation rate and magnitude on merger efficiency (Section 2.5.2).
The comparative static also serves as a sensitivity check for quantified merger efficiency with
respect to generation upgrade parameters.
2.5.1 Merger Evaluation
Tables 6-845 present total discounted surpluses and profits for the three scenarios for game
A, B, and C, respectively. For games A and B that have learning-by-doing, the merger
scenarios are further categorized into two cases: no experience transfer (τ = 0) and complete
experience transfer (τ = 1).
Larger experience transfer helps Boeing to lower its marginal cost. Thus, when τ in-
creases from 0 to 1, both Boeing and the consumers should be better off. However, when
Boeing has a large cost advantage under τ = 1, Airbus products’ might making less profits.
45Negative profits arise in the tables for products that are effectively not active in production. The discrete
choice model of the demand function leads to a production level close to, rather than equal to, 0, when a
product should be shut down. Since I do not allow exit, the resulting profit is close to total discounted fixed
cost. It does not affect estimations of prices or consumer surplus.
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These intuitions are confirmed comparing columns for τ = 0 with those for τ = 1 in Tables
6 and 7. When there are dynamic efficiencies (Tables 6 and 7), the merger lowers consumer
surplus when τ = 0 but raises it when τ = 1. When there is no dynamic efficiency, Table
8 suggests that the merger is detrimental to consumer welfare. Finally, comparing results
between Scenario (i) and (ii) in all three tables implies that consumers are always better
off when MD-11 is kept after the merger. However, keeping MD-11 lowers Boeing’s total
profit.
Analyzing Tables 6-8 leads to the following property with respect to the merger.
Property 1 (The Welfare Effect Property). With complete transfer of experience,
the merger increases consumer surplus by $1.57 billion while the static equilibrium model
predicts a $22.53 billion loss. Merger efficiency mainly comes from learning-by-doing. The
presence of generation upgrade raises net merger efficiency at a smaller τ but reduces it at
a larger τ . The merger has no impact on long-run consumer welfare.
The last 2 columns of Table 6 indicate that the merger effect on consumer surplus is $1.57
billion when experience transfer is complete and $-1.78 billion when there is no experience
transfer. The entire relationship between the net consumer surplus and experience transfer
rate τ is demonstrated in Figure 11. Values of surpluses, prices, and profits for this and all
subsequent figures are in millions of 1994 dollars. The horizontal line in the figure marks
zero consumer effect for the merger. The solid and dashed curves plots net consumer surplus
for Game A and B, respectively. The solid curve for Game A increase with τ and crosses
the horizontal line at around τ = 0.2, inferring that the merger is beneficial to consumers as
long as there is at least a 20% transfer rate. Note that the break-even spillover rate τ = 0.2
is smaller than the difference between the within-firm spillover and the cross-firm spillover
(θ2 − θ3 ≈ 0.22, see Table 4.).
The last column of Table 8 shows that abstracting away dynamic efficiencies, the pure
market power effect leads to a consumer loss as large as $22.53 billion. Since net consumer
surplus in the full model (Game A) is the difference between merger efficiency and the market
power effect, a large market power effect implies that absolute efficiency from learning-
by-doing and generation upgrade is also large. In addition, Game C corresponds to the
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traditional static analysis. The large difference in consumer surplus between Table 6 and
Table 8 suggests that ignoring dynamic effects can lead to seriously biased results and
erroneous conclusions with regard to the welfare impact of the merger.
Comparing the two curves in Figure 11 and the last two columns in Tables 6 and 7
suggests that the presence of generation upgrade raises net merger efficiency at a smaller
τ but reduces it at larger τ . On the one hand, by shutting down MD-11, productions are
concentrated on other products with higher quality after the merger. This channel of merger
efficiency is not captured for the model without generation upgrade (Game B). From this
prospective, adding generation upgrade to the model increases consumer surplus after the
merger. On the other hand, when experience is higher, quantity is also higher, inferring a
larger loss for a given unit cost rise. Since experience is higher with the merger, loss from
experience setback due to generation upgrade is then larger with the merger. In this sense,
generation upgrade erodes merger benefits from learning-by-doing. Modeling generation
upgrade thus leads to two opposite forces on merger efficiency. When there is no experience
transfer, experience is low and the setback effect on it is minimum. Thus, the effect of
concentration on the higher quality product dominates, and net consumer surplus is larger
for the model with generation upgrade (Game A) at τ = 0. As experience transfer rate
τ increases, the experience setback effect becomes more and more important. At τ = 1,
the results suggest that experience setback effect dominates and the presence of generation
upgrade lowers merger efficiency. Finally, differences in net consumer surplus between Game
B and Game C (about $20 billion) is much larger than that between Game A and Game B
(about $2 billion). Thus, the primary efficiency comes from the difference between Game
B and Game C, that is, the effect of learning-by-doing rather than generation upgrade.
Figure 12 reports the evolution of expected consumer welfare since 1997 for each scenario.
The merger has only an intermediate influence on consumer welfare; per period consumer
surpluses are the same in the long-run for all scenarios. This is because MD-11 is not in
production and market structures converge to the same steady state for all scenarios in the
long-run. However, two things needs to be clarified regarding absence of the long-run effect.
First, it does not render the dynamic analysis futile. In the absence of the intermediate
dynamic efficiency, a static model leads to misleading conclusions on consumer welfare.
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Second, the long-run effect result here is specific to the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger,
and is particularly due to the inferiority of MD-11. In general, long-run effect is likely to
emerge for a different merger in a dynamic analysis. I will discuss more on this in the next
property.
Property 2 (The Market Structure Effect Property). Only A330 and B777 are
actively in production in the long-run in all scenarios. For the first several years after the
merger, the merger accelerates experience accumulation but has no clear implication on the
innovation rate. The merger has no impact on long-run firm behavior.
Figures 13-16 and 17-20 report the evolution of expected quantity and experience re-
spectively since 1997 for each scenario for the four products A330, A340, B777, and MD-11.
Recall that experience is simply accumulated quantities through the mechanism of learn-
ing, forgetting and spillover. The first observation that can be made from the four quantity
figures is that only A330 and B777 are in production in the long-run.46 The results suggest
A340 and MD-11 are less favored by airlines than A330 and B777 are, and their market
shares were gradually eroded by competitors. Learning-by-doing reinforces disadvantages
of A340 and MD-11. On the one hand, low production rates of A340 and MD-11 are not
enough to cover organizational forgetting in experience, leading to rising marginal cost.
On the other hand, the competitive products, A330 and B777, are able to achieve lower
marginal cost through learning because of the added production due to the merger. En-
larged differences in marginal cost eventually drive out A340 and MD-11. This result is
consistent with the reality where MD-11 was shut down immediately after the merger and
A340 phased out in 2011. Exit of A340 comes early in the model because the model predic-
tion provides expected path while the reality path is just one realization possibly affected
by several positive shocks.47 The mechanism of learning and forgetting favors concentrated
production from the prospect of reaching and maintaining high experience levels. If product
distances are not large enough, it is not profitable to keep two similar products in one firm.
Now turn back to the figures reporting experience. For τ = 0, experience levels of A330,
46Experience stock of A340 and MD-11 (when merged into Boeing) are not 0 because of experience spillover
defined in Equation (15). They have no impact on market evolution as long as they are not in production.




A340, and B777 are slightly higher for a few years if the merger took place. However, the
merger benefit of experience accumulation is small since production of MD-11 is low and
quickly approaches 0 even without the merger. (See Figure 16.) This explains why learning-
by-doing is not large enough to cover the market power effect if τ = 0. However, for τ = 1,
B777 would enjoy an intermediate marginal cost advantage if the merger took place. Cost
advantage of B777 would be so large that it would lower quantities and experience levels
of Airbus products. In the long-run, MD-11 would not be in production whether there was
a merger or not. In addition, Boeing’s cost advantage is not large enough to discourage
Airbus from catching up. Thus, all scenarios, with or without merger, converge to the same
steady state in the long-run.
Figures 21-24 demonstrates path of upgrade probabilities. A340 and MD-11 are not
produced in the long-run, so there is no upgrade on them. Long-run upgrade rates for A330
and B777 are equal to the outside good upgrade rate as inherited in the model; firms only
upgrade to maintain optimal generation levels in the long-run. Figure 23 indicates that for
the first 5-6 years after the merger, upgrade of B777 is more likely to take place earlier
for the merger scenario with complete experience transfer than for the no-merger scenario.
This is probably because Boeing would have a cost advantage high enough right after the
merger that a little setback in experience in exchange for a higher quality is profitable.
Generally speaking, the effect of the merger on generation upgrade is ambiguous. After the
merger, softened competition could discourage innovation but enlarged market share may
mean a bigger benefit from a better quality product, which would stimulate incurring the
fixed cost to innovate. In addition, generation upgrade negatively impacts experience and
raises unit cost, which further complicates the impact of the merger on upgrade decisions.
Property 3 (The MD-11 Property). With the merger, consumers are worse off with
immediate shutdown of MD-11 (Scenario (i)) compared to continuing production of MD-11
(Scenario (ii)). However, total profits of the merged firm would be lower and would need to
be subsidized to keep MD-11. In addition, with the merger, MD-11 is phased out faster.
Recall that the learning effect is potentially beneficial for the merger, either through
concentrating learning on fewer products and reaching the bottom of learning curve faster
47
ZHAO: Chapter 2
in the scenario where MD-11 was shut down immediately after the merger, or through
within-firm spillover when MD-11 is kept after the merger. Thus, keeping MD-11 after the
merger might benefit consumers by enjoying experience spillover while avoiding reduced
number of products. Comparing consumer surplus and product profits for Scenarios (i) and
(ii) in Tables 6 and 7 shows that keeping MD-11 leads to a higher consumer surplus but
lower profits for Boeing and Airbus. Theoretically, keeping MD-11 might also be beneficial
for Boeing if there were sufficiently large spillover effects and significant differences in char-
acteristics between MD-11 and Boeing 777. However, the results suggests that Boeing’s
total profit would be lower because it would incur fixed costs from MD-11 that could not
be fully covered by revenues from MD-11. Airbus’s profit would also be lower because it
would face more competition. Thus, if a policy maker wanted to keep MD-11 for consumers’
benefit, Boeing would need to be subsidized.
In Figure 16, quantity curves for the merger scenarios are lower than the curve for the
no-merger scenario for the first 6-7 years after the merger. Namely, MD-11 would phase
out faster if it was merged into Boeing. On the one hand, MD-11 receives more experience
spillover after the merger. On the other hand, Boeing needs to internalize business stealing
of the more promising B777 from production of MD-11. The result shown in Figure 16
indicates that business stealing concerns dominated and Boeing found it more profitable to
concentrate on production of Boeing 777.
2.5.2 Comparative Statics
The 2010s is witnessing a boom of generation upgrades in the entire aircraft industry. For
the medium-sized wide-bodied market, Boeing 787 was introduced to replace 777 in 2011
and Airbus responded with the new A350, which is projected to take over A330’s market
in 2014. Boeing 787 and Airbus A350 are expected to save much more operating cost
than previous innovations.48 This suggests that estimated industrial innovation rate pG
and, more importantly, estimated generation quality gap ϕ based on past data might be
too conservative. In fact, estimated ϕ is only 12% as shown in Table 3, which implies that
48With the first 13 B787 delivered, its launch customer All Nippon Airways said the airplane is 21% better
on fuel consumption than old models. Boeing had also claimed its 787-8 to have about 15% lower operating
cost than A330-200, while Airbus predicted A350-1000 will have 25% lower fuel burn than B777-300ER.
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upgrading to the next generation only increases a product’s market share by 12% relative to
the outside good. In contrast, industry experts predict that the new Boeing 787 and Airbus
A350 will eventually drive out old generation models, indicating a much larger percentage
change in market share ratio. Thus, I vary pG and ϕ in all dynamic game scenarios to
evaluate their impact on estimated merger efficiency. I find that:
Property 4 (The Innovation Property). Higher innovation rate or larger generation
gap increases merger efficiency for all τ . Net merger efficiency is increasing in both the
innovation rate pG and generation gap ϕ.
I call the dynamic model using parameter values estimated from Section 2.4 the “base
model.” Comparative static analysis is then performed by varying one or more parameters
of the base model and resolving the dynamic game. Figure 25 compares merger efficiency
(∆CS) across different values for the transfer rate τ in the base model, with merger efficiency
in a model with doubled pG and merger efficiency in a model with doubled ϕ. When pG is
doubled, consumers benefit more from the merger but not by much, and a smaller experience
transfer rate shall be enough for the learning-by-doing effect to offset the market power effect
(∆CS = 0). It is probably because higher pG implies more frequent generation upgrades and
setbacks in experience, favoring a more concentrated market that accumulates experience
faster. Furthermore, a doubled ϕ generates larger consumer benefit than the doubled pG
does. When MD-11 was active, it was not upgraded to a new generation because it was
expected to stop production in the long-run. Therefore, production of MD-11 leads to lower
consumer surplus under the no-merger scenario. A larger generation quality gap ϕ magnifies
the loss from MD-11 production, indicating higher consumer welfare for the merger scenario.
Figure 26 plots the net merger consumer surplus ∆CS at τ = 1 as a function of ϕ for pG and
doubled pG. ∆CS is found to be increasing in both in pG and ϕ. Thus, if the magnitude
or rate of innovation is larger in the future, the merger would be more consumer beneficial.
The analysis here also provides a sensitivity check of the consumer welfare effect of the
merger with respect to innovation rate pG and generation gap ϕ. In Figure 25, the difference
between ∆CS curve of the base model and that of the “doubled pG” model is relatively
small while net consumer surplus at τ = 1 for the “doubled ϕ” model is more than three
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times larger than that for the base model. Thus, merger efficiency calculated in this paper
would be too conservative if one were to believe that generation gaps should be much larger
in the future.
2.6 Summary
In summarizing this paper’s contribution, I will first describe the innovation in terms of
model and methods and then describe the policy contribution with respect to evaluating
the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger.
A dynamic oligopoly model is constructed that allows for multi-product firms, learning-
by-doing and endogenous quality improvements. Allowing for both the evolution of cost
and product quality is, to my knowledge, new to the literature on dynamic oligopoly mod-
els. Having two product-specific dynamic states (experience and generation) that evolve at
multiple and different stages creates complexity in solving the dynamic model. I find that
it is helpful to distinguish state profiles at different stages. Joint probabilistic upgrading
decisions for a multi-product firm could be very complicated, and I deal with this by intro-
ducing randomness in a separable term (upgrading cost) that guarantees a unique analytical
solution with given expected future values.
To reduce computational burdens, I also introduced a preference rank state variable
to replace the unobserved characteristics state variable for each product. The preference
rank state variable is applicable to any dynamic oligopoly models, including those without
learning-by-doing or innovation features. Since its size does not depend on number of
products, the preference rank state variable is most powerful in reducing size of state space
for dynamic games with many products where variations in unobserved characteristics are
primarily induced by preference shocks over certain attributes of the products, for example,
ownership.
As described, the model is applicable to many industries for which learning-by-doing and
quality innovation are relevant. However, the primary purpose of the model was to evaluate
the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger in the medium-size wide-bodied aircraft indus-
try. I find that with complete experience transfer, the merger increases consumer surplus
by $1.57 billion. Consumers are better off as long as there is at least a 20% experience
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transfer rate after the merger. Learning-by-doing is the major source of merger efficiency
and is large enough to cover the detrimental market power effect of about $20 billion. The
merger’s impacts on both consumer welfare and market structure are intermediate; it only
accelerates experience accumulation towards the steady state and there is no-merger effect
in the long-run. Comparative statics suggest that if future generation gaps were to be larger,
merger efficiency would be even greater. Differences in net consumer surplus between the
dynamic model and a static model suggest potential caveats in traditional static analysis
in antitrust practices.
While the primary purpose of the model was to empirically investigate the aircraft
manufacturing industry, the model is applicable to many industries for which learning-by-
doing and quality innovation are relevant. For example, the model can be modified to
examine the potential impact of the recently turned-down takeover of Seagate by Western
Digital in the hard disc drive industry. More generally, the model and methods developed
here may prove useful for gaining an improved empirical assessment of the significance of
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2.7.1 Treating MD-11 as a Within Firm Product for L-1011
There are 5 aircraft with 11 submodels that have overlaps in production life with Lockheed
L-1011. To estimate Equation (12), I need to observe different families of aircraft within the
Lockheed corporation. However, L-1011 is the only wide-bodied commercial aircraft that
Lockheed had ever produced. Hence, I make a further assumption that DC-10 of McDon-
nell Douglas can be treated as a within-firm product for Lockheed L-1011.49 Seemingly a
strong assumption, using an outside product as an inside product tends to under-estimate
the within firm spillover effect, which would lead to conservative estimate of merger effi-
ciency. However, the under-estimation problem could be (partially) relieved considering the
following arguments. First, L-1011 and DC-10 are probably the pair of most similar aircraft
in the entire history of wide-bodied aircraft industry. Both aircraft are fitted with three
high-bypass turbofan engines, seat around 300 passengers, and have about the same fuse-
lage diameter and exactly the same wingspan. They are also very similar in many detailed
aspects that could not all be covered by the product difference function in Equation (12).
Hence, with respect to similarity, DC-10 should have the highest spillover on L-1011, off-
setting part of the under-estimation. Second, DC-10 was put into production about a year
before L-1011 and stayed in lead during their whole production histories. Combining with
the similarities, this implies that Lockheed would enjoy a followers advantage in production
techniques and benefit more than average cases in experience sharing from the production of
DC-10. Third and probably the most important reasoning, the plants for producing L-1011
and DC-10 both sat in the Los Angeles area while the plants of Boeing and Airbus were
far away in Seattle and Europe, respectively. Lockheed’s plant was in Burbank, California
while Douglas manufactured in Long Beach, California. The two cities are on the opposite
side of Los Angeles City with about 30 miles between them. Producing together in the
Los Angeles County since the 1920’s implies an unique close connection between workers of
49An alternative choice is to use Lockheed’s military aircraft C-5A Galaxy produced during the period
of 1968-1973. C-5A Galaxy has the same number of engines and very similar plane size, range, and other
characteristics as Boeing 747. Problems in using C-5A lie in the differences between military and commercial
aircraft. For example, C-5A Galaxy does not have a corresponding number of seats characteristic as it is an
airlift. In addition, C-5A had shorter overlapping production periods with L-1011 than DC-10 did.
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the two companies. When there are layoffs and other mobilities, work force can easily shift
from one firm to the other. Experience can be shared in the unions or even in the bars.
Since within-firm spillover mainly comes from workforce shifts and experience sharing, the
spillover effect between the two plants should be closer to the level of within-firm spillovers.
2.7.2 Alternative Modeling of Experience Transition
The expected value function and therefore the right hand side of the Bellman equation
(Equation (5)) is not continuously differentiable in quantities according to the numerical
transition rule in Equation (16). This non-differentiability makes it hard to solve for optimal
quantities in numerical computation. Here I propose an alternative modeling of experience
transition to smooth the expected value function.50
The problem of non-differentiability comes from the part that Equation (16) restricts
transitions to closest lower and upper bounds/grids only while next period experience could
span the entire space for theoretical experience transition (Equation (12)). To overcome







Thus, the discrete experience state Et+1 is chosen by using E
∗
t+1 plus a random normal draw
ε and then rounding to the nearest grid. For example, if ε ∼ N (0, σ) , then no matter what




could be any real number and Et+1 has positive probability going
to any grid. This solves the non-differentiability problem but creates incorrect expectation
as expectation of Et+1 would then not be equal to E
∗
t+1. To fix this problem, I turn to a
mixture of Equation (16) and Equation (19). The mixture is accomplished in two steps.
First, I define Ẽ as
Ẽ = E∗(q) + ν, (20)
where ν ∼ f (ν), with E (ν) = 0 and CDF F (ν) . Then I replace E∗t+1 with Ẽ in Equation






V k is continuously differentiable under this alternative
transition rule. I then show that expectation of Et+1 equals E
∗
t+1. Let N be the number of
50I am greatly indebt to C. Lanier Benkard for suggesting this alternative modeling idea.
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where the last equation used the fact E (ν) = 0.
However, note that if I restrict the domain of ν to be
(



























Note that with Equation (12), next period experience is bounded below by δEt−1 but
not so under this alternative transition. This problem could be fixed by defining lower
bound of next period E to be δEt−1. However, this will further complicates the function
form to achieve correct expectation.
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There are several problems with this alternative modeling though. First, it introduces
non-negligible computational burden by employing a more complicated function form. Sec-
ond, it might create too much variation of experience evolution than the data does. under
this alternative transition rule, it is possible for experience to jump from the lowest state to
the highest state even when q = 0 (or from the highest state to the lowest state even when
q is very large). This would cause problems for some simulation paths. However, it won’t
be a problem for expected discounted CS since probability of such events will be very small.
2.7.3 Proof on Uniqueness of PrUii for Given EV
Ui
i
In Equation (3), EV Uii is not a function of any cj for given Ui. Hence, the difference between
EV Uii and EV
U ′i




i − CGi is simply a
vector of 2Ji numbers and we can always find the largest number. Thus, CGi divides the
Ji-dimension Euclidean space [Cd, Cu]Ji into 2Ji areas in a unique way51. PrUii then is
unique and equals the proportion of areas of the Euclidean space [Cd, Cu]Ji .52
I give an example on finding the unique solution of upgrade probabilities for a two-
product firm below. Models with firms that have more than 2 products can be solved
similarly. In the example, for subscript ij, i and j denotes product 1 and 2 of the firm,
respectively. i (or j) equals 1 (or 0) if product i (or j) is upgraded (not upgraded). There
are four possible choices for the firm:
U11, U10, U01, U00.
The problem can be summarized as solving
P11, P10, P01, P00,
for given continuation values
EV11, EV10, EV01, EV00.
51Strictly speaking, there might be less than 2Ji areas since some Ui might be so undesirable that it is
never chosen for any cj ∈ [Cd, Cu]Ji
52Note that the upgrade probabilities PrUii are continuous but generally not differentiable (at boundaries
between cases) in EV Uii .
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The net value from each choice is then:
V11 = EV11 − c1 − c2;
V10 = EV10 − c1;
V01 = EV01 − c2;
V00 = EV00.
Comparing Vij defines the following six lines in the c1-c2 plane that marks the boundaries
between Vij .
L1: EV00 − EV10 + c1 = 0 (vertical)
L2: EV01 − EV11 + c1 = 0 (vertical)
L3: EV00 − EV01 + c2 = 0 (horizontal)
L4: EV10 − EV11 + c2 = 0 (horizontal)
L5: EV10 − EV01 + c2 − c1 = 0 (45◦)
L6: EV00 − EV11 + c1 + c2 = 0 (−45◦)
It is important to notice that the six boundary lines satisfy the following relationship:
L1 + L4 = L6
L2 + L3 = L6
L4 − L2 = L5
L3 − L1 = L5
In addition, upgrade choices are indicated in the c1-c2 plane by areas defined by the six
boundary lines as follows:
U11 : left of L2, under L4, under L6;
U10 : left of L1, above L4, above L5;
U01 : right of L2, under L3, under L5;
U00 : right of L1, above L3, above L6.
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Specific divisions of the c1-c2 plane can be divided into two major cases, with EV00+EV11−
EV01−EV10 ≥ 0 and EV00 +EV11−EV01−EV10 < 0 demonstrated, respectively, in Figure
27 and 28.








, in the c1-c2
plane. The upgrade probabilities Pij then equal their corresponding percentage of areas








. Specifically, depending on the size of the square
box and its relative position to the six boundary lines, the division of the square box can be
categorized into the following 24 cases. The upgrade probabilities Pij are solved according
to the following formulas in each case:
• For EV00 + EV11 − EV01 − EV10 ≥ 0
– Case I(i)
∗ Condition:
Cd > EV11 − EV10;





Cd > EV11 − EV10;
Cd ≤ EV10 − EV00 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P10 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd





EV00 − EV11 + 2Cd ≥ 0;
EV10 − EV00 < Cd;





Cd ≤ EV11 − EV10 < Cu;
Cu ≤ EV10 − EV00
∗ Probability:
P11 =
EV11 − EV10 − Cd
Cu − Cd
;P10 = 1− P11
– Case I(v)
∗ Condition:
Cd ≤ EV10 − EV00 < Cu;
Cd ≤ EV11 − EV10 < Cu;
∗ Probability:
P10 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV10)
Cu − Cd
S11 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd




Cu − (EV10 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV10)
Cu − Cd




EV00 − EV11 + Cu + Cd ≥ 0
Sjoint 11 =
(
EV11 − EV10 − Cd
)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P11 = S11 + Sjoint 11
P00 = S00 + Sjoint − Sjoint 11
eles if,
EV00 − EV11 + Cu + Cd < 0
Sjoint 00 =
(EV10 − EV00 − Cu)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P11 = S11 + Sjoint − Sjoint 00
P00 = S00 + Sjoint 00
– Case I(vi)
∗ Condition:
EV00 − EV11 + 2Cu < 0;
EV11 − EV10 ≥ Cu;







Cd > EV10 − EV00;
Cd > EV01 − EV00;
Cu ≤ EV11 − EV01;










2 ;P11 = 1− P00 otherwise
– Case I(viii)
∗ Condition:
Cd ≤ EV11 − EV01 < Cu;
Cd ≤ EV01 − EV00 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P01 =
EV01 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV01)
Cu − Cd
S11 =
EV01 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd




Cu − (EV01 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV01)
Cu − Cd
Sjoint = 1− P01 − S11 − S00
if,





EV11 − EV01 − Cd
)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P11 = S11 + Sjoint 11
P00 = S00 + Sjoint − Sjoint 11
eles if,
EV00 − EV11 + Cd + Cu < 0
Sjoint 00 =
(EV01 − EV00 − Cu)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P11 = S11 + Sjoint − Sjoint 00
P00 = S00 + Sjoint 00
– Case I(ix)
∗ Condition:
Cd > EV11 − EV01;
Cd ≤ EV01 − EV00 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P01 =
EV01 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
;P00 = 1− P01
– Case I(x)
∗ Condition:
Cd ≤ EV11 − EV01 < Cu;
Cu ≤ EV01 − EV00
∗ Probability:
P11 =
EV11 − EV01 − Cd
Cu − Cd





Cd > EV11 − EV01;





EV11 − EV10 < Cu
EV01 − EV00 ≥ Cd
EV11 − EV01 < Cu
EV10 − EV00 ≥ Cd
∗ Probability:
P01 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV10)
Cu − Cd
P10 =
EV01 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV01)
Cu − Cd
S11 =
EV11 − EV01 − Cd
Cu − Cd




Cu − (EV01 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV10 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
Sjoint = P10 + P01 + S11 + S00 − 1
then













Cd > EV10 − EV00;





Cd > EV01 − EV00;
Cd ≤ EV10 − EV00 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P10 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
;P00 = 1− P10
– Case II(iii)
∗ Condition:
EV10 − EV01 + Cd − Cu ≥ 0;
EV10 − EV00 ≥ Cu;







Cd ≤ EV01 − EV00 < Cu;
Cd > EV10 − EV00
∗ Probability:
P01 =
EV01 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
;P00 = 1− P01
– Case II(v)
∗ Condition:
Cd ≤ EV10 − EV00 < Cu;
Cd ≤ EV01 − EV00 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P00 =
Cu − (EV10 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV01 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
S10 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV01 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
S01 =
Cu − (EV10 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
· EV01 − EV00 − C
d
Cu − Cd
Sjoint = 1− P00 − S10 − S01
if,
EV10 − EV01 + Cd − Cd = EV10 − EV01 ≥ 0
Sjoint 01 =
(
EV01 − EV00 − Cd
)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P01 = S01 + Sjoint 01
P10 = S10 + Sjoint − Sjoint 01
eles if,





EV10 − EV00 − Cd
)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P01 = S01 + Sjoint − Sjoint 10
P10 = S10 + Sjoint 10
– Case II(vi)
∗ Condition:
EV10 − EV01 + Cu − Cd < 0;
EV01 − EV00 ≥ Cu;





Cd > EV11 − EV01;
Cd > EV11 − EV10;
Cu ≤ EV10 − EV00;
















Cd ≤ EV11 − EV01 < Cu;
Cd ≤ EV11 − EV10 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P11 =
EV11 − EV10 − Cd
Cu − Cd




EV11 − EV01 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV10)
Cu − Cd
S01 =
Cu − (EV11 − EV01)
Cu − Cd
· EV11 − EV10 − C
d
Cu − Cd
Sjoint = 1− P11 − S10 − S01
if,
EV10 − EV01 + Cu − Cu = EV10 − EV01 ≥ 0
Sjoint 01 =
(EV11 − EV01 − Cu)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P01 = S01 + Sjoint 01
P10 = S10 + Sjoint − Sjoint 01
eles if,
EV10 − EV01 + Cu − Cu = EV10 − EV01 < 0
Sjoint 10 =
(EV11 − EV10 − Cu)2
2 (Cu − Cd)2
P01 = S01 + Sjoint − Sjoint 10





Cu ≤ EV11 − EV01;
Cd ≤ EV11 − EV10 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P11 =
EV11 − EV10 − Cd
Cu − Cd
;P10 = 1− P11
– Case II(x)
∗ Condition:
Cu ≤ EV11 − EV10;
Cd ≤ EV11 − EV01 < Cu
∗ Probability:
P11 =
EV11 − EV01 − Cd
Cu − Cd
;P01 = 1− P11
– Case II(xi)
∗ Condition:
Cu ≤ EV11 − EV10;







EV10 − EV00 < Cu
EV11 − EV10 ≥ Cd
EV01 − EV00 < Cu
EV11 − EV01 ≥ Cd
∗ Probability:
P11 =
EV11 − EV01 − Cd
Cu − Cd




Cu − (EV10 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV01 − EV00)
Cu − Cd
S10 =
EV10 − EV00 − Cd
Cu − Cd
· C
u − (EV11 − EV10)
Cu − Cd
S01 =
Cu − (EV11 − EV01)
Cu − Cd
· EV01 − EV00 − C
d
Cu − Cd
Sjoint = P11 + P00 + S10 + S01 − 1
then








2.7.4 Expected Value Function and State Transition
First I describe the state transition with experience state variables only. In this case, define
ηj (h; qj) =
(
E∗j,t+1 (qj)− Ej,d (qj)
Ej,u (qj)− Ej,d (qj)
)h(
1−
E∗j,t+1 (qj)− Ej,d (qj)




where h is either 0 or 1. Then,
EVj (












































Vj (E1,h1 , ...Ek,hk , ...EJ,hJ )


















Then I add in market size state variable Mt. Note that given Qt and Et, Et+1 does not
























































j is just EVj in Equation 27.
Similar as the market size state variable, the feature that preference rank state variables(
κT , κF
)
evolves separately from other state variables make computation easier. Since
Pr
(










































































































j is just EVj in Equation 28.














Since (M,κT , κF ) evolve exogenously, I only need to specify transitions of E and G. Note
that Gω is only updated in Stage (i) and (ii) governed by Equation (1) and (2). Transition
of G does not depend on transition of E but not the other way around. For given ω̃, denote
Gdown and Gstay as the states of G at the beginning of Stage (ii) in the next period when
the event Outside Good Generation Upgrade took place and otherwise, respectively. For






j denote probability of generation
difference Gj of product j after Stage (ii) in the next period decreases, remains the same
and increases, respectively. Then,
Prdownj = p
G · (Pruji |Gdown) + (1− p
G) · (Pruji |Gstay)
Prstayj = (1− p
G) · (Pruji |Gdown)
Prupj = p
G · (Pruji |Gstay).




.53 Given Prdownj ,
53I omit special cases of hitting the smallest and largest grids of E and G in notations here for simplicity.
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the transition of Ej part is simply
E′j =

Euj downgrade by nG with prob. Pr
down
j · ηj(1)
Edj downgrade by nG with prob. Pr
down
j · ηj(0)
Euj with prob. (1− Prdownj ) · ηj(1)
Edj with prob. (1− Prdownj ) · ηj(0)
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Table 1: Aircraft Characteristics
Characteristics A330 A340 B777 MD-11
Aircraft ID 1 2 3 4
first delivery 1993 1993 1995 1990
seats 270 326 325 293
range(km) 12378 14312 14067 12670
No. of engines 2 4 2 3
Table 2: Demand Function Estimates
R2 = 0.9724; Adj. R2 = 0.9711
Variable Estimate S.E. t p > |t| Data S.E
Constant -3.59 0.22 -16.51 0.00 N/A
seats/100 0.11 0.06 1.91 0.06 0.36
range/10000 2.04 1.07 1.91 0.06 0.20
No. of engines -0.07 0.02 -2.73 0.01 0.91
price/100 -0.52 0.16 -3.25 0.00 0.17
InGroup Corr. (σ) 0.98 0.04 23.81 0.00 1.13
Table 3: Demand Function Estimates (with Generation)
R2 = 0.9724; Adj. R2 = 0.9711
Variable Estimate S.E. t p > |t| Data S.E
Constant -3.40 0.22 -15.46 0.00 N/A
Generation 0.12 0.06 2.02 0.05 0.49
seats/100 0.07 0.06 1.25 0.21 0.36
range/10000 0.15 0.11 1.43 0.16 0.20
No. of engines -0.03 0.03 -0.80 0.42 0.91
price/100 -0.75 0.13 -5.90 0.00 0.17
InGroup Corr. (σ) 0.97 0.02 50.26 0.00 1.13
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Table 4: Learning Curve Parameters
Explanation Value Std Value Std
lnA Labor Cost Intercept 9.2590 (3.2885) 9.3113 (3.1696)
γ2 Return to Scale 0.3178 (0.5904) 0.3141 (0.5552)
γ1 Learning Parameter -1.1462 (0.1374) -1.1523 (0.1275)
Implied Learning Rate 55% 55%
δ Depreciation of E 0.9546 (0.0014) 0.9549 (0.0012)
θ1 In-family Spillover 0.9999 (0.0239) 0.9742 (0.0198)
θ2 In-firm Spillover 0.2383 (0.0029) 0.2408 (0.0001)
θ3 Across-firm Spillover 0.0138 (0.0017) 0.0182 (0.0001)
υ1 Seats Diff. 0.9998 (0.0037)
υ2 Maximum Range Diff. 0.9998 (0.0032)
Note: Implicit learning rate is calculated as 1− 2γ1,
which measure percent of labor saving when experience doubles.
Table 5: Market Size and Preference Rank Parameters
ξj = (-1.5E-9, 6.0E-10, 0.0, -1.2E-9)
κT1 = ( 0.0995, 0.0590)
κT0 = (-0.0885, -0.0524)
κF1 = (-0.0156, -0.0754)











M grids: ( 2823, 2966, 3100)
M transition:





Table 6: Merger Effect for Game A (Full Model)
Scenario (i) Scenario (ii) Scenario (iii) (i)-(iii)
Value (a) τ = 0 (b) τ = 1 (a) τ = 0 (b) τ = 1 (i.a)-(iii) (i.b)-(iii)
CS 154.19 157.55 154.83 157.61 155.97 -1.78 1.57
πall 30.43 36.30 27.41 33.62 26.31 4.12 9.99
TS 184.62 193.85 182.25 191.23 182.29 2.34 11.56
πA330 18.27 15.13 17.87 15.17 17.05 1.22 -1.92
πA340 -2.23 -2.35 -2.27 -2.35 -2.30 0.07 -0.05
πB777 14.39 23.52 14.19 23.35 13.83 0.55 9.69
πMD11 N/A N/A -2.38 -2.54 -2.27 2.27 2.27
All values are total discounted expected values in billions of 1994 U.S. dollar.
Table 7: Merger Effect for Game B (without Generation Upgrade)
Scenario (i) Scenario (ii) Scenario (iii) (i)-(iii)
Value (a) τ = 0 (b) τ = 1 (a) τ = 0 (b) τ = 1 (i.a)-(iii) (i.b)-(iii)
CS 177.89 184.06 178.36 184.06 180.68 -2.79 3.38
πall 58.99 63.64 56.09 61.02 53.98 5.01 9.66
TS 236.87 247.69 234.46 245.08 234.66 2.22 13.04
πA330 24.04 20.69 23.71 20.69 22.34 1.71 -1.65
πA340 -1.45 -1.97 -1.52 -1.98 -1.69 0.24 -0.28
πB777 36.40 44.92 36.27 44.92 35.28 1.11 9.64
πMD11 N/A N/A -2.36 -2.61 -1.95 1.95 1.95
All values are total discounted expected values in billions of 1994 U.S. dollar.
Table 8: Merger Effect for Game C (the Static Game)
Value Scenario (i) Scenario (ii) Scenario (iii) (i)-(iii)
CS 63.05 82.99 85.58 -22.53
πall 51.91 45.77 43.68 8.23
TS 114.96 128.76 129.26 -14.30
πA330 26.56 17.22 16.18 10.38
πA340 23.45 15.50 14.63 8.82
πB777 1.90 -0.65 -0.25 2.15
πMD11 N/A 13.69 13.13 -13.13
All values are total discounted expected values in billions of 1994 U.S. dollar.
Recall that τ = 0 corresponds to no experience share after the merger while τ = 1
matches complete experience share. The 3 scenarios are:
• Scenario (i): Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas and immediately shut down
MD-11
• Scenario (ii): Boeing kept MD-11 after the merger.
• Scenario (iii): No merger
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Figure 2: Seats and Range of All Wide-bodied Aircraft in Production since 1990
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Figure 3: Distribution of medium-wide-ratio
Figure 4: Correlation of Quantities and Past Accident Index
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Figure 5: Fit of Labor Input of L-1011
Figure 6: L-1011 Generation Impact on Experience Level
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Figure 7: Distribution of Percentile Difference between Actual and Estimated Market Share
Ratio
Figure 8: Distribution of Percentile Difference between Actual and Estimated Quantity
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Figure 9: ξ Approximation Performance Comparison
Figure 10: Demonstration of Robustness of Discretization
83
ZHAO: Chapter 2
Figure 11: Comparison of ∆CS for Game A and B when τ Varies
Figure 12: CS Path Comparison since 1997
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Figure 13: Quantity Path Comparison of A330 since 1997
Figure 14: Quantity Path Comparison of A340 since 1997
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Figure 15: Quantity Path Comparison of B777 since 1997
Figure 16: Quantity Path Comparison of MD-11 since 1997
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Figure 17: Experience Path Comparison of A330 since 1997
Figure 18: Experience Path Comparison of A340 since 1997
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Figure 19: Experience Path Comparison of B777 since 1997
Figure 20: Experience Path Comparison of MD-11 since 1997
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Figure 21: Paths of Expected Upgrading Prob. for A330 since 1997
Figure 22: Paths of Expected Upgrading Prob. for A340 since 1997
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Figure 23: Paths of Expected Upgrading Prob. for B777 since 1997
Figure 24: Paths of Expected Upgrading Prob. for MD-11 since 1997
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Figure 25: Comparison of ∆CS when τ Varies for Different Models
Figure 26: Merger Efficiency for different pG and ϕ when τ = 1
91
ZHAO: Chapter 2
Figure 27: EV00 + EV11 − EV01 − EV10 ≥ 0
Figure 28: EV00 + EV11 − EV01 − EV10 < 0
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3 Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Innitely Repeated
PrisonersDilemma1
3.1 Introduction
Antitrust and competition law has long recognized that collusion comes in two varieties:
explicit and tacit. Explicit collusion involves express communication among the parties
regarding the collusive agreement - what outcome is to be supported and how it is to be
sustained. Tacit collusion is coordination without express communication. A common form
of tacit collusion is indirect communication through price signaling: A rm raises its price
with the hope that other rms will interpret this move as an invitation to collude and
respond by matching the price increase. As a member of the 7th Circuit Court, Judge
Richard Posner articulated such a mechanism in the High Fructose Corn Syrup decision:
If a rm raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise,
and they do, the rms behavior can be conceptualized as the o¤er of a unilateral
contract that the o¤erees accept by raising their prices.2
A rm raising its price in anticipation that it may be subsequently matched is taking
a risk because rival rms may not respond in kind, either because they failed to properly
interpret the price signal or deliberately chose not to collude. If the price rise is not matched
then the rm will experience a decline in prot from a loss of demand. The prospect of
such a signaling cost was well-recognized in the airlines industry where tacit collusion was
implemented not with actual price increases but instead the announcement of future price
increases which could be retracted (prior to any transactions taking place) in the event that
rival rms did not respond with similar announcements (Borenstein, 2004). However, when
such price announcements are unavailable as a signaling device, a rm must then consider
the risky route of raising price without knowing how rivals will react. Of course, a rm
always has the option of waiting on the hope that another rm will take the initiative of
1This chapter is coauthored with Joseph E. Harrington, Jr..
2 In Re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation Appeal of A & W Bottling Inc et al, United States
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 295 F3d 651, 2002; p. 2.
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raising price. The trade-o¤ from waiting is that it avoids the possible demand loss from
raising price but could delay the time until a collusive outcome is reached.
The objective of this paper is to explore the dynamics associated with the emergence
of tacit collusion towards addressing the following questions: Is the likelihood of collusion
declining over time? If so, does it converge to zero? If it converges to zero, does it occur
asymptotically or in nite time? That is, does a su¢ ciently long string of failed attempts
to collude result in rms, who are willing and able, becoming su¢ ciently discouraged that
they give up trying to collude? Or is collusion assured of eventually occurring?
There are two desiderata for a theory to address these questions and shed light on the
emergence of tacit collusion. First, there must be some reason for a rm to wait rather
than simply set a collusive price. Second, delay must be produced so that there are some
meaningful dynamics. To satisfy the rst criterion, we consider an innitely repeated two-
player PrisonersDilemma with incomplete information. There are two player types: One
type never colludes, while the other type has the capacity to collude and will surely do so
once convinced its rival is also capable of colluding. Thus, the value to waiting is learning
the other rms type. As our approach will deploy the equilibrium framework, we will not be
exploring the non-equilibrium process by which players settle upon a collusive equilibrium;
players will always be playing according to some equilibrium. Tacit collusion in our setting
refers to the coordination on collusive prices within the context of a particular equilibrium.
In other words, a dynamic equilibrium process is derived that may settle on collusive prices.
The second criterion is that the theory should produce delay as an equilibrium phenom-
enon. Delay is required in order to have dynamics to investigate but is also desirable because
it is consistent with experimental evidence and casual observation of actual markets.3 In
practice, tacit collusion takes time to develop; hence, an essential property for a theory to
shed light on the emergence of collusion is that it generates delay. To satisfy this second
criterion, our analysis focuses on a class of equilibria that produce delay with positive prob-
ability. A class of equilibria is considered that has two distinct phases: a learning phase
3The dynamics associated with the emergence of tacit collusion are di¢ cult to document for actual
markets but are well-documented for articial markets. For the innitely repeated Prisoners Dilemma,
experimental evidence shows that subjects may or may not cooperate and that cooperation can take time
to occur; see, for example, Dal Bó (2005) and references cited therein.
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and a collusion phase. In the learning phase, players are potentially signaling their types
in order to initiate collusion. In the collusion phase, their types have been revealed and -
if, in fact, they are collusive types - collusion subsequently occurs. This class of equilibria
admits equilibria that are separating, semi-separating, and pooling. Pooling equilibria are
those for which rms never collude so there is no learning phase. Separating equilibria have
rms immediately reveal their types; hence, collusion occurs either without delay or not at
all. While those equilibria are Pareto-e¢ cient, the learning phase is minimal and thus they
fail to produce the phenomenon that motivates the analysis. It is semi-separating equilibria
that involve gradual learning and potential delay in achieving a tacitly collusive outcome.
These equilibria encompass not just uncertainty about the other rms type - is my rival
willing and able to collude? - but also uncertainty about what the other rm will do - even
if my rival is willing and able to collude, will it take the lead or wait for me to make the
rst move and raise price? This latter uncertainty arises because a collusive-type rm uses
a mixed strategy that determines whether it takes the initiative by setting a high price or
waits by setting a low price. Embodying both sources of relevant uncertainty makes these
equilibria especially attractive in light of our objectives.4
To be more concrete, consider the managers of two gasoline stations located half a
mile apart on the same street. Each is contemplating whether to post higher prices on its
stations sign or instead deciding to "wait and see" what the other stations manager will
do.5 Is the other station also contemplating a collusive price hike but similarly holding
o¤ raising price? Or is the other station oblivious to such reasoning and has no intent of
trying to tacitly collude? As time moves on without any price hikes, a station manager
adjusts her beliefs as to whether the other manager is "waiting" or "oblivious" and modies
her calculus accordingly in deciding whether or not to go ahead and raise price. This is
the dynamic that is captured by the equilibria characterized in this paper. Of particular
4As Pareto-e¢ ciency is a common equilibrium selection device, it is important to emphasize that our
selection of semi-separating equilibria is not guided by what is collectively best for rms but rather by what
best matches the class of phenomena we are interested in understanding. While any delay in achieving
collusive prices is Pareto-ine¢ cent, in fact delay is a real feature to actual and experimental markets, and it
is the objective of this research project to explore those dynamics.
5For gasoline stations in Quebec, Clark and Houde (2011) nd that a small price premium (2 cents or




interest is whether, in spite of the possibility of delay, collusion will eventually occur for
sure.
To summarize the main ndings, the probability of collusion emerging in any period is
shown to be declining over time but is always positive; at no point are beliefs su¢ ciently
pessimistic that collusive types give up trying to collude. While always positive, the proba-
bility of collusion emerging in the current period (given it has not yet occurred) converges to
zero asymptotically. Furthermore, even if both players are collusive types, the probability
they never achieve the collusive outcome can be positive. Though collusive type players
never give up trying to collude - in the sense that they always choose the collusive price
with positive probability - they may never succeed in colluding. Hence, the waiting game
faced by rms may not just delay collusion but prevent it from emerging altogether.
While there is a huge body of work on the theory of collusion, none of it, to our knowl-
edge, explores the emergence of collusion through means that can reasonably be interpreted
as tacit.6 Our model does, however, share some features with the literature on reputation
in that it allows private information over a players type and the space of types includes
those which are committed to a particular strategy.7 The seminal work of Kreps et al (1982)
examines cooperation in a nitely repeated PrisonersDilemma where an "irrational" type
might be endowed with tit-for-tat, while a "rational" type optimizes unconstrained. Au-
mann and Sorin (1989) considered cooperation in a common interests game where a player
might be endowed with a strategy with bounded recall. More recently, reputation research
has considered an innitely repeated game with commitment types with the typical research
objective being to narrow down the set of equilibrium payo¤s (compared to the usual Folk
Theorem). When one players type is private information, the issue is cast as whether
equilibria with low payo¤s for that player can be eliminated; see, for example, Cripps and
Thomas (1997) and Cripps, Dekel, and Pesendorfer (2005). More recently, there has been
research allowing both players to have private information; see, for example, Atakan and
Ekmekci (2008). Also relevant is work on relational contracts where, in a di¤erent setting
and with a di¤erent mechanism than are modelled here, players learn to cooperate more
6Coordination within the context of a coordination game, rather than a game of conict, is explored in
Crawford and Haller (1990).
7For a review of some of the research on reputation, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
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e¤ectively (while in our setting, they simply learn to cooperate); see Chassang (2010) and
Halac (2010).
Our model considers two-sided incomplete information in the innitely repeated setting
when the commitment type is myopic. It di¤ers in several respects from previous work on
reputation. Prior research for the innitely repeated setting has not explored the Prisoners
Dilemma but rather other stage games including games of common interests, conicting
interests,8 and strictly conicting interests.9 As a result, in those settings, a player wants
to mimic the commitment type, while in the PD setting, they (eventually) want to sepa-
rate from the commitment type.10 More importantly, the central issue in the reputation
literature is about characterizing the set of equilibrium payo¤s which, as noted above, is
distinct from our objective. The task before us is not to limit the set of equilibria but
rather to explore the dynamics of play for a particular class of equilibria. In our setting, a
player ultimately wants to reveal it is a cooperative type but would like to do so only after
the other player has done so. Thus, the issue is about the timing of building a reputation
and whether that tendency to wait prevents cooperation from ever emerging. In this sense,
our equilibrium has some commonality to the war of attrition characterized in Atakan and
Ekmekci (2009) though they consider a di¤erent class of stage games.11
Though for complete information, a related mathematical structure to that explored
here is Dixit and Shapiro (1985). They consider a repeated Battle of the Sexes game
which can be interpreted as two players simultaneously deciding whether or not to enter
a market. It is protable for one and only one rm to enter. The stage game then has
two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria and one symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
In the repeated version, the dynamic equilibrium has randomization in each period with,
e¤ectively, the game terminating once there is entry. Farrell (1987) considers this structure
8The Stackelberg action for one player minimaxes the other player.
9Player 1s Stackelberg action along with player 2s best reply produces the highest stage game payo¤
for player 1 and the minimax payo¤ for player 2.
10On this topic, also see Mailath and Samuelson (1998).
11 In Atakan and Ekmekci (2009), the equilibrium is equivalent to a war of attrition as each player seeks
to hold out revealing it is not committed to its Stackelberg action. In their setting, the player that concedes
in the war of attrition increases its current period payo¤ relative to not conceding, but ends up with a lower
future payo¤ than if its rival had conceded. In our setting, the player that concedes decreases its current
period payo¤, relative to its rival conceding, but su¤ers no disadvantage in terms of its future payo¤ from
having conceded rst. In our setting, waiting occurs in order to avoid a short-run cost from conceding, while,




inverse market demand for rm i of 0   1qi   2qj where 0 > 0; 1  2 > 0; thus,
products can be di¤erentiated. In mapping the PrisonersDilemma to this setting, action
















0   1ql   2qh   c
i
;
which holds if and only if qh > ql. The Bertrand price game with homogeneous goods and
constant marginal cost is, loosely speaking, the special case when b = 2a; a > d = c = 0: If
both set the monopoly price then each earns a. Deviation from that outcome involves just
undercutting the rivals price which means that the price-cost margin is approximately the
same but sales are doubled so that the payo¤ is 2a. Given the other rm prices at cost,
pricing at cost as well yields a prot of zero (so, d = 0) as does pricing at the monopoly
price (so, c = 0).14
Players are innitely-lived and anticipate interacting in a PrisonersDilemma each pe-
riod. There is perfect monitoring so the history of past actions is common knowledge. If
players have a common discount factor of ; the grim trigger strategy is a subgame perfect




To capture uncertainty on the part of a player as to whether the other player is willing to
cooperate, it is assumed that a players discount factor is private information. A player
can be of two possible types. A player can be type L (for "long run") which means its
discount factor is  where  > b ab d . Or a player can be type M (for "myopic") which means
its discount factor is zero (though any value less than b ab d should su¢ ce). Hence, type M
players always choose D. A necessary condition for cooperative play to emerge and persist
over time is then that both players are type L.
14The reference to "loosely speaking" is that this interpretation requires three prices - monopoly price,
just below the monopoly price, and marginal cost - while the PrisonersDilemma has only two actions.
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3.3 A Class of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
There are potentially many equilibria to this game and well focus on what we believe is a
natural class in which there is a learning phase and a collusion phase.15 The learning phase
comprises those periods for which rms types are not common knowledge and behavior
depends only on beliefs over types (that is, the strategy assigns the same action for all
histories that yield the same set of beliefs over types), while the collusion phase consists
of periods for which rmstypes are common knowledge and behavior can depend on past
play in an unrestricted way. During the learning phase, players are exclusively trying to
learn about the other players type towards initiating collusion. This interpretation is made
appropriate by focusing on strategies that depend only on beliefs as to the other players
type (as long as playerstypes are private information) and otherwise are independent of
the history of play. When instead both playerstypes are public information, rms enter
the collusion phase if they are both type L by adopting the grim trigger strategy for the
remainder of the horizon. At that point, behavior depends on the history of play. Finally,
there is the case when one players type is revealed to be L and the other players type is
still private information. We will assume that both players (when they are type L) adopt
the grim trigger strategy. As one player has revealed his type, the learning phase is over in
which case it is natural that the player whose type has been revealed adopts a grim trigger
strategy towards achieving collusion; and the other players best response, if type L, will be
to do the same.
To describe strategies during the learning phase, let t denote the probability that a
player attaches to the other player being type L in period t. For the symmetric equilibria
that we will characterize, t is common to both players as long as both playerstypes are
private information. Since only type L players choose action C then if, on the equilibrium
path, a player chooses C then the player must be type L. Hence, playerstypes are private
information only as long as they have both chosen D. Given symmetric strategies (and
symmetric initial beliefs), players have common beliefs regarding the other players type,
and these beliefs are common knowledge. Hence, t is not only the probability that player
15Strategies are described only when a player is type L because, when type M, a player always chooses D.
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1 attaches to player 2 being type L but is also player 1s point belief as to the probability
that player 2 attaches to player 1 being type L, and so forth.
The solution concept is a modication of Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (MPBE),
where a strategy is Markovian only during the phase when playerstypes are not common
knowledge. More specically, if t 2 (0; 1) then a type L agents period t play depends
only on t and no other element of the history; a Markov strategy is then of the form,
q () : [0; 1] ! [0; 1]. As long as playerstypes are private information, beliefs are updated
as follows. Suppose, in period t, t 2 (0; 1) and a type L player chooses C with probability







1  tqt : (2)
Note that t is montonically decreasing and strictly so when qt 2 (0; 1). Given that a type
M chooses D for sure and a type L chooses D only with probability 1 qt, the probability the
other rm is type L is declining with the length of time for which only D has been chosen.
1 is the common prior probability. By the usual denition, the equilibrium is not a MPBE
as rms engage in a grim trigger strategy upon their types becoming common knowledge.
To avoid confusion, well refer to the solution concept as Partial Markov Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PMPBE).
The class of PMPBE can be partitioned according to q1; the probability that a type L
chooses C in the rst period. Initially consider a strategy prole in which q1 = 1; that is,
a type L player chooses C for sure. The strategy is then separating which means that the
learning phase is limited to the rst period. If both players choose C in period 1 then it
is common knowledge both are type L and they adopt the grim trigger strategy. If, say,
player 1 chooses D then player 2 assigns probability zero to player 1 being type L in which
case player 2 chooses D, whether of type L or M. Thus, one or both choosing D in period
1 results in both choosing D in all ensuing periods, in which case there is no collusion.
To verify this strategy prole is an equilibrium, we need to show that choosing C for
sure in period 1 is optimal and, in response to both choosing C in period 1, it is optimal























1   ) (3)
1  (1  ) (d  c)
(1  ) (d  c) +  (a  d)  (1  ) (b  a) (4)
where (4) follows from (3) assuming the denominator is positive. (If the denominator is
negative then (3) does not hold.) The denominator is positive and the RHS of (4) is less
than one if and only if
 (a  d)  (1  ) (b  a) > 0)  > b  a
b  d;
which we assumed in (1) to ensure that collusion is feasible under complete information.
Also note that if this condition is satised then, in response to both choosing C in period
1, it is optimal to adopt the grim trigger strategy for the remainder of the horizon. In
sum, if players are su¢ ciently patient (as specied in (1)) and attach su¢ cient probability
to the other player being type L (as specied in (4)) then, when both players are type L,
they will choose action C in the rst period and collusion will immediately ensue. For this
equilibrium, the learning phase is trivial.
Next consider a PMPBE in which q1 = 0 so that type L players (as well as type M
players) choose D in the rst period. Since, by (2), 2 = 1 then, by the Markovian
assumption, q2 = 0. By induction, qt = 0 for all t. This is a pooling equilibrium; it has no
learning phase and rms never collude.
Finally, consider a PMPBE in which q1 2 (0; 1) so that a type L player assigns positive
probability to both choosing C and D, so it is a semi-separating equilibrium. In that it
has already been specied what happens when one or both players choose C (a player who
chose C adopts the grim trigger strategy), let us explore the various possibilities when all
previous play involves D having been chosen. There are three cases: i) 9T > 1 such that
qt 2 (0; 1) for all t 2 f1; :::; T   1g and qT = 1; ii) 9T > 1 such that qt 2 (0; 1) for all
t 2 f1; :::; T   1g and qT = 0; and iii) qt 2 (0; 1) for all t:
Case (i) has rms randomizing until period T at which time (if both have always chosen




useful to know whether such an equilibrium exists or instead equilibria must be of the form
in case (ii) which would imply that beliefs must eventually become su¢ ciently pessimistic
that attempts at collusion stop. Second, if these equilibria do exist - so players keep on
trying to collude in the sense of choosing C with positive probability - there is the question
of whether it implies that collusion will eventually occur for sure. Even if the probability
of choosing C declines over time, whether collusion is ensured depends on the speed of
that decline. Third, the primary focus of the paper is on the learning phase, which makes
this equilibrium attractive because learning is not arbitrarily assumed to terminate in some
period (as with case (ii)). Instead, rms randomize as long as it is optimal to do so which
continues to provide the opportunity to learn a rivals type. Fourth, in contrast to the
Pareto-e¢ cient separating equilibrium in which collusive types collude for sure in the rst
period, this equilibrium is able to produce delay with positive probability which means we
can explore the dynamics associated with the emergence of tacit collusion. Though rms
may prefer to enact collusion without delay, market and experimental evidence show that
they often do not. An equilibrium with delay may then be able to deliver some insight
regarding the emergence of collusion.
3.4 Equilibrium Properties
In this section we explore some properties of a Partial Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Recall that a PMPBE is partly described by: if t 2 (0; 1) then a type L agents period
t play depends only on t and no other element of the history, so it is of the form, q () :
[0; 1]! [0; 1]. The particular class of PMPBE we will explore are dened by the following




2 (0; 1). In period t  2; if (D,D)




2 (0; 1); and if (D,D) in periods
1; :::; t  2 and not (D,D) in period t  1 then choose C and adopt the grim trigger strategy.
Recall that, as long as both players chose D, t evolves according to (2). Equilibrium
conditions are of three types. First, conditions to ensure randomization is optimal when
(D,D) has always been played. Second, given both players chose D up to the preceding
period and then one player chose C and the other chose D in the preceding period, it is
optimal for the player who chose C to do so again in the current period (it being the initial
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move for the grim trigger strategy). Third, in response to the history just described, it is
optimal for the player who chose D to choose C (again, it being the initial move for the
grim trigger strategy). The last scenario just requires optimality of the grim trigger strategy
given the other player is type L and chooses the grim trigger strategy, which is satised
if and only if (1) holds. The second case is distinct in that player 1 remains uncertain as
to the other players type. After dealing with the rst set of conditions, well examine the
second condition.17
Before tackling these conditions, a comment is in order. In deriving equilibrium con-
ditions, a player will go through the thought experiment of deviating from q (). Note,
however, that this does not upset the specication of common beliefs. Suppose player 1




. As each player expects the




, each player assigns probability
t(1 q(t))
1 tq(t)
to the other player being type L. While player 1 knows that player 2s beliefs about player
1s type are incorrect, that is irrelevant as all player 1 cares about is player 2s type and





the relevant state variable, even if a player deviates from equilibrium play.
Suppose both playerstypes are private information, so either it is period 1 or it is some






















With probability ; the other player is type L and chooses C with probability q which results
in cooperative payo¤ a being earned in the current and future periods; and chooses D with
probability 1  q so that payo¤ c is earned in the current period and the cooperative payo¤
17As shown by, for example, Bhaskar (1998) and Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2008), mixed strategy
equilibria for an innitely repeated game need not be puriable, which, if that is the case, removes an
important motivation for mixed strategy equilibria. The loss of purication is due to the loss of local
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. For example, Bhaskar (2000) derived a continuum of mixed strategy Nash
equilibria for a repeated game, none of which were the limit of pure strategy equilibria of a perturbed game.
This concern about purication could well provide a rationale for our focus on PMPBE. With PMPBE,
randomization only occurs when strategies condition on players (common) belief over the other players




thereafter. Note that, regardless of the other players action, if the other player is type L
as well then both players adopt the grim trigger strategy thereafter so a is earned in the
future. With probability 1  ; the other player is type M so that player chooses D which
results in a payo¤ of c in the current and subsequent period (as C is chosen in the next
period as well on the hope that collusion will have been initiated) and the non-collusive
payo¤ d thereafter. Simplifying this expression,
WC() = q (a  c) + (1 + ) c+ 

(a  d)




1   : (5)









































If, in equilibrium, q 2 (0; 1) then the expressions in (5) and (7) must be the same:
q (a  c) + (1 + ) c+ 

(a  d)






































+ (b  a)  (d  c)
: (8)
(8) will need to hold for type L rms to optimally randomize when the history is composed
only of having played D.










 [(1  ) (a  c) +  (a  d)] 2 [0; 1) ;
and lim!1 q () < 1.
Let us briey review the key elements of the proof of Theorem 1. As stated in Theorem
1, if  <  then rms choose D. To ensure the optimality of that behavior, the highest
value for  is found such that a rm prefers D regardless of the value for q of the other rm
(with the binding case being q = 0). This condition delivers : Theorem 1 also states that,
when  > , a rm is content to randomize between C and D given the history is composed
of rms having only chosen D. It is shown that if  >  then, if its rival chooses D for
sure (q = 0), a rm strictly prefers C (q = 1) because therell be no chance of cooperation
otherwise; thus, q = 0 is not part of a symmetric equilibrium. If its rival chooses C for sure
(q = 1), a rm strictly prefers D (q = 0) because it does not need to choose C in order
for cooperation to emerge; thus, q = 1 is not part of a symmetric equilibrium either. From
these results and the continuity of payo¤s, it follows that there is a value of q 2 (0; 1) such
that the expected payo¤s from C and D are equalized. Finally, recall that when a player
has randomized and chosen C when the other rm simultaneously chose D, the player that
chose C needs to nd it optimal to choose C in the next period for sure. It was previously
derived in (9) that the prescribed behavior of following C with C is optimal if and only if
  . It is shown in the proof that if  is su¢ ciently close to one then    which
ensures that a rm that takes the initiative by rst choosing C (which implies  > ) will
optimally choose C again on the hope that its rival will reciprocate by choosing C.
The next result concerns the evolution of beliefs and behavior in response to a failure
to cooperate, by which we mean both players have thus far always chosen D. Recall that
if a player assigns probability  to the other player being type L then, after observing the
other player choose D, the updated probability is (1 q())1 q() where q () is the equilibrium
probability that a type L player chooses C given beliefs . Further recall, from Theorem 1,
that if  >  then q () > 0:
Theorem 2 If q () is a symmetric Partial Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as de-




> 0 for all t and
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Recall that  has the property that if t <  then choosing D is optimal because the
likelihood that its rival is type L - and has the capacity to collude - is su¢ ciently low.
Hence, if 1 <  then type L rms will choose D in the rst period (and, by stationarity,
thereafter) and collusion never has a chance to emerge. However, if instead 1 >  then,




> 0 for all t: Therefore, no matter
how long players have failed to cooperate, a type L player will continue to try to initiate
cooperation (in the sense of assigning positive probability of choosing C). In other words,
beliefs never become so pessimistic about the other players willingness to cooperate that a
player prefers to abandon any prospects of cooperation by playing D for sure. When  > 0,
it is also the case that the probability of a player initiating cooperation converges to zero
over time in response to the probability that the other player is type L converging to 
after a history of failed cooperation. Note that the probability of a type L player playing C
must converge to zero as the probability of a player being type L approaches  (> 0) from
above. If q () was instead bounded above zero then a su¢ ciently long sequence of playing
D would have to result in a su¢ ciently small probability of the player being type L, which
would contradict this probability being bounded below by  (at least when  > 0). Finally,
conditional on cooperation not yet having emerged, the probability assigned to a player




in which case the probability that cooperation emerges





2. While this value is always positive - so collusion is
always a possibility - it converges to zero in response to an ever-increasing sequence of failed
attempts at collusion, in which case collusion eventually becomes very unlikely to emerge.
Whether collusion emerges for sure is explored for the class of PMPBE examined in the
next section.
3.5 A¢ ne Equilibria
For the class of PMPBE described in Theorem 1, let us examine those for which the value
function is a¢ ne in  (when playerstypes are private information). The appeal to a¢ ne
PMPBE is their tractability in that they have closed-form solutions, which will allow addi-
109
ZHAO: Chapter 3
tional properties to be derived about the dynamics. In particular, the question of whether
collusion is delayed but inevitable can be addressed.
Denition 3 An a¢ ne Partial Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a PMPBE (as
described in Theorem 1) in which the value function is a¢ ne in  for  2 [; 1].
Theorem 4 There exists b 2 (0; 1) such that if  > b then there exists a unique a¢ ne




1  if  2 [0; ]
x+ y if  2 [; 1]
(10)
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2 (1  ) : (12)
and

  [(b  a)  (d  c)]2 + 4 (a  c) (b  a) : (13)
Furthermore, if  2 (; 1] then
q () =
 (a  d) +  (1  ) (d  c  y)











(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y)
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converges to zero and thus is even-





ically declining over time, in which case the probability a player chooses C decreases with
the length of time for which cooperative play has not yet occurred.





If both players are type L then, in any period, there is always a positive probability
that one of them will choose the cooperative action and thereby result in the emergence
of collusion. It must then be true that a long sequence of choosing D is not a su¢ ciently
pessimistic signal (that the other player is type L) which can only be the case if, as t ! ,
the probability that a type L player chooses C converges su¢ ciently fast to zero. But, as
shown in the previous result, this also has the implication that the probability that two
type L players start colluding in period t is going to zero su¢ ciently fast, which means
collusion is not assured. If both players are willing and able to cooperate, there is a positive
probability that they never do so though they never give up trying.
3.6 Examples
3.6.1 Example 1: Bertrand Price Game
Assume b = 2a; d = c = 0; and normalize so a = 1: This case approximates the Bertrand
price game in which, for example, market demand is perfectly inelastic at two units with a
maximum willingness to pay of 1, and rms have zero marginal cost. A rms equilibrium
strategy during the learning phase is20 q () =
 p
4 + 1  1
  p
4 + 1 + 1

: As one would
expect, the probability of choosing C is higher when players are more patient.
3.6.2 Example 2: Bertrand Price Game with Relative Compensation
Let us modify the Bertrand price game so that managers - not owners - are repeatedly mak-
ing price decisions and managerial compensation is based on relative performance. Specif-
ically, a manager receives compensation equal to half of rm prot but, in the event that
the other rm has higher prot, incurs a penalty equal to one-quarter of the rival rms
prot. The single-period payo¤ to a manager is then:






(1=2)ti   (1=4)tj if ti < tj
20Derivations for all examples are available on request.
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where ti is the period t prot of rm i. If market demand is perfectly inelastic at two units
with a maximum willingness to pay of 2 (and zero marginal cost) then the managerspayo¤
matrix is represented by: a = 1; b = 2; c =  1; d = 0. Equilibrium has:
q () =
8><>:
















If  = :8 then  = :375 and, for  > :375, q () ' :335   :126 : If players have thus far
always played D then, in each player updating their beliefs as to the other players type, t
will fall over time which then induces type L players to choose C with a lower probability.
Assuming each rm initially assigns a 50% chance to its rival being type L, there is a 36%
chance that collusion is never achieved.
3.6.3 Example 3: Asymmetric Bertrand Price Game
Consider the following generalization of Example 1 where the collusive outcome is now
allowed to be asymmetric and  2 [1=2; 1).21




Cooperate ; 1   0; 1
Defect 1; 0 0; 0
The collusive outcome gives player 1 a market share of  which is at least 1/2. There is an
a¢ ne PMPBE with
q1 =
p
( + 4(1  ))  p
( + 4(1  )) + 
; q2 =
p
(1  )(1   + 4)  (1  )p
(1  )(1   + 4) + (1  )
One can prove that q1 is decreasing in  and increasing in ; and q2 is increasing in  and
:
21A preliminary analysis suggests that many of the results in Sections 3 and 4 can be extended to when




Then there is work in which sales or some other endogenous variable is private informa-
tion and rms exchange messages for monitoring purposes; see Aoyagi (2002), Chan and
Zhang (2009), and Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011).23 Communication may also be used
to resolve strategic uncertainty; specically, in order to coordinate a move from a non-
collusive to a collusive equilibrium. Here, intentions rather than hard information is being
communicated.
Within the context of the equilibrium paradigm, the current paper sought to make
progress on the tacit signaling of the intention to collude. In a sense, signaling in our model
is part information (regarding a players type) and part intentions (regarding cooperative
play). Let us summarize our main ndings. If the initial probability that players are capable
of colluding is su¢ ciently high then, in any period, there is always the prospect of collusion
emerging; no matter how long is there a history of failed collusion, beliefs as to players being
cooperative types remain su¢ ciently high that it is worthwhile for them to continue to try
to cooperate. This does not imply, however, that collusion is assured. For a wide class of
situations, there is a positive probability that collusion never emerges. Players never give
up trying to collude but they may also never succeed.
In terms of future work, one research direction is to allow a players type to change over
time, rather than remain xed forever.24 When a cooperative type raises price and does not
receive a favorable response, itll infer that its rival is an uncooperative type. In that case, it
might be inclined to try again later on the hope that the rivals type has changed. But it may
also be the case that a player who has previously failed to respond in kind to an invitation
to collude will see itself as having the onus to initiate cooperation (in the event that its type
changes) because its rival believes it is an uncooperative type. Now suppose players are
currently engaged in cooperative play. A deviation by a player is part of equilibrium play
and signals a change in a players type to being uncooperative. Assuming persistence in
types, the punishment of the deviator would have a certain credibility (beyond simply being
an equilibrium) in that the other player believes there is little point in trying to cooperate.
Indeed, non-cooperation may be the unique equilibrium. All this could put the burden on
23There is also an extensive game theory literature on the issue of private monitoring. See Compte (1998),
Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Kandori (2002), Zheng (2008), and Obara (2009)
24Recent work by Escobar and Toikka (2009) provides a foundation for such an analysis.
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the deviator to re-initiate cooperation. Even this cursory analysis suggests that a rich set
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Proof of Theorem 1. To start, let us show that  2 [0; 1) :   0 follows from d  c
and a > d.  < 1 if and only if




(d  c),  > d  c
a  c :




a  c ) (b  a) (a  c)  (d  c) (b  d)) b+ c  a+ d
which is true by assumption.
We need (9) to hold when rms are randomizing, which means when  > . That is
the case if    which, after some manipulation, is equivalent to:
1 + 
 [(1  ) (a  c) +  (a  d)] 
1
 (a  d)  (1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] : (15)
(15) holds as  ! 1. Thus, as long as  is su¢ ciently close to one (which is a condition
of Theorem 1) then as soon as one player chooses C, both players will optimally adopt the
grim trigger strategy when they are type L.
Now let us move on to establishing stated properties on q (). A player strictly prefers

































Note that V () has a lower bound of d1  - as a player can assure itself of a payo¤ of at











where we used (20). However, note that the expressions in (21) are the same as those in
(17). By our previous analysis, if  =  then (17) holds with equality when q = 0 and with
strict inequality when q > 0. We conclude that (21) and q () > 0 are inconsistent and,
therefore, q () = 0.
Next let us show: if  >  and q () is part of a PMPBE then q () 2 (0; 1). To prove
q () > 0; suppose not so 90 >  such that q (0) = 0: By the preceding logic, V (0) = d1  :
In that case, the payo¤ to D is at least as great as that from C if and only if (19) holds with
a weak inequality which the previous analysis showed that is the case if and only if   :
Therefore, if  >  then q () > 0. To show that q () < 1, suppose q () = 1. The payo¤s
from C and D are:
























Since choosing D yields a strictly higher payo¤ 8 2 (0; 1], it follows that q () must
be bounded below 1 8 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, q () < 1 8 2 (0; 1] and, furthermore,
lim!1 q () < 1: Finally, Theorem 4 proves by construction that there exists q () : (; 1]!
(0; 1) for which the expected payo¤s from C and D are equalized and thus is part of a
PMPBE.
To complete the proof, let us show the properties on V () are true, given the properties







; as V () has a
lower bound of d1  and
a
1  is an upper bound because the highest average symmetric
payo¤ is a. If q () = 0 then type L players play D for sure in the current period and
since (1 q())1 q =  then the same is true for all ensuing periods; hence, by stationarity, if







when  2 (; 1) ; note that
q () 2 (0; 1) implies V () = WC() = WD(): d1  is a lower bound on V () for all 





Proof of Theorem 4. First note that, by the same argument in the proof of Theorem 1,
if  is su¢ ciently high then   .
Re-arranging (8), an equilibrium q () is dened by
q [(b  a)  (d  c)] + (1  )  (a  d)
1   + (d  c) +  (1  ) (d  c) (24)
=  (1  q)

a





Conjecturing that the value function is linear in ;
V () = x+ y; (25)
substitute (25) into (24).
q [(b  a)  (d  c)] + (1  )  (a  d)
1   + (d  c) +  (1  ) (d  c) (26)
=  (1  q)

a








 (a  d) +  (1  ) (d  c  y)









(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y)
Thus, q is a¢ ne in  if the value function is a¢ ne in . As a player is indi¤erent between
playing C and D, the value can be given by the payo¤ to choosing C for sure:
V () = q (a  c) +  (a  d)
1   + c+
d
1      (1  ) (d  c) :
The value function is a¢ ne in q and, since q is a¢ ne in , V () is a¢ ne in :
The next step is to show that there exist unique values for x and y. Using the payo¤ to
playing C, in equilibrium the value function equals:
V () = q (a  c) + c+  (a  d)
1   +
d





 (a  c) [(a  d) + (1  ) (d  c  y)]
(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y)+ (28)
 (a  d)
1   +  (d  c)
+ (a  c)
"









1      (d  c)
Equating coe¢ cients between (25) and (28), we have
x = (a  c)
"










1      (d  c)
y =
 (a  c) [(a  d) + (1  ) (d  c  y)]
(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y) +
 (a  d)
1   +  (d  c) (30)
To show that there is a unique solution to (29)-(30), dene z  x+ y and note that:
z = x+ y = V (1) =WC(1) = Q(a  c) +  (a  d)
1   + c+
d
1   ;
where Q = q(1): Simplifying the preceding equation gives:
z = Q(a  c) + a
1   + c: (31)
If we can show that there exists a unique Q 2 (0; 1) satisfying the equilibrium condition
(26) when  = 1, then z = x+ y = V (1) is unique.
Evaluating (26) at  = 1, we have:
Q [(b  a)  (d  c)] + (d  c) =  (1 Q)

a






 (a  c)Q2   [2 (a  c) + (b  a)  (d  c)]Q+ [ (a  c)  (d  c)] = 0:
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This quadratic has two solutions:
Q =




2 (a  c) ;
where

  [2 (a  c) + (b  a)  (d  c)]2   4 (a  c) [ (a  c)  (d  c)] (32)
= [(b  a)  (d  c)]2 + 4 (a  c) (b  a)
> 0
since b > a > c. Hence, the two solutions are real. Next note that the bigger root exceeds
one:
Qb = 1 +




2 (a  c) > 1:
Thus, we only need to show that the smaller root falls in (0; 1).
Qs = 1 +




2 (a  c) < 1
if and only if
(b  a)  (d  c) <
p

, [(b  a)  (d  c)]2 < 
,
[(b  a)  (d  c)]2 < [(b  a)  (d  c)]2 + 4 (a  c) (b  a)
, 0 < 4 (a  c) (b  a) ;
therefore, Qs < 1. Qs > 0 if and only if
[2 (a  c) + (b  a)  (d  c)]2 > 
:
From (32), the preceding condition is equivalent to
4 (a  c) [ (a  c)  (d  c)] > 0;
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There then exists a unique Q 2 (0; 1); and z = x+ y = V (1) is unique since it is linear
in Q. In addition, plugging Qs in (31) gives
z =







1   + c
=
2a + (1  )
h





2 (1  ) :
To close the model, use the initial condition V () = d1  ; which takes the form:
x =
d





 [(1  ) (a  c) +  (a  d)] :
x is then the unique solution to
x =
d






 [(1  ) (a  c) +  (a  d)] ;
and y is the unique solution to: y = z   x: This completes the proof that there is a
unique a¢ ne PMPBE. Finally, solving for q from (27) gives us (14).
This construction of an equilibrium q () was the basis for the existence statement in
Theorem 1. As that statement also had q () 2 (0; 1) if  2 (; 1] then we need (14) to
satisfy that condition as well. Given that q is increasing in  (see Theorem 6), it need
only be shown that q () = 0 and q (1) < 1. Those two properties are straightforward to
establish by substituting  and 1, respectively, into (14).
Proof of Theorem 5. Since the equilibrium probability of choosing C is
q () = 

 (a  d) +  (1  ) (d  c  y)













then q () is increasing in  if and only if
 (a  d) +  (1  ) (d  c  y)
(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y) > 0: (33)
By assumption (b  a)  (d  c)  0; and V (1) < a1  implies
a
1     (x+ y) > 0: (34)
Thus, (33) is true if and only if the numerator is positive:
(a  d)
1   + (d  c) > y: (35)
Suppose (35) was not true. From (30), we have
y =
 (a  c) [(a  d) + (1  ) (d  c  y)]
(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y) +
 (a  d)
1   +  (d  c) : (36)








1   + (d  c)
which contradicts the supposition that (35) is not true. From this contradiction, we conclude
(35) and thus q () is increasing in .
To show that V () is increasing in , recall that
V () = q () (a  c) +  (a  d)
1   + c+
d
1      (1  ) (d  c) :
That q () is increasing in  delivers the result.
Proof of Theorem 6. For   , q () = 0, so it is non-decreasing in  for  2 [0; ].
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From hereon, suppose  >  so that
q () =
 (a  d) +  (1  ) (d  c  y)











(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y)
#
Thus, q () is increasing in  if and only if
"





(1  ) [(b  a)  (d  c)] + a   (1  ) (x+ y)
#
< 0 (37)
The denominator of the LHS of (37) is positive because b   a  d   c by assumption and
a
1  > x+ y as shown in (34). Thus, (37) is true if and only if the numerator is negative:




(d  c) < 0: (38)
Suppose (38) was not true. From (29), we would then have x  c + d1     (d  c) which
implies





 a   (1  ) (c+ d





By rearranging terms, the RHS of (39) is equivalent to
  (1  ) (1  2)(d  c) (40)
which is negative if and only if d > c. Hence, the LHS of (38) is negative for d > c, which
contradicts the supposition that (38) is not true. From this contradiction, we conclude (38)






























































































































4 An Empirical Framework for Exclusive Discount
4.1 Introduction
Rather than directly constraining buyerspurchases, exclusive dealing sometimes takes a
more subtle form: discounting with an exclusive requirement. For exclusive discount, buyers
receive the discount price only if they make a certain proportion of their total purchase
(market-share requirement) or a certain amount of purchases (volume requirement1) from
the supplier. If buyers do not agree or do not meet the requirement, they have to pay a
higher noncompliance price.2 When the market-share requirement is 100%, the discount is
perfectly exclusive. When in addition the noncompliance price is set to innity, it gives the
special case of perfect exclusion. This paper focuses on building an empirical framework
for perfect exclusive discount. Exclusive discount is more complicated when applied to
bundled products. The discount may only apply to buyers who obtain the bundle from
the supplier (hereafter bundled discount) or it may also apply to buyers who purchase a
subset of products in the bundle as long as they restrict their purchase from rival suppliers
(hereafter exclusive discountin a narrow sense). As shown in this paper, di¤erent forms
of discounts may lead to opposite conclusions in consumer welfare analysis. For example,
in some cases, exclusive discount may benet consumers while bundled discount hurts them
under the same market conditions. Thus, it is crucial to distinguish forms of discount in
antitrust practice.
Exclusive discount has raised various antitrust concerns in recent years.3 Despite its
name, exclusive discount is not necessarily a true discount. The so-called discount is
relative to the noncompliance or stand-alone prices rather than to the but-for prices. The
major antitrust concern with exclusive discount is its potential foreclosure e¤ect: a market-
share requirement or volume target might hurt competitors by foreclosing a certain portion
1Though not explicitly so, a volume requirement is generally exclusive as it decreases residual demand
for competitorsproducts.
2Noncompliance prices are not always higher than the bundled discount. Rey and Tirole (2013) provides
an example where bundled prices are higher then the sum of stand-alone prices.
3 Important examples includes SmithKline v. Eli Lilly, Ortho v. Abbot, Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp, Virgin Atlantic v. British Airways, and LePages v. 3M. See Greenlee and Reitman (2005) and
Kobayashi (2005a) for a review.
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of market demand. Even if competitors are not foreclosed from the market, exclusive
discount may serve as a tool to segregate the markets and reduce competition. Bundled
discount also raises concerns in price discrimination against buyers who are only interested
in some of the products in the bundle. In addition, as discussed in Elhauge (2009a, 2009b),
when the magnitude (either in percentage or absolute value) of discount is xed, exclusive
discount might discourage the supplier from competing for free buyers.
Despite of these potential anticompetitive e¤ects, an exclusive discount might also be
procompetitive. For example, exclusivity might help in avoiding free-riding, reducing uncer-
tainties, and generating cost e¢ ciencies. More importantly, exclusive discount might reect
true price discount and thus enhance competition and benet consumers even absent any
of these procompetitive e¤ects. In this case, exclusive discount allows the rm to charge
di¤erent prices for di¤erent bundles. Thus, it can price more aggressively in one bundle
without cutting prices for other bundles. Hence, whether a specic exclusive discount is
detrimental to consumers or not should be examined case by case rather than be declared
legal or illegal per se.
There is a gap between economic theory and antitrust practice in the sense that there
exist few empirical works that are both rooted in current economic theory and directly
applicable for case-by-case antitrust practice.4 Economic theory generally assumes homo-
geneous product together with other simplications. It is generally unclear how to apply
these models to a specic case and how to estimate the demand and cost functions. On
the other hand, antitrust practice often relies on rule-of-thumb tests that lack a complete
economic theory foundation or do not necessarily target consumer welfare. For example,
pricecost tests, such as the Ortho test, generally evaluate whether the discount prices are
above average cost so that it will not foreclose an equal competitor. However, these tests
are inappropriate because they focus only on the supply side of the market. The antitrust
law is intended to protect competition rather than competitors and the ultimate standard
should be based on impact on consumer welfare. Hence, a proper empirical analysis should
provide predictions on consumer welfare.5
4Pereira et al. (2012) is one of the few papers using current economic theory to model demand and dene
market for bundled products.
5Some theoretical works also provide tests that target consumer welfare. For example, Greenlee et al.
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This paper attempts to ll the gap between economic theory and antitrust practice for
bundled and exclusive discount by developing empirical frameworks directly applicable to
case studies. The frameworks are based on the discrete-choice models popular in industrial-
organization literature since Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) employed them. The paper
shows that by dening product bundles as choice alternatives and di¤erentiating between
products and alternatives, the discrete-choice model can be applied to estimate demand
with bundled or exclusive discount. The framework also claries the di¤erence between
a bundled discount and an exclusive discount. The numerical examples demonstrate that
these di¤erences are important as there are cases where bundle discount hurts consumers
while exclusive discount makes them better o¤ and vice versa. The framework admits a
variety of variations. To name a few, it applies to cases where consumers are allowed to buy
products in the bundle from di¤erent rms and to cases where they are not. It also applies
when not all rms o¤er all products in the bundle. The framework assumes away potential
procompetitive e¤ects related to free-riding, uncertainty and cost e¢ ciencies, which are
usually specic to industry characteristics and di¢ cult to evaluate in practice. Thus, if
any of these procompetitive e¤ects is believed to be important to an industry, applying the
framework provides conservative conclusions on the benet of exclusive discount.
With the estimated-demand system, counterfactual analysis can be performed to eval-
uate the impact on consumers and producers of an environmental or policy change, for ex-
ample, disallowing exclusive discount or a new entrant. As the di¤erence between products
and alternatives complicates the computations in counterfactuals, numerical examples and
solution steps (in the Appendix) are provided to demonstrate how to apply the framework.
The numerical examples also show that welfare e¤ects of bundled or exclusive discount are
case-specic and can be obtained by applying the framework to a specic case.
In conclusion, the paper provides a general empirical framework for a variety of ex-
clusive discounts, including bundled-product markets and commitment in discounts. The
framework is based on current game theory and structural economic models and is intended
as a tool for antitrust practice directly targeting consumer welfare analysis. The rest of
(2008) suggests tests based on their theoretical model that links price comparison to welfare e¤ect. However,
the tests require homogeneous products and other restrictions.
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the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes potential procompetitive and anti-
competitive e¤ects discussed in the literature and in practice. Section 3 provides the main
model analyzing exclusive discount with bundled products. Representative variations of
the main model are given in Section 4. Section 5 provides numerical examples applying the
main model and its variations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Antitrust Issues with Exclusive Discount
Various pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects of exclusive discount are explored in the literature
and in antitrust practice. Di¤erent e¤ects are crucial in di¤erent cases and some e¤ects
might be irrelevant in certain cases. Important potential anticompetitive e¤ects include
foreclosure, price discrimination, discouraged discounting, and reduced product diversity.
On the other hand, exclusive discount might also benet consumers through true discount,6
preventing free-riding, generating e¢ ciencies, and reducing uncertainties. The framework
introduced in the next section captures the net e¤ect of an exclusive discount in the absence
of benets from all the procompetitive e¤ects other than the pricing mechanism itself. In
practice, for a given xed- or setup-cost level, equilibrium prots solved in the framework
can be used to predict exit and entry decisions (the foreclosure e¤ect). Inuences of an
exclusive discount on incentives for discounting or product diversity can be evaluated by
applying the framework to di¤erent market structures and comparing the equilibriums as
shown in Section 4. Potential benets related to free-riding, e¢ ciencies, and uncertainties
are not captured in the framework. Modeling them should be industry specic and data
dependent. Thus, when any of these potential benets are important, conclusions from the
framework alone would be conservative in validating an exclusive discount contract.
To highlight di¤erent channels through which an exclusive discount might a¤ect con-
sumer welfare, pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects are listed in this section item by item. How-
ever, it is worth noting that these e¤ects might be interdependent. For example, exclusive
discount may reduce uncertainty and promote investment, which is generally regarded as a
procompetitive e¤ect. However, investment promotion is not necessarily procompetitive as
6True discount is dened as the lowering of price in the absence of any other procompetitive e¤ects
compared to the but-for price without exclusive discount. It emphasizes the impact of the pricing mechanism
and is, strictly speaking, a net e¤ect. See more discussion on this in Section 2.2.1.
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it might facilitate foreclosure.7 This implies that we should not evaluate e¤ects separately
and then summarize them. Instead, an empirical model targeting net consumer welfare and
incorporating important relevant e¤ects would be more appropriate.
4.2.1 Potential Anticompetitive E¤ects
In this subsection, I briey describe three common anticompetitive concerns raised in the
literature and in practice.8 In addition, the last part stresses consideration of product
diversity, which is rarely considered but could be important. To highlight the e¤ects, the
discussion focuses on the chain of causalities of an anticompetitive e¤ect while ignoring
interactions with other e¤ects. The same rule applies to the section on procompetitive
e¤ects. Instead of matching the conditions for each e¤ect, the empirical setting should be
based on industry specics and the estimated net e¤ect of bundled or exclusive discount is
a balance of all relevant anticompetitive and procompetitive e¤ects.
4.2.1.1 Foreclosure
The major antitrust concern on an exclusive discount is that it may foreclose (potential)
competitors by depriving them of (part of) the market demand, thereby reducing competi-
tion constraints.9 With reduced individual demand, rival rms may be e¤ectively prevented
from reaching e¢ cient scale, discouraged from making investment,10 and forced to adjust
their target market. When the foreclosed market is large enough, the exclusive contract may
induce exit or deter entry. The foreclosure e¤ect of an exclusive discount depends on many
factors11 such as the degree of foreclosure, the length of the contract, the importance of the
market to the rival suppliers, and availability of potential buyers to which a rival supplier
7See Fumagalli et al. (2009) for further discussion.
8There are also other less commonly considered anticompetitive e¤ects. For example, bundled discount
can be used to internalize pricing externalities in the presence of complementary goods.
9There is a large body of literature on the foreclosure e¤ect of exclusive dealing. See, for example,
Fumagalli and Motta (2006), Wright (2009), Abito and Wright (2008), Chen and Riordan (2007), Nalebu¤
(2004, 2005).
10Foreclosure discourages investment because the residual market is not large enough to cover the invest-
ment. Foreclosure is also likely to stimulate investment for a rival in order to improve its market condition.
However, such a story must explain why the rival would not make the same or even greater investment
without the pressure of exclusive contract.




can turn. In practice, pricecost type tests are commonly used and the major issue lies in
determining the but-for prices, which should provide predictions about rm strategies under
counterfactual settings. The counterfactual analysis demands a structural economic model
of consumer preference and other factors that are reasonably linked between the reality and
counterfactual worlds.
4.2.1.2 Market Power and Price Discrimination
Suppliers use of exclusive discounts in the distribution of their products has also been
attacked as unlawful price discrimination under the RobinsonPatman Act.12 For example,
the FTC challenged payments by McCormick in exchange for near exclusive shelf space
allocations as secondary-line price discrimination under this act.13 Theoretically, bundled
discounts can be used to price discriminate when consumers have heterogeneous preferences.
For imperfect competition in the bundled market, mixed bundling allows a supplier to
separate the consumers who demand the entire bundle from those who are only interested
in a single market. The price-discrimination e¤ect suggests that bundled exclusive discount
may hurt consumers even without foreclosing any competitors.14 However, as the numerical
examples in Section 5 imply, the price-discrimination e¤ect might be weak and dominated
by procompetitive e¤ects when suppliers also compete in o¤ering the bundled discount.15
4.2.1.3 Discourage Discounting
Elhauge (2009a, 2009b) argues that exclusive discounts can perversely discourage discount-
ing when suppliers commit in discount rate or magnitude. The idea is that when a supplier
commits in discount rate or magnitude, it has less incentive to compete for free buyers.
With the commitment, any price reduction to win sales to free buyers will also lower prices
to loyal buyers. This restriction in cutting prices in turn reduces the incentive of its ri-
12Building a theoretical model with homogeneous products, Greenlee et al. (2008) proposed tests for the
impact of price discrimination from exclusive discount on consumer welfare.
13For further discussion, see Kobayashi (2005b).
14 It is well known that there are simplied theoretical examples where second -degree price discrimination
might benet consumers even with a monopoly. However, it is not clear whether that is also true in the case
of exclusive discount without further examinations as in Section 5.
15As discussed in Anderson and Leruth (1993), when bundled discount is employed by all suppliers,




vals to cut prices. In addition, bundled exclusive discount may also discourage rivals from
discounting if the rivals do not compete in all products in the bundle. In this case, the
multimarket supplier can o¤er a small discount on all products in its bundle to make the
bundle more attractive than a large discount of a single product supplier. However, this
argument may rely on monopoly power in one of the linked markets. If the supplier faces
competitors in each market, then even if the rival on each product market is not su¢ cient to
exert competitive constraint, the rivals together may e¤ectively o¤era competitive bun-
dle. In addition, when market structure changes, the optimal discount rate or magnitude
might be smaller than the committed level, then the distortion in the suppliers strategy
might force it to discount more than its optimal level and could instead benet consumers.
4.2.1.4 Reducing Product Diversity
For consumers with heterogeneous preferences, reduction in product diversity due to an
exclusive contract should also be treated as an anticompetitive e¤ect. Note that even
partial requirements, such as a market-share discount, reduce product diversity. To satisfy
the exclusive requirement, a distributor needs to restrict availability of rivals products
for certain consumers or for certain periods. This provides a crucial implication for tests
that concentrate solely on prices: When diversity is important to consumers, showing that
consumers enjoy prices lower than the but-for case is insu¢ cient. The consumers might
benet in prices while losing in product diversity. Thus, an economic model taking into
account product diversity, such as the discrete-choice model, might be more appropriate.
4.2.2 Potential Procompetitive E¤ects
Other than using discounts as a tool for more aggressive competition (reduced -price e¤ect),
all the procompetitive e¤ects discussed below are related to the impact of the exclusive re-
quirement from the literature of exclusive dealing.16 These e¤ects are generally hard to
verify, let alone to quantify. As a rst step in building an empirical framework for exclu-
16There are other relatively rare procompetitive arguments. For example, Kolay et al. (2004) shows that
all-units discounts can be used to e¢ ciently address double-marginalization problems in the presence of
bilateral monopoly. For bundled discount, Greenlee et al. (2008) provides an interesting example with pure
bundling where bundling facilitates entry. Kobayashi (2005b) discusses that when demands for products are
correlated, a manufacturer may also use bundled discount as a way to facilitate entry into a new market.
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sive discount, the empirical model ignores the procompetitive e¤ects other than reducing
prices. Thus, the framework will underestimate benets of the exclusive discount when the
procompetitive e¤ects discussed below (other than the reduced-price e¤ect) are important.
4.2.2.1 Reduced Price
Although the literature stresses and examines situations where the discounts are not truly
lowering prices, the most natural procompetitive e¤ect of exclusive discount should be the
possibility of reducing prices. For bundled discount, exclusive discount might be used to
price more aggressively for certain bundles. It is more likely that exclusive discount will
strengthen competition when the competitors, instead of being foreclosed from the market,
o¤er exclusive discounts themselves. Even when foreclosure happens, as long as only part of
the market is foreclosed and any competitor is still able to reach its minimum e¢ cient scale,
it is still possible for exclusive discount to benet consumers. Klein and Murphy (2008)
provides one interesting story on this. In essence, exclusive dealing in the KleinMurphy
model intensies competition and lowers prices because it replaces individual preferences
for di¤erent brands with aggregate indi¤erence among brands.
4.2.2.2 Prevention of Distributor Free-Riding
Distributor free-riding occurs when distributors use either manufacturer-supplied promo-
tional investments or manufacturer paid-for promotional e¤orts to sell rival products.17
The reason is that manufacturers and distributors have divergent incentives in making an
additional sale of the manufacturers product. When a retailer distributes products of com-
peting manufacturers, a manufacturer benets from incremental sales of its product from
promotion. However, the distributor benets less because she must take into account the
negative externality of the incremental sales of the promoted product on sales of other com-
peting products. Utilizing promotional e¤ort from a particular manufacturer to improve
sales of all manufacturersproducts is thus protable for the distributor but detrimental to
the manufacturer.
17See further discussion on conditions and rationales for exclusive discount in preventing free-riding in
Klein and Lerner (2007) and Klein and Murphy (2008).
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The potential of free-riding discourages manufacturers from making promotional e¤orts,
thus reducing competition in promotional investment. When promotional e¤orts facilitate
the purchases of the nal consumers or help them in making decisions by providing necessary
information, the negative impact of free-riding could directly hurt nal consumers.
Exclusive dealing solves the free-riding problem by eliminating the distributorsoption
of selling competing products. Even for incomplete exclusionary contracts like a market-
share contract, it still helps by reducing the distributors benet and incentive for selling
the rivals products.
4.2.2.3 Generating E¢ ciencies
The exclusive dealing requirement of the discount, either involving bundling or not, has
many potential e¢ ciencies. First, it could reduce transaction cost. Second, if the contract
results in a higher sale compared to the but-for case, then it recovers xed cost faster
and generates e¢ ciencies through economies of scale. Third, for distributors, exclusive
dealing may help to assure quality or assure uniformity. It could also help distributors
achieve logistical e¢ ciencies as they deal with fewer suppliers.18 Fourth, for contracts that
involve bundling, bundling also may reduce the transaction and information costs involved
in purchasing, distributing, and selling goods and services. If the bundled products are
demand-side complements, it might benet consumers by providing package- or market-
integrated products. For example, as suggested by Kobayashi (2005b), transaction cost
savings can explain the use of standardized option packages for automobiles, computer
hardware and software, and the packaging of cold remedies and analgesics.
4.2.2.4 Reduced Uncertainty
By establishing an exclusive contract, both the manufacturers and the distributors might
benet from reduced uncertainty. Some benets from reduced uncertainty are directly cost
related, while some are not. Specifying price in the contract protects both parties against
price uctuations. By making demand and supply more predictable, the contract may assure
a dependable source of supply, prevent the hold-up problem, and promote investment in
18See further discussion in Steuer (2000).
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new supply and product enhancements.19 It is easy to see that the benet from uncertainty
for a specic case will depend on both the degree of uncertainty and its importance. For
example, if the relevant market has a record of maintaining a steady price level, then
protecting against price uctuation is hardly a concern in introducing the exclusionary
requirement.
4.3 An Empirical Framework for Exclusive Discount
4.3.1 Setup and Demand Function
Consider a static model where suppliers produce heterogeneous products in several related
markets. For example, in the pediatric vaccine market, rms produces several di¤erent
types of vaccines that may or may not be purchased together by consumers. Firms compete
in price and maximize their current prots. For the rest of this section, I elaborate with
a three-supplier, two-market model that captures key features of bundled and exclusive
discount. The model is easily revised to allow more markets and suppliers.
In markets A and B, there are three suppliers. Supplier S1 sells product A1 on market
A and product B1 on market B. Supplier S2 sells product A2 on market A only. Supplier
S3 sells product B2 on market B only. In this setting, Supplier S1 embodies the supplier
who might use its advantage in markets A and B to charge di¤erent prices conditional
on consumers bundle choices, which may (or may not) hurt other competitors and the
consumers. One could also choose to allow all suppliers to compete in all markets and all
o¤er bundled discount as in Section 4.1.2. I leave that as a variation because the literature
and antitrust practice suggest that industries where all suppliers can o¤er bundled discount
raise fewer antitrust concerns, especially the concern of the anticompetitive foreclosure
e¤ect.
Consumers choose to buy either one product from each market, or one product from
market A or B only, or make no purchases at all. Thus, the full set choices for a consumer
is:
AB = fA1; A2; B1; B2; (A1; B1) ; (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1) ; (A2; B2) ;NoPurchaseg :
19See further discussion in Gilbert (2000) and Steuer (2000).
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Dening an outside good A0 (B0) on market A (B), the choice set can be otherwise written
as
AB = f(a; b) j a 2 fA1; A2; A0g ; b 2 fB1; B2; B0gg : (1)
The utility of a nal consumer i choosing a bundle (a; b) 2 AB, namely product a from
market A and product b from market B, is
uabi = f (a; b) + "abi:
When there is no need to specify product a and b, I use n; ab; and (a; b) interchangeably
to simplify expressions and stress that choice is over the bundle rather than a single prod-
uct. As commonly employed in the literature, I further assume that utility is linear in
characteristics and prices of product a and b:20
uabi = Xaai +Xbbi + ab   i (pa + pb) + "abi:
Note that we can only identify an unobserved quality for the bundle, ab. As some bundles
share common products in market A or B, a logit model assuming i.i.d. "abi is inappropriate.
Specic to industry characteristics, one can use a nested logit model, a general nested logit
model21 or a random-coe¢ cient model. In this example, I illustrate with a nested logit
model where products are assigned to four groups: no purchase, purchase in both markets,
purchase in market A only, and purchase in market B only:
G0 : (A0; B0)
G1 : (A1; B1) ; (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1) ; (A2; B2)
G2 : (A1; B0) ; (A2; B0)
G3 : (A0; B1) ; (A0; B2) :
20The model also permits a nonlinear utility function. I choose a linear function because it is most
commonly used in practice.
21A cross-nested logit model is more appropriate. For example, all rms might sell in all markets with
no bundles consisting of products from di¤erent rms. Then the alternatives can be grouped by markets
covered as well as by producers. See Pereira et al. (2012) for an example, and see Bierlaire (2006) for how
to apply the cross-nested logit model.
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The utility function then can be written as
uabi = Xaa +Xbb + ab    (pa + pb) + "abi
= vab    (pa + pb) + "abi
= ab + "abi;
where for choice alternative n of the total N alternatives and group k of the total K groups
for consumer i, the cumulative distribution of "i = ("i1;:::;"iN ) is








k is the parameter that measures the degree of independence in unobserved utility among
the alternatives in group k. The mean utility of (A0; B0) can be normalized to be 0: 00 = 0.














Note that sn is a function of all prices as it is a function of all mean utilities (n 8 n).
Once choice alternatives are dened as bundles as in Expression (1), demand function
parameters can be estimated using price, market share, product characteristics, and instru-
ment data as in Berry et al. (1995). In cases where individual purchase data are observed,22
maximum likelihood, control function, or other estimation methods can be applied using
Expression (2). See Train (2003) for a thorough discussion.
4.3.2 Supply Side and Pricing Mechanisms
For Supplier S1, the cost function is C1 (qA1 ; qB1) with
@C1
@qA1
> 0 and @C1@qB1
> 0. For
simplicity, let
C1 (qA1 ; qB1) = cA1qA1 + cB1qB1 + F1:




For Suppliers S2 and S3, let
C2 (qA1) = cA2qA2 + F2;
C3 (qB2) = cB2qB2 + F3:
Fixed costs are omitted in the rest of the discussion as they do not a¤ect market equilibria
in the model.
The suppliers prot functions depend on their pricing mechanisms. In this section,
I consider three settings based on strategies allowed for supplier S1: (i) no discount; (ii)
bundled discount; (iii) (perfect) exclusive discount. In applications, pricing mechanisms
allowed for all suppliers should be case specic. For example, if single-product suppliers,
such as S2, are found to o¤er exclusive discount, this can easily be incorporated into the
framework in this paper. I allow suppliers S2 and S3 to employ exclusive discount in the
numerical examples (case (iv) all-product exclusive discount) but omit the formulae in this
section for simplicity. Fixed-di¤erence discounts are discussed in Section 4.2.
The prices of Supplier S1 a¤ect ve alternatives:
(A1; B1) ; (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1) ; (A1; B0) ; (A0; B1) :
Let the price when purchasing both products from Supplier S1 be dA1B1 , the prices when
purchasing one product from Supplier S1 and one from the other suppliers be (pA1 ; pB1),
the prices when purchasing only in market A or B be (dA1 ; dB1). The prot function of
Supplier S1 can be written as
1 (dA1B1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; dA1 ; dB1) (3)
= (dA1B1   cA1   cB1) qA1B1 + (pA1   cA1) qA1B2
+(pB1   cB1) qA2B1 + (dA1   cA1) qA1B0 + (dB1   cB1) qA0B1
= M
264 (dA1B1   cA1   cB1) sA1B1 + (pA1   cA1) sA1B2
+(pB1   cB1) sA2B1 + (dA1   cA1) sA1B0 + (dB1   cB1) sA0B1
375
where M is the market size or the total number of nal consumers. Note that M does not
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a¤ect price choices as I assume suppliers can always nd an interior solution for optimal
prices that generates positive prot.
For (i), no discount, Supplier S1 sets a common price (pA1 ; pB1) for all alternatives.
Namely,
dA1B1  pA1 + pB1 ;
dA1  pA1 ; dB1  pB1 :
Then the rst-order conditions (FOCs) for Supplier S1 in this case are















































For (ii), bundled discount, discount is only applied when consumers purchase the bundle
(A1; B1). Stand-alone prices are the same whether consumers purchases products from
suppliers S2 and S3 or not:
dA1  pA1 ; dB1  pB1 :
Supplier S1 sets the bundle price and stand-alone prices (dA1B1 ; pA1 ; pB1) and the FOCs are
sA1B1 + (dA1B1   cA1   cB1)
@sA1B1
@dA1B1

















sA1B2 + sA1B0 + (dA1B1   cA1   cB1)
@sA1B1
@pA1

















sA2B1 + sA0B1 + (dA1B1   cA1   cB1)
@sA1B1
@pB1


















For (iii), exclusive discount, consumers receive the discount if and only if they do not




Supplier S3 chooses pB2 to maximize its prot:
3 (pB2) = (pB2   cB2) (qA1B2 + qA2B2 + qA0B2) (8)
= M (pB2   cB2) (sA1B2 + sA2B2 + sA0B2) :
FOC:












I assume that all suppliers choose their prices simultaneously. The FOCs of the prot-
maximization problems (3), (7), and (8) give the suppliers best replies. Solving them
together provides the equilibrium prices.24 FOCs for this bundle alternative model are
more complicated than the single-product alternative case. Important steps in solving the
FOCs are given in the appendix.
Note that when two rms set two prices that together determine the total price of
a cross-rm alternative and the two prices are not part of the total prices of any other
alternatives, one possible equilibrium is that the two prices are set e¤ectively to innity so
that market share of the alternative is e¤ectively 0.25 This is part of an equilibrium because
a unilateral price drop will not a¤ect the alternatives market share.
4.3.3 More on the Cost Function
Policy evaluation requires computing equilibrium strategies in this case, prices for the
counterfactual settings using the FOCs. If there is no cost data, after the demand function
is estimated based on expression (2), marginal costs can be solved using FOCs for observed
prices. These marginal costs solved from reality cases are then used in solving prices in
24As in Berry et al. (1995), existence of an equilibrium is assumed and can be checked numerically.
Besides, the FOCs only provide necessary conditions, the solutions are numerically checked to be prot
maximizers.
25Mathematically, the market share is never 0 unless the price goes to innity. Numerically, a high enough
price will give a 0 market share, which is what e¤ectively innity and e¤ectively 0mean. Given the
price of one rm, if the price of the other rm must be below marginal cost to generate a positive market
share for the alternative, then any price above marginal cost that keeps the market share e¤ectively 0 is
a best response. Thus, I also nd equilibria where only one of the two prices for the alternative is set to
e¤ectively 0 in numerical results.
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the counterfactual settings. FOCs in the previous section are suitable for solving marginal
costs when the observed reality case is (i) no discount. In this case, the total number of
price variables equals the total number of products and the total number of marginal cost
parameters is as in the FOCs (4). Note that the FOCs are linear in the marginal costs.
Thus, as long as the coe¢ cient matrix is invertible, the marginal costs can be uniquely
determined using the FOCs.
However, when the observed reality case is instead (ii), bundled discount, or (iii), ex-
clusive discount, FOCs (5) and (6) cannot be directly used to back out the marginal cost
parameters. This is because the number of price variables is di¤erent depending on the
discount mechanism. For cases (ii) and (iii), the number of price variables is larger than
number of marginal cost parameters. Thus, if the augmented coe¢ cient matrix for the
FOCs when treating marginal cost as the unknowns has full rank, then there is no solution
for the marginal costs. Empirically, the solution is simply to allow more cost parameters
so that number of FOCs equals number of cost parameters. For example, for (ii), bundled
discount, one can allow the sum of marginal cost in o¤ering A1 and B1 together as a new
parameter aA1B1 . Then the FOCs for Supplier S1 become
sA1B1 + (dA1B1   aA1B1)
@sA1B1
@dA1B1

















sA1B2 + sA1B0 + (dA1B1   aA1B1)
@sA1B1
@pA1

















sA2B1 + sA0B1 + (dA1B1   aA1B1)
@sA1B1
@pB1


















Similarly, for (iii), exclusive discount, one can allow marginal costs to be di¤erent when
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A1 or B1 are o¤ered in discount as aA1 and aB1 . Then the FOCs for Supplier S1 become





























































































Empirically, if we observe more price variables in the data, we can back out a more
complicated the cost-function structure. Then the chosen cost-function structure is applied
to all cases. Note that theoretically there is nothing prevents
aA1B1 = cA1 + cB1
or
aA1 = cA1 ; aB1 = cB1
in the model. Thus, theoretically, if the true cost function is a simple special case of the
more general cost function specied in the model, then solving cost parameters from the
FOCs will result in this special case. Specically, backing out the cost parameters from the
FOCs will tell us whether there is a di¤erence in cost with the discount cases. For bundled
discount, one intuition on di¤erent marginal costs is that there could be distributional
savings in providing A1 and B1 together. For exclusive discount, one intuition is based
on the fact that there is an additional cost in monitoring whether consumers are violating
the exclusive agreement. In addition, whenever a contract is signed for the discount, the
monitoring cost may present savings from reduced uncertainties as well. These contract




If (ii), bundled discount, is the observed reality case and cost parameters are backed out
from FOCs (9), then when applied to counterfactual case (i), no discount, parameter aA1B1
is not used. When applied to counterfactual case (iii), exclusive discount, one can either
not use aA1B1 and stay with FOCs (6) or, instead, let the cost in the exclusive case to be
proportional, for example,




Similarly, if (iii), exclusive discount, is the observed reality case and cost parameters are
backed out from FOCs (10), then aA1 and aB1 can be ignored in the counterfactual cases
or we can let aA1B1 = aA1 + aB1 . Without additional cost data, the choices should depend
on the econometricians understanding of the industry features.
Note that one can also have nonlinear cost functions as long as the number of cost
parameters equals the number of FOCs (assuming that the coe¢ cient matrix from the FOCs
always has full rank). When there is additional cost-side data, it can be used to enrich the
cost function. One example is marginal cost as a function of product characteristics as in
Berry et al. (1995). Again, the econometrician should make sure (a) the cost parameters
can be exactly backed out from the reality-case FOCs and (b) the cost parameters can be
reasonably applied to the counterfactual cases.
4.3.4 Welfare E¤ect
After the cost parameters are solved using data from the reality case, they can be used in the
FOCs for the counterfactual cases to solve for the counterfactual prices. Prices across cases
can then be used to evaluate the impact of the bundled- or exclusive-discount contracts. In
addition, because Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions are identical in the nested
logit discrete-choice model, consumer surplus, CS, can be obtained simply by integrating









26Change in CS is a compensation variation, and CS tends to be overestimated in a logit-based model.
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where C is a constant representing that the absolute value of consumer surplus cannot be
determined. Following the literature on GEV models since McFadden (1978), it can also be
shown that nested and general nested logit models also satisfy Equation (11). Particularly,

























where !nk  0 8 n; k captures the portion of alternative n that is allocated to group k and
X
k
!nk = 1 8 n:










where i denotes the random coe¢ cients that vary across consumers.
4.4 Variations of the Framework
4.4.1 Other Market Structures
Theoretically, the model structure works with any number of suppliers covering any number
of markets. Here I discuss two representative structures. The rst has a monopoly in one
market, demonstrated by removing Supplier S3 in the main model. This variation addresses
the issue of extending market power in one market to another through bundled discount.
The second has a duopoly in both markets, which merges suppliers S2 and S3 and allows
the merged new supplier to o¤er bundled or exclusive discount as well. The model can be
used to provide judgments over the argument used by some courts that bundled discount
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is not anticompetitive if the other rms can also o¤er it.
4.4.1.1 Monopoly in One Market
Take the setup in Section 3, but assume that there is no Supplier S3. That is, the data
(prices, market shares, and others) observed are from competition between Suppliers S1
and S2. The set of all alternatives is
AB0 = f(a; b) j a 2 fA1; A2; A0g ; b 2 fB1; B0gg ;
and the alternatives are grouped as
G0 : (A0; B0)
G1 : (A1; B1) ; (A2; B1)
G2 : (A1; B0) ; (A2; B0)
G3 : (A0; B1)
In this market structure, Supplier S1 has a monopoly in market B. A natural question
in antitrust practice is whether this monopoly power can be extended to market A through
bundled or exclusive discount. As in Nalebu¤ (2008), monopoly power is extended when
(1) in equilibrium the monopoly Supplier S1 lowers its price in market B for consumers who
purchase from it exclusively in market A and (2) this bundling increases prot of Supplier
S1 compared to the no-discount case. For the exclusive-discount case, discount price dB1 is
directly observable. For the bundled-discount case, only the total bundled price is observed.
Assuming the e¤ective price of A1 in the bundle is no lower than pA1 , then dA1B1   pA1
provides an upper bound of the e¤ective price of B1 in the bundle. For a given industry,
equilibrium prices, prots, and consumer surplus can be compared between the no-discount
case and the bundled-discount case. The numerical examples in Section 5 suggest that the
conclusion should be case specic. They can also be used to compare this monopoly-in-one-
market structure with the main model. The examples suggest that qualitative results do
not naturally extend from the main model to the new structure.
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4.4.1.2 Duopoly in Both Markets
In this market structure, I assume that all suppliers produce in both markets A and B
and can o¤er bundled or exclusive discount.27 Particularly, I assume that products A2
and B2 are produced by the same rm. Thus, when compared to the main model, the
duopoly structure can be used to evaluate a hypothetical merger between Suppliers S2
and S3. Another purpose is to incorporate the situations where more than one rm o¤ers
bundled or exclusive discount. There are arguments in practice that bundled discount is
not anticompetitive if the other rms can also o¤er it. Although the arguments seems to
be reasonable for symmetric rms, it is not obvious whether it is also the case when one
rm enjoys a cost or quality advantage. In addition, bundled or exclusive discount in linked
markets A and B may be used for price discrimination to segregate markets and reduce
competition. The numerical examples in Section 5 explore possible welfare e¤ects under
this market structure.
4.4.2 Commitment in Discounts
In Section 3, I assume that there is no xed relationship between discount prices and regular
prices. In practice, suppliers sometimes must make a commitment to lower the discount
prices whenever the regular prices are lower to convince consumers to accept the exclusive
purchase requirement. The commitment could come in the form of xed value or percentage
discount. For example, for product j,







When dj (or j) are choice variables, the optimal solution has no di¤erence from those
in Section 3. However, if dj (or j) is xed when there is an environmental change in
27 In the corresponding examples in Section 5, I assume that either both suppliers choose bundled discount
or both choose exclusive discount. However, one can also let the two suppliers employ di¤erent pricing
mechanisms if that is the case in an industry.
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the markets, commitment in dj (or j) a¤ects the suppliers incentive for competition as
argued in Elhauge (2009a).28 Elhauge (2009a) argues that when a new supplier enters the
market, a discount commitment discourages the incumbent to compete for free buyers even
when buyers do not commit. However, the result is derived from a stylized theoretical
model. Elhauge implicitly assumes that, in a homogeneous product setup, a buyer would
not switch suppliers if the incumbent can match the price of the entrant. While this is
a reasonable assumption for homogeneous products, it seems to be crucial for the result.
In this section, I provide a model to evaluate the commitment e¤ect under heterogeneous
product competition as in the main model. A numerical counterpart is given in Section
5. This model and its numerical counterpart can then be used to test the generality of
Elhauges result in the heterogeneous product setup commonly used in empirical work.
Note that I use the setup in Section 3 where suppliers compete in more than one market to
provide a broad framework for empirical application. The modeling idea readily extends to
single-market competition.
I again illustrate the idea with an example, but the model can be generalized to more
suppliers with di¤erent product sets. Take the setup in the main model. That is, the data
(prices, market shares, and others) observed are from competition between Suppliers S1, S2,








) using Equation (12)
(or (13)) for observed prices and discounts of the last year in the data before the market
structure changes. Then assume that a hypothetical entrant, Supplier S4, who produces








) xed and (pA1 ; pB1) as the only choice variables for Supplier S1. As Supplier
S4 is a hypothetical entrant, no cost parameter can be backed out from the data. For the
purpose of antitrust analysis, allow product A3 to have the same cost and quality (mean









) can also be calculated. Comparing equilibrium prices with
consumer surplus evaluates the impact of commitment in discounts. Note that consumers
are assumed to have the freedom to switch suppliers when Supplier S4 enters as in Elhauge
28Elhauge labeled it loyalty discount. To avoid confusion with loyalty discount for buyers making
repeated purchases from the seller, I will refer to it as xed di¤erence discount or discount with commitment.
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(2009a). The results of the numerical analysis are presented in the appendix.
4.5 Numerical Examples
In the numerical examples, I assume the demand function is estimated from some dataset
via a nested logit model with the market-share function given as in Expression (2).29 For
the cost function, I assume that the data is obtained from the no-discount case and the
marginal cost is backed out from the FOCs (4). The xed cost is set to zero for all products
because endogenous entry and exit are not allowed in the model. The equilibrium prots
then provide the xed-cost thresholds for rms to be active.
With demand estimation, parameters in the model can be simplied. Specically, as
product characteristics are given,
vij  Xij + ij
is a xed number for each alternative (Ai; Bj). The utility function can be written as
uij = ij + "ij = vij   pij + "ij ;
where vij and  are given based on data and demand estimation. In this section, I evaluate
the market equilibrium for several di¤erent settings of the parameters: consumer preference
over price , within-group correlation parameter k, marginal costs (ci; cj), and mean price-
excluded utilities vij . The purpose is to illustrate possible results from the model. Welfare
e¤ects are found to be qualitatively di¤erent across settings, suggesting the e¤ect of bundled
or exclusive discount is case specic.
For each parameter setting, I compare equilibrium price, market share, prot, and con-
sumer surplus across several di¤erent market structures: (a) the main model described in
Section 3 where a multimarket supplier competes against a single-market rival on each mar-
ket; (b) monopoly in one market described in Section 4.1.1 where the multimarket supplier
faces no competition in market B; and (c) duopoly in both markets described in Section
29As demand estimation is standard in the literature once alternatives are dened as bundles, I focus on
computing counterfactuals and evaluating consumer-welfare e¤ects in the numerical examples.
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4.1.2 where two multimarket suppliers compete in both markets. I consider four pricing
mechanisms: (i) no discount, (ii) bundled discount for Supplier S1, (iii) exclusive discount
for Supplier S1, (iv) all-product exclusive discount.
4.5.1 Setting 1: Quasihomogeneous Products
In this rst setting, I assume that product characteristics are identical for all products in
markets A and B with mean price-excluded utilities vij being the same within a group.
Specically, I assume that
vij =
8>>>><>>>>:
vAB = 4 if i > 0; j > 0
vA = 2 if i > 0; j = 0
vB = 2 if i = 0; j > 0.
Marginal costs are also assumed to be the same across products as
cAi = cBj = 1 8 i; j > 0:
Thus, products are di¤erent to consumers only in terms of prices and unobserved individual
preferences over alternatives "ij , hence the name quasihomogeneous products.
Tables 14 provide the equilibrium when  = 1 and k =  = 0:6 8 k. To under-
stand the results here, we need to examine the impact of di¤erent price mechanisms at the
choice-alternative (bundle) level of competition. It is important to di¤erentiate between
within-rm alternatives, where all products in the alternative are produced by the same
supplier, from cross-rm alternatives, where product A and B are from di¤erent suppliers.
(See classication in Table 2.) A supplier enjoys the full benet of lowering prices for its
within-rm alternatives but does not for its cross-rm alternatives. In fact, as within-rm
and cross-rm alternatives compete directly against each other, the suppliers have incen-
tives to raise prices for cross-rm alternatives while lowering prices for within-rm alterna-
tives under erce competition. From the perspective of S1, within-rm alternatives include
(A1; B1) ; (A1; B0) ; (A0; B1) while cross-rm alternatives include (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1). For (i),





main model (a) with those in the monopoly structure (b) provides insight on the impact
of having monopoly power in market B. The rst two rows in Table 1 show that for any
price mechanism, removing Supplier S3 increases the prots of Supplier S1 while weakly
reducing the prots of Supplier S2. For example, when Supplier S3 is excluded from the
market (going from market structure (a) to (b)), under exclusive discount, the prots of
Supplier S1 increase from 0.60 to 0.88 while the prots of Supplier S2 decrease from 0.25 to
0.24. However, this is the case even under the no-discount case. Hence Supplier S1 benets
when having monopoly power in market B, but it is not necessarily through bundled or
exclusive discount. In fact, prices on market A and the prots of Supplier S2 are only
slightly a¤ected, indicating that most increase in prot of Supplier S1 come solely from the
lower competition in market B.
Third, all discounts are lower than the but-for prices (price under the no-discount case)
and stand-alone prices are higher than the but-for prices. For example, in the main model
for product A1, the exclusive-discount price, stand-alone price, and but-for price are, re-
spectively, 1.84, 1.97, and 2.39. Thus, the actual discounts are not as large as nominal
discounts.33 The lower discount price and higher stand-alone prices help shift demand from
cross-rm to within-rm alternatives.
Table 1: Prots and CS of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 1
Prot (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
Firm (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
S1 0.59 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.86 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.59 0.55 0.48
S2 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.59 0.55 0.48
S3 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CS 1.88 1.87 1.92 1.92 1.39 1.36 1.40 1.39 1.88 1.98 2.06
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive; (iv) All-product
33Actual discount is the di¤erence between discount price and but-for price while nominal discount is the




Table 4: Market Shares of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 1
Share (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
sA1B1 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.22 0.15
sA1B2 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.09 0.03 0.03
sA2B1 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.03
sA2B2 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.09 0.22 0.15
sA1B0 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.13
sA2B0 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.13
sA0B1 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.13
sA0B2 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.12 0.09 0.13
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive; (iv) All-product
4.5.2 Setting 2: Small-Firm Cost Advantage
In this setting, all parameters are the same as in Setting 1 except that
cA1 = cB1 = 1:5:
Thus, competitors enjoy a cost advantage over Supplier S1. Tables 58 provide the equi-
librium under this setting. Compared to Setting 1, prices of all suppliers are higher and
the prots of Supplier S1 are lower. This is understandable as the costs of Supplier S1s
products are higher. The most important qualitative di¤erence lies in consumer surplus for
the main model (a) in Table 5, which is higher under bundled discount (1.62) than under no
discount (1.61) in this setting.35 This implies that conclusions on consumer welfare depend
on market parameters. It seems that when a rm (Supplier S1) is in a disadvantageous
position (in terms of marginal cost), having the privilege of o¤ering bundled discount in-
creases its competitiveness and results in a more competitive market, which may benet
consumers. However, generally speaking, the degree of competition is di¢ cult to measure
35 In all the trials run, the di¤erences between consumer surplus in bundled discount and no discount gets
larger as I increase cA1 and cB1 .
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when di¤erent pricing mechanisms are allowed in a multimarket competition. As discussed
in Section 5.1, equilibrium prices and corresponding welfare e¤ects are a result of balancing
several di¤erence forces. Thus, it is di¢ cult to predict or fully understand the net e¤ect
(i.e., the equilibrium). In fact, in this example, qualitative results do not naturally extend
across structures either. While consumer surplus is higher in the bundled-discount case
(1.62) than in the no-discount case (1.61) under structure (a), the relation reverses under
structure (b) (1.14 versus 1.15). Which price mechanism benets the consumers is specic
to the balance of the impact of discount on within-rm and cross-rm alternatives, which
is determined by the market environment (preference and cost parameters) and the market
structure.
Table 5: Prots and CS of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 2
Prot (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
Firm (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
S1 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.59 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.37 0.33 0.28
S2 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.26 0.73 0.74 0.67
S3 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CS 1.61 1.62 1.64 1.64 1.15 1.14 1.16 1.15 1.61 1.69 1.74
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive; (iv) All-product
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Table 6: Prices for Alternatives of Structure (a) for Setting 2
(a) Main Model
Price # of products Supplier S1s View (i) (ii) (iii)
pA1B1 double within-rm 4.68 4.11 4.45
pA1B2 double cross-rm 4.42 4.58 4.66
pA2B1 double cross-rm 4.42 4.58 4.66
pA2B2 double other-rm 4.16 4.11 4.10
pA1B0 single within-rm 2.34 2.52 2.23
pA2B0 single other-rm 2.08 2.06 2.05
pA0B1 single within-rm 2.34 2.52 2.23
pA0B2 single other-rm 2.08 2.06 2.05
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive
Table 7: Equilibrium Prices of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 2
Price (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
dA1B1 N/A 4.11 N/A N/A N/A 4.63 N/A N/A N/A 3.95 N/A
dA1 N/A N/A 2.23 2.23 N/A N/A 2.37 2.33 N/A N/A 2.14
dB1 N/A N/A 2.23 2.23 N/A N/A 2.74 2.70 N/A N/A 2.14
pA1 2.34 2.52 2.61 2.61 2.34 2.61 N/A N/A 2.34 2.47 2.47
pB1 2.34 2.52 2.61 2.61 2.90 3.13 3.24 Inf 2.34 2.47 2.47
dA2B2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.47 N/A
dA2 N/A N/A N/A 2.04 N/A N/A N/A 2.01 N/A N/A 1.90
dB2 N/A N/A N/A 2.04 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.90
pA2 2.08 2.06 2.05 2.05 2.08 2.08 2.04 Inf 2.08 2.37 2.52
pB2 2.08 2.06 2.05 2.05 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.08 2.37 2.52




exclusive-discount case. Taking the main model (a) as an example, consumer surplus under
no discount, bundled discount, exclusive discount, and all-product exclusive discount is,
respectively, 2.89, 2.59, 2.65, and 2.47. In fact, Table 10 shows that prices are the lowest for
all alternatives under the no-discount case. Table 11 suggests that the exclusive-discount
price (2.83) is actually higher than the but-for price (2.77). Thus, it is possible that the
discount is only nominal. It seems that when a rm (Supplier S1) is in an advantageous
position (in terms of product quality), having the privilege of o¤ering bundled discount
strengthens its dominance and makes competitive constraints less e¤ective, which hurts
consumers.
Lastly, even for the duopoly structure (c), consumers are still better o¤ without any
discount than with the exclusive discount (2.84 versus 2.83). Thus, additional competition
pressure with more than one rm o¤ering discount does not necessarily dominate incentives
in raising prices to exploit product advantage. This observation indicates that the belief that
exclusive discount is not anticompetitive if other rms can also o¤er exclusive discount
is not always valid, especially when the accused rm already has product advantages.
Table 9: Prots and CS of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 3
Prot (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
Firm (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
S1 2.43 2.77 2.72 2.84 3.02 3.19 3.12 3.12 2.48 2.57 2.56
S2 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.30 0.18 0.15
S3 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.08 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CS 2.89 2.59 2.65 2.47 2.24 2.10 2.15 2.15 2.84 2.88 2.83
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive; (iv) All-product
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Table 10: Prices for Alternatives of Structure (a) for Setting 3
(a) Main Model
Price # of products Supplier S1s View (i) (ii) (iii)
pA1B1 double within-rm 5.54 5.70 5.66
pA1B2 double cross-rm 4.58 6.46 6.52
pA2B1 double cross-rm 4.58 6.46 6.52
pA2B2 double other-rm 3.63 3.88 3.73
pA1B0 single within-rm 2.77 4.52 2.83
pA2B0 single other-rm 1.81 1.94 1.87
pA0B1 single within-rm 2.77 4.52 2.83
pA0B2 single other-rm 1.81 1.94 1.87
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive
Table 11: Equilibrium Prices of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 3
Price (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
dA1B1 N/A 5.70 N/A N/A N/A 6.19 N/A N/A N/A 5.37 N/A
dA1 N/A N/A 2.83 2.93 N/A N/A 2.73 2.73 N/A N/A 2.74
dB1 N/A N/A 2.83 2.93 N/A N/A 3.45 3.45 N/A N/A 2.74
pA1 2.77 4.52 4.65 Inf 2.27 3.59 N/A N/A 2.79 4.13 Inf
pB1 2.77 4.52 4.65 Inf 3.86 5.19 Inf Inf 2.79 4.13 Inf
dA2B2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.74 N/A
dA2 N/A N/A N/A 1.97 N/A N/A N/A 1.96 N/A N/A 1.65
dB2 N/A N/A N/A 1.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.65
pA2 1.81 1.94 1.87 Inf 1.84 2.05 1.96 Inf 1.87 2.08 Inf
pB2 1.81 1.94 1.87 Inf N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.87 2.08 Inf
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive; (iv) All-product
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Table 12: Market Shares of Structures (a), (b), and (c) for Setting 3
Share (a) Main Model (b) Monopoly in B (c) Duopoly
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii)
sA1B1 0.58 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.58 0.75 0.72
sA1B2 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.10 0.01 0.00
sA2B1 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.00
sA2B2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.02 0.08 0.03
sA1B0 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
sA2B0 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.08
sA0B1 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
sA0B2 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.06 0.05 0.08
(i) No discount; (ii) Bundled; (iii) Exclusive; (iv) All-product
4.5.4 Comments Across Parameter Settings
Comparing equilibria under di¤erent parameter settings suggests that price and welfare
e¤ects are specic to preference and cost parameters and to market structures. Discount
prices could be higher or lower than but-for prices. Stand-alone prices may be set to innity
(pure exclusion) or not. Consumer surplus under the no-discount case, the bundled-discount
case, and the exclusive-discount case could be in any order.36 For xed percentage or
value discount, the impact on prices and consumer welfare compared to the free exclusive-
discount case is also uncertain.37 In summary, the impact of bundled or exclusive discount
on consumer welfare is theoretically ambiguous even without considering exit and entry.
The discounts also a¤ect exit and entry di¤erently in the model, as reected by di¤erent
equilibrium prots of competitors across settings, which are absent of any xed or setup
cost.
36Many additional parameter settings are evaluated, strengthening the parameter-specic conclusion.
These additional results are available upon request.
37For the chosen parameter settings, the di¤erences are generally not visible when we rounded the numbers




This paper attempts to ll the gap between economic theory and antitrust practice for
exclusive discount. It builds an empirical framework rooted in rigorous current economic
theory and targeting consumer welfare. The framework is general in the sense that it allows
heterogeneous products and bundled products. For bundled products, the idea is to treat
bundles as alternatives in a discrete-choice model for demand estimation. The di¤erence be-
tween products and alternatives complicates solving for the counterfactual equilibria. The
paper then provides formulas and numerical examples to illustrate application of the frame-
work. The numerical example suggests that the price, prot, and consumer-welfare e¤ects
of exclusive discount are case specic. Thus, instead of making rule-of-thumb judgments to
classify exclusive discount as per se legal or illegal, the empirical framework should instead
be applied in case studies. The numerical example also demonstrates that bundled and ex-
clusive discount might have di¤erent qualitative e¤ects on consumers. Thus, it is important
to classify the type of discount in practice.
The paper should be viewed as a rst step in building a rigorous empirical framework for
exclusive discount and needs to be expanded to account for more general situations. One
important extension is to allow a vertical structure with intermediate distributors. With
the vertical structure, the partial market-share or volume discount can be more appropri-
ately evaluated. Modeling market-share or volume discount on distributorsbulk purchases
also permits multiunit purchases, which is important for some cases. Another direction of
extension is to create a two-period or even dynamic version of the model to incorporate
dynamic decisions. Particularly, it would be useful to allow endogenous entry and exit in
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4.7.1.1 Alternatives and Price-Choice Variables
For the main model in Section 3, let choice alternatives be ordered as
(A1; B1) ; (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1) ; (A2; B2) ; (A1; B0) ; (A2; B0) ; (A0; B1) ; (A0; B2) ;
and order price variables as
No discount: (pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2)
Bundled discount: (dA1B1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2)
Exclusive discount: (dA1 ; dB1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2)
All-product exclusive discount: (dA1 ; dB1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; dA2 ; pA2 ; dB2 ; pB2) :
The rm-by-product ownership structure is
Ownership =
266664
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
377775 :
For the monopoly-in-one-market variation, order alternatives as
(A1; B1) ; (A2; B1) ; (A1; B0) ; (A2; B0) ; (A0; B1) ;
and order price variables as
No discount: (pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2)
Bundled discount: (dA1B1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2)
Exclusive discount: (dA1 ; dB1 ; pB1 ; pA2)
All-product exclusive discount: (dA1 ; dB1 ; pB1 ; dA2 ; pA2)
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The rm-by-product ownership structure is
Ownership =
2641 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
375 :
For the duopoly variation model, order alternatives as
(A1; B1) ; (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1) ; (A2; B2) ; (A1; B0) ; (A2; B0) ; (A0; B1) ; (A0; B2) ;
and order price variables as
No discount: (pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2)
Bundled discount: (dA1B1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; dA2B2 ; pA2 ; pB2)
Exclusive discount: (dA1 ; dB1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; dA2 ; dB2 ; pA2 ; pB2)
The rm-by-product ownership structure is
Ownership =
2641 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
375 :
For the commitment-in-discount model, order alternatives as
(A1; B1) ; (A1; B2) ; (A2; B1) ; (A2; B2) ; (A3; B1) ; (A3; B2) ;
(A1; B0) ; (A2; B0) ; (A3; B0) ; (A0; B1) ; (A0; B2) ;
and order price variables as
No discount: (pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2 ; pA3)
Exclusive discount: (dA1 ; dB1 ; pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2 ; pA3)
Percentage discount: (pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2 ; pA3)
Value discount: (pA1 ; pB1 ; pA2 ; pB2 ; pA3)
174
ZHAO: Chapter 4
The rm-by-product ownership structure is
Ownership =
266666664
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1





The FOCs for the bundle alternative model are more complicated than the single-product
alternative case for at least two reasons: First, the total price of an alternative can be
a sum of two prices set by di¤erent rms. Thus, the same alternative market share can
match di¤erent prices in di¤erent rmsFOCs. Second, one price can a¤ect more than one
alternative. For example, in computing partial derivatives of market share, sA1B1 , with
respect to pA1 using (2) for case (i), no discount, pA1 presents in three alternatives (A1; B1),
(A1; B2), and (A1; B0) ; which for (A1; B1) are, respectively, the product itself, a same-group
product, and a di¤erent-group product. Here I discuss how this a¤ects the computation.


























Suppose product r is only part of alternative m. Then the partial derivative of sn of group
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  k sn if r is part of alternative n
2nm = snsm





if r is part of alternative m 6= n and m 2 Gk
3nm = snsm if r is part of alternative m and m =2 Gk
However, as one product might be part of more than one alternative, the partial derivative is
more complicated. For example, for the structure in the main model in Section 3, the matrix















































































































































































4.7.2 Numerical Examples on Commitment in Discounts and Entry
In Section 4.2, I discussed the model of commitment in discounts. In a homogeneous-product
theoretical model, Elhauge (2009a) shows that commitment in discounts hurts consumers
as it discourages rms from competing for free buyers. In this section, I examine whether
Elhauges conclusion generalizes to my empirical framework. In addition to the market
structures considered in the numerical examples in Section 5, I examine a fourth mar-
ket structure: (d) commitment in discounts described in Section 4.2 where, under market
structure (a), Supplier S4 enters market A. Product A3 of the new entrant, Supplier S4,
is assumed to be identical to product A1 of Supplier S1. four cases are considered: (i) no
discount, (iii) (free) exclusive discount for Supplier S1, (v) xed-percentage exclusive dis-
count for Supplier S1, (vi) xed-value exclusive discount for Supplier S1. Comparing prices
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and consumer welfare under cases (iii), (v), and (vi) provides the impact of commitment in
discounts. Applying this market structure to all three numerical examples in Section 5, I
found no qualitative di¤erences in any case. Commitment in discount does not necessarily
lower consumer welfare. The results are demonstrated in Tables 1321.
Note that this market structure can also be used to study the impact of entry when
compared to market structure (a). In Setting 2, the entrant (Supplier S4) also enjoys a cost
advantage over Supplier S1. However, the patterns of consumer surplus are not di¤erent
from those of Setting 1 (compare the last row of Table 13 and Table 16). Thus, even a 33%
((1:5  1)=1:5) cost advantage favoring the entrant might not be crucial at all; the prot of
Supplier S4 is still lower under exclusive discount than under no discount (0.21 versus 0.23).
Exclusive discount might lead to foreclosure even when the entrant has a cost advantage.
(In this case, for example, if the xed cost for the entrant Supplier S4 is 0.22.)
Table 13: Prots and CS of Structure (d) for Setting 1
Prot (d) S4 Enter
Firm (i) (iii) (v) (vi)
S1 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
S2 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17
S3 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26
S4 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17
CS 2.13 2.16 2.16 2.16
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Table 14: Equilibrium Prices of Structure (d) for Setting 1
Price (d) S4 Enter
(i) (iii) (v) (vi)
dA1 N/A 1.71 1.72
38 1.71
dB1 N/A 1.80 1.76 1.76
pA1 1.83 2.23 2.23 2.26
pB1 1.97 2.23 2.29 2.32
dA2 1.83 1.80 1.80 1.80
dB2 1.97 1.93 1.93 1.93
dA3 1.83 1.80 1.80 1.80
Table 15: Market Shares of Structure (d) for Setting 1
Share (d) S4 Enter
(i) (iii) (v) (vi)
sA1B1 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12
sA1B2 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
sA2B1 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
sA2B2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
sA3B1 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04
sA3B2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
sA1B0 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
sA2B0 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
sA3B0 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
sA0B1 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
sA0B2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
38The discounted prices for cases (v) and (vi) are calculated using equilibrium prices and discount rate 
(or d) calculated from case (iii) in structure (a). They are not choice variables in cases (v) and (vi).
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Table 16: Prots and CS of Structure (d) for Setting 2
Prot (d) S4 Enter
Firm (i) (iii) (v) (vi)
S1 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
S2 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21
S3 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35
S4 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21
CS 1.90 1.92 1.92 1.92
Table 17: Equilibrium Prices of Structure (d) for Setting 2
Price (d) S4 Enter
(i) (iii) (v) (vi)
dA1 N/A 2.12 2.12 2.12
dB1 N/A 2.21 2.17 2.17
pA1 2.23 2.48 2.49 2.50
pB1 2.34 2.48 2.54 2.55
dA2 1.87 1.86 1.86 1.86
dB2 2.08 2.06 2.06 2.06
dA3 1.87 1.86 1.86 1.86
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Table 18: Market Shares of Structure (d) for Setting 2
Share (d) S4 Enter
(i) (iii) (v) (vi)
sA1B1 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
sA1B2 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
sA2B1 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
sA2B2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
sA3B1 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
sA3B2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
sA1B0 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
sA2B0 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
sA3B0 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
sA0B1 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
sA0B2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Table 19: Prots and CS of Structure (d) for Setting 3
Prot (d) S4 Enter
Firm (i) (iii) (v) (vi)
S1 2.21 2.49 2.49 2.49
S2 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06
S3 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.08
S4 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06
CS 3.14 2.94 2.94 2.93
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Table 20: Equilibrium Prices of Structure (d) for Setting 3
Price (d) S4 Enter
(i) (iii) (v) (vi)
dA1 N/A 2.64 2.67 2.67
dB1 N/A 2.75 2.71 2.72
pA1 2.50 4.38 4.39 4.49
pB1 2.83 4.38 4.46 4.54
dA2 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72
dB2 1.80 1.81 1.81 1.81
dA3 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72
Table 21: Market Shares of Structure (d) for Setting 3
Share (d) S4 Enter
(i) (iii) (v) (vi)
sA1B1 0.53 0.70 0.70 0.70
sA1B2 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01
sA2B1 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
sA2B2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
sA3B1 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
sA3B2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
sA1B0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
sA2B0 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
sA3B0 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
sA0B1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
sA0B2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
4.7.3 Random-Coe¢ cient Model
In this section, I provide an example to show how the framework works when the demand
side is a random-coe¢ cient model instead of a nested logit model. Suppose the coe¢ cients
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on observed product characteristics are random:









+ ab    (pa + pb) + "abi
= vab    (pa + pb) +XaA!Ai +XbB!Bi + "abi
= ab +XaA!Ai +XbB!Bi + "abi;
where (!Ai; !Bi) are vectors or variables following an i.i.d. standard normal distribution.39
"abi follows an i.i.d. Type 1 extreme-value distribution. If an alternative involves not buying
in Market A (or B), the corresponding characteristics Xa (or Xb) are set to zero.






d (!Ai) d (!Bi)
=
Z
sabid (!Ai) d (!Bi) ;
where sabi is the choice probability of consumer i choosing alternative (a; b).
In the numerical examples, I use Monte Carlo integration. Specically, draw R pairs of
(!rAi; !
r
















Suppose product r is only part of alternative m, then the partial derivative of sn with








sni (1  sni) d (!Ai) d (!Bi) if m = n
2nm =
R
snismid (!Ai) d (!Bi) if m 6= n.
However, as any one product might be part of more than one alternative, the partial deriva-
tive is more complicated. For example, for the structure in the main model in Section 3, the


















































































































































































In the numerical example, as for the nested logit model, I assume that product character-
istics are identical for all products in markets A and B with mean price-excluded utilities,
vij , being the same within a group. Specically, I assume that
vij =
8>>>><>>>>:
vAB = 4 if i > 0; j > 0
vA = 2 if i > 0; j = 0
vB = 2 if i = 0; j > 0.
In addition, assume that there is only one random coe¢ cient for characteristics of product
A or B so that !Ai and !Bi are scalar variables. Assume that demand estimation gives
XaA = 1; XbB = 1 8 (a; b) 2 AB
Similar to Setting 1 in Section 5, the assumptions maintain as much homogeneity across
products as possible. However, the equilibrium results are not directly comparable as the
demand parameters are not necessarily based on the same data set. The numerical results
for the main model (a) presented in Tables 2225 below only serve as a particular example
by having a random coe¢ cient model on the demand side with  = 1, R = 10000, and
cAi = cBj = 1 8 i; j > 0:
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Similar observations can be drawn as for the main model of Setting 1 in Section 5.
Table 22: Prots and CS of Structure (a) for Setting 1
Prot (a) Main Model
Firm (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
S1 0.59 0.64 0.60 0.60
S2 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.25
S3 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.25
CS 1.88 1.87 1.92 1.92
Table 23: Prices for Alternatives of Structure (a) for Setting 1
(a) Main Model
Price # of products Supplier S1s View (i) (ii) (iii)
pA1B1 double within-rm 4.91 3.99 4.62
pA1B2 double cross-rm 4.91 5.32 5.34
pA2B1 double cross-rm 4.91 5.32 5.35
pA2B2 double other-rm 4.91 4.84 4.82
pA1B0 single within-rm 2.46 2.90 2.31
pA2B0 single other-rm 2.46 2.42 2.41
pA0B1 single within-rm 2.46 2.90 2.31
pA0B2 single other-rm 2.46 2.42 2.41
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Table 24: Equilibrium Prices of Structure (a) for Setting 1
(a) Main Model
Price (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dA1B1 N/A 3.99 N/A N/A
dA1 N/A N/A 2.31 2.31
dB1 N/A N/A 2.31 2.31
pA1 2.46 2.90 2.94 2.94
pB1 2.46 2.90 2.94 2.94
dA2B2 N/A N/A N/A N/A
dA2 N/A N/A N/A 2.42
dB2 N/A N/A N/A 2.42
pA2 2.46 2.42 2.41 2.41
pB2 2.46 2.42 2.41 2.41
Table 25: Market Shares of Structure (a) for Setting 1
(a) Main Model
Share (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
sA1B1 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.10
sA1B2 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05
sA2B1 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05
sA2B2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
sA1B0 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.14
sA2B0 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
sA0B1 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.14
sA0B2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
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